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・Idiris DANISMAZ (Kyoto University)

  " Ethical and Practical Perspective in Ismāʿīl Ḥaqqī Bursawī's (d.1725) Sufi Exegesis *Rūḥ al-Bayān*"

・MARUYAMA Daisuke (Kyoto University)

  "What Is *Walī* ? : In the Tradition of Islamic Theology"

・KINOSHITA Hiroko (Kyoto University)

  "Transformation of the Islamic Network between Middle East and Malay-Indonesian World:

  Historicial Observation"

Ethical and Practical Perspective in Ismāʿīl Ḥaqqī Bursawī's (d.1725) Sufi Exegesis *Rūḥ al-Bayān.*

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Abstract

Studies on Sufi exegesis (Sufi tafsir) have been more active recently. Early accounts of Western scholars like Goldziher (d.1921) who has regarded Sufi tafsir as the reading of one's own imagination into a text [Goldziher 1920] have no more attention in the academic world. The main stream which has lasted until now is based on accepting Sufi tafsir a kind of exegesis that is originating from the Qurʾān. Despite studies that were conducted by successors of this line such as Massignon [1968], Ateş [1969], Böwering [1980], Çelik [2002], Okuyan [2002], Sands [2006], Keeler [2006] with others give us enough ideas about the origins of Sufi terminologies, there is still a bit of an academic void in studies about the intellectual basis of Sufi tafsir.

Meanwhile, in Muslim scholarship, the former account about Sufi tafsir that was a strict Sufi component replaced with a moderate one that is based on a two-fold division of Sufi tafsir. According to that classification, there are two types of Sufi tafsir. The first is al-tafsīr al-ishārī (indicative tafsīr) which is accepted with some conditions. And the second is al-tafsīr al-naẓarī (theorical tafsir) which is excluded completely. According to al-Dhahabi (d.1977), al-tafsīr al-naẓarī should not be accepted as it consists of some preconceived theories that have non-Islamic origins like waḥda al-wujūd (oneness of being) and uses tafsir just as a tool to innovate such theories through interpretation of the Qurʾānic verses [al-Dhahabi II, 340-50].

In short, the present situation of Sufi tafsīr is that, Sufi tafsīr is recognized by western scholars a type of tafsir that is originating from the Qurʾān and partially accepted by Muslim scholars. But, what some Muslim scholars don't accept yet and western scholars have not studied yet is so called al-tafsīr al-naẓarī and its relationship with mystical cosmology. That is also the problem of this presentation. Is al-tafsīr al-naẓarī just a tool for induction of non-Islamic ideas into Islam through tafsīr? If it is not so what kind of other explanation could be possible?

In this presentation, because of the time limit only a case of a Sufi interpreter (mufassir) whose name is Ismāʿīl Ḥaqqī Bursawī, from the 18th century of the Ottoman Empire will be dealt with. Therefore, the topic of this presentation can be summarized in following 2 points. Firstly, Sufi tafsīr in Bursawī's *Rūḥ al-Bayān*. Secondly, the relationship between Bursawī's Sufi tafsīr and his mystical view. In relation to that, this presentation is going to try to answer the following questions: Firstly, what are the premises or sources of Bursawi's tafsīr? Secondly, how does he apply these

premises to the Qurʾānic verses? Or, how does he gain practical advices from Sufi tafsīr?

In order to achieve the above purposes I am going to focus on Bursawī's tafsīr in the 18.th chapter (sūra al-kahf). More precisely, four examples of Bursawī's tafsīr that are considered as typical tafsīr of the author from three stories (the story of the companions of the cave, the story of the Prophets Mūsā and Khiḍr, and the story of Dhu al-Qarnain) will be picked up. As for the methodology, related parts of Bursawī's tafsīr will be examined philologically in order to extract his mystical view and way of practical advices from tafsīr which are based on his mystical view.

As a result of considerations concerning four examples, the following points will be argued. In Bursawī's exegesis, an interesting type of tafsīr that can be described as "ethical and practical perspective" is found. It has two features.

Firstly, it is based on Sufi cosmology. For instance, as for the dog of the companions of the cave (Q18:18), unlike the other mufassirs who claimed uncleanliness of the dog, Bursawī emphasized the ontological cleanliness of the dog. In the background of making such tafsīr following premise of Sufi cosmology can be seen: "There is no essential evil in the universe Because the universe is manifestations of God's attributes (sifat) and God has no bad attribute". Also, tafsīr of "damage to ship" (Q18:79) in the story of the Prophet Mūsā and Khiḍr can be included in this type. Besides this, tafsīr of "far west" (Q18:86) as "corporeal world" and "far east" (Q18:90) as "spiritual world" in the story of Dhu al-Qarnain shows how mystical cosmology is applied in tafsīr.

Secondly, Bursawī tries to derive practical benefits that can be applied into the real life from his tafsīr that is based on his mystical view. For example, in addition to the ethical interpretation of "the dog" as "a clean existent" he praises some features of the dog like being "hungry" (jūʻ) as good character that should be acquired. Beside this, from Dhu al-Qarnain's choice "far west" firstly "far east" secondly as order of destinations in his travel, Bursawī recommends to start with training of body then that of the soul in mystical training. Moreover, from consistent of "good and evil" in damage of Khiḍr to the ship he extracts some manners that can be applied in human-relationships. Bursawī claims that a harmful fact which is stated by an honest man is for your benefit even if it harms you.

Lastly, as it was seen from Bursawī's tafsīr, categorization of a Sufi tafsīr with mystical view-based as al-tafsīr al-naẓarī somehow is not proper at least to Bursawī's case. Because Bursawī's tafsīr seems to have aim of getting some general manners that can be applied rather than being only a theorical interpretation or a vehicle for the carrying of non-Islamic ideas to Islam. Therefore, as name of such kind of tafsīr we should describe "ethical and practical perspective" instead of al- tafsīr al-naẓarī.

Resume

1. Introduction:

1. <u>Western Scholarship</u>: Sufi Tafsīr → the reading one's own imagination into a text [Goldziher 1920] → a way of interpretation and Sufi vocabulary originating from the Qur'ān [Massignon 1968, Ateş 1969, Böwering 1980, Çelik 2002, Okuyan 2002, Sands 2006, Keeler 2006, etc.].

2. <u>Muslim Scholarship</u>: two-fold classification of Sufi Tafsīr: 1) al-Tafsīr al-Ishārī (Indicative Tafsīr) → conditionally accepted. 2) al-Tafsīr al-Naẓarī (Theorical Tafsīr) → excluded completely (as it is a tool for innovation of non-Islamic thoughts into Tafsīr).

3. <u>Problems of Sufi Tafsīr</u>: 1) Academic void in study on intellectual base of Sufi tafsīr (intellectual origin of interpretations).

4. Theme: 1) Mystical interpretation of the Qur'ān in Ismā'īl Ḥaqqī Bursawī's *Rūḥ al Bayān (the Spirit of the Qur'ān)*. 2) Relation between Bursawī's interpretations and his mystic view.

5. Purpose: 1) What are premises or sources of Bursawī's mystical interpretation? 2) How does he apply these premises to the Qur'ānic verses? How does he gain practical advises to the people from interpretation?

2. Ismā'īl Ḥaqqī Bursawī

1. Life: born in Aidos (located in recent Bulgaria) in 1652, becomes a sheikh of Jalwatī order in 1690. Spent most of his life and died in Bursa in 1725.

2. Works: More than 100 writings about Islamic Sciences in Turkish, Arabic and Persian. His masterpiece is ***Rūh al Bayān***:

3. Ethical and Practical Perspective in ***Rūh al Bayān***

Example1: the dog of Aṣḥab al-Kahf (Companions of the the Cave)
"And their dog was laying its paws at the entrance." (Q18:18)

Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr, (d. 1301)	al-Fakhr al-Rāzī (d. 1209)	Bursawī
Place where the dog was laying: outside of the cave, because it is unclean	Badness of sitting style of the dog: Beware of sitting like dog	Pure existence that is regarded "good/clean"[1]
Canonical aspect	Canonical aspect	Ontological aspect

[1] He adds positive comments for dog such as: dog is one of those animals that will enter paradise. A good dog in your house better than a betrayer neighbor〔Bursawī n.d. 226-27〕.

Two Features:

"Because everything is originating from God's attributes (ṣifāt) and God has not "bad attribute, In the existence there is no essential bad". **(Ethical Perspective)**

"The dog has ten characters that Muslim should have as well. The dog is always hungry. Hungry (jūʿ) is necessary also for everybody. The dog doesn't have any place where can settle down. Being homeless is one of the features of those people who leaves everything to Allah (mutawakkil)…
［Bursawī n.d. 226-27］"". **(Practical Perspective)**

Bursawī's tafsīr is two-fold: 1. interprets the dog ethically. 2. Gets practical manners from good aspect of the dog. ="**ethical and practical perspective**".

Example2: Khiḍr's interesting behaviors and relativity of good/bad

"As for the ship, it belonged to poor fishermen, and I wanted to render it defective. There was a king coming after them, who was confiscating every ship, forcibly: (Q18:79).

Khiḍr's behavior	Criticism of an honest man	Acclaim of a dishonest man
↓	↓	↓
Damages to ship (bad)	harms you (bad)	Sounds good (good)
Protects from capture (good)	For your benefit (good)	Causes you a loss (bad)

Relativity of bad/good   →   Relativity of bad/good in human relations
(**Ethical perspective**)   (**Practical perspective**)

Example3: Directions of Dhu al-Qarnain's travel (west firstly, east secondly)
"When he reached the far west…" (Q18: 86), "When he reached the far east…" (Q18: 90).

expressions	Bursawī's tafsīr (based on mystical cosmology)
far west	corporeal world (al-ʿālam al-jismānī)
far east	spiritual world (al-ālam al-rūḥi)

If the training of the corporeal world doesn't end level of the spiritual world can not be reached (**ethical and practical perspective**)

4. Conclusion:

In Bursawī's exegesis, an interesting type of tafsīr that can be described as "ethical and practical perspective" is found. It has two features.

Firstly, it is based on Sufi cosmology. For instance, as for the dog of the companions of the cave (Q18:18), unlike the other mufassirs who claimed uncleanliness of the dog, Bursawī emphasized the ontological cleanliness of the dog. In the background of making such tafsīr following premise of Sufi cosmology can be seen: "There is no essential evil in the universe. Because the universe is manifestations of God's attributes (ṣifāt) and God has no bad attribute". Also, tafsīr of "damage to ship" (Q18:79) in the story of the Prophet Mūsā and Khiḍr can be included in this type. Besides this, tafsīr of "far west" (Q18:86) as "corporeal world" and "far east" (Q18:90) as "spiritual world" in the story of Dhu al-Qarnain shows how mystical cosmology is applied in tafsīr.

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What Is *Walī* ?: In the Tradition of Islamic Theology

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0. Abstract

According to preceding philological studies of the theory on *walī*, many scholars have thought that Sufism enjoyed the exclusive position in theorizing *walī*. As against that, this paper focuses on Sunnite theology and aims to clarify what *walī* means in the tradition of Sunnite theology.

1. Introduction

Saint veneration can be widely observed in the contemporary Islamic world. We find people who visit a saint's tomb (*ziyāra*) in order to invoke the saint's blessing (*baraka*), and gather at the tomb to celebrate the saint's festival (*mawlid*). In order to research saint veneration and the related practices, it is important to understand the religious life of Muslims. However, a certain problem exists, namely, the definition of a saint in Islam.

Saint is one of the problematic terms in Islamic studies. A saint can usually be described as a person believed to have an ideal personality. Further, he is believed to be able to bestow favors on people by means of special powers from *Allāh*.

However, when we discuss Islamic saints, we must focus on two problems. First, the term "saint" is not a substantial concept but an analytical one. This is because there is no correspondence between this term and any particular term or word in Islamic world. The term *walī*[1] [*Allāh*] (friend [of God]) is most commonly translated as saint; however, there are other related words, such as *shaykh* (master), *ṣalīḥ* (pious man), *sharīf* (descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad), *sayyid* (descendant of Muḥammad), *pīr* (master, particularly used in South Asia), and *ishān* (His Eminence, particularly used in Central Asia). Second, as many researchers have mentioned, the term "saint" is

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[1] The term *walī* has many meanings. In Arabic, the original meaning of *walī* is someone who is close to somebody. Hence, it means friend, helper, attendant, patron, protector, and so on. In *al-Qur'ān*, we can find the word *walī* (pl. *awliyā'*) 85 times. However, the meaning of the term differs according to the context. Therefore, we must remember that *walī* does not always mean a saint. Sometimes, it may mean relatives of God or Muḥammad. It is also used to mean friends of God (*awliyā' Allah*) and friends of Satan (*awliyā' Shayṭān*).

borrowed from Christianity[2]. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the Islamic concept of a saint effectively.

As the first step toward understanding the notion of a saint in Islam, in this paper, I focus on the concept of *walī*, which can be most suitably translated as saint.

According to preceding philological studies on the theory on *walī*, many scholars have believed that Sufism enjoyed an exclusive position in theorizing *walī*[3]. In Sufism, *walī* is defined as the elect or elite who has experienced *fanā'* (mystical annihilation) among sufis[4]. Further, many Sufis have discussed the concept of *walī* for a long time. We can classify the arguments in this discussion in Sufism into four topics. The first is *karāma* (a miracle of a saint, pl. *karāmāt*)[5]. A *walī* is believed to accomplish *karāma* by the grace of God. Sufis have discussed the difference between *karāmāt* and *mu'jiza* (a miracle of a prophet, pl. *mu'jizāt*). The second topic is the relationship between *walī* and *nabī* (prophet)[6]. The third topic is the relationship between *walī* and *sharī'a*[7], and the fourth is the hierarchy of *walī*[8].

It is certain that Sufism has developed the original concept of *walī* over a long period of time. However, this is a one-sided view of *walī*; therefore, we cannot understand the theory on *walī* completely. Furthermore, understandings of *walī* based on frameworks differing from that of Sufism would also exist[9].

Here, I would like to suggest that we should adopt two approaches for understanding *Allāh*: *Bāṭin* (esoteric) and *Ẓāhir* (exoteric). *Bāṭin* approach implies understanding the esoteric and mystical knowledge about *Allāh*. Sufism is a typical example of the *Bāṭin* approach, and as I have already mentioned, the understanding of *walī* from this viewpoint has been the ordinary approach for

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[2] See D. F. Eickelman, *The Middle East: An anthropological Approach*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 269–270 (First Edition published in 1981); C. W. Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism*, Boston: Shambhala, 1997, pp. 58–59; Y. Tonaga, "Sufi Saints and Non-Sufi Saints in Early Islamic History," *The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies*, 22, 2004, p. 1.

[3] See R. A. Nicolson, *The Mystics of Islam*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975 (First published: London: George Bell & Sons Ltd., 1914); A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975; C. W. Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism*, Boston: Shambhala, 1997.

[4] R. A. Nicolson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 122; Y. Tonaga, "Sufi Saints and Non-Sufi Saints in Early Islamic History," p. 3.

[5] See A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975, pp. 206–213; R. A. Nicolson, *The Mystics of Islam*, pp. 129–147.

[6] See M. I. el-Geyoushi, "al-Tilmidhi's Theory of Saint and Sainthood," *Islamic Quarterly*, 15, 1971, pp. 17–61.

[7] See R. A. Nicolson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 127.

[8] See A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, pp. 200–203; R. A. Nicolson, *The Mystics of Islam*, pp. 123–124; C. W. Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism*, pp. 60–61; Syed Ali Bin Uthman al-Hujweri, *The Kashful Mahjub: Unveiling the Veiled*, M. W. B. Rabbani tr., Kuala Lumpur: A. S. Noordeen, 2000, p. 223 (First published in 1997).

[9] Y. Tonaga, "Polytheistic Islam," *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture*, 86, 2004, p. 9.

comprehending the theory on *walī*. On the other hand, the *Ẓāhir* approach implies understanding knowledge related to *Allāh* through theology, and explaining authentic belief in and the practice of Islam.

My paper will concentrate on the theory on *walī* using the latter approach, that is, the theory on *walī* in Islamic (Sunnite) theology. I adopted four theological positions, namely, the *Ash'arī* school, the *Māturīdī* school, the *Hanbalī* school, and *al-Wahhābīya*. Further, I attempt to clarify the concept of *walī*.

I will begin by explaining the theory of the *Ash'arī* school in the next section, the theory of the *Māturīdī* school in section 3, and the theory of the *Hanbalī* school and *al-Wahhābīya* in section 4[10]. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the concept of *walī* in Sunnite theology.

2. The Theory on *Walī* in the *Ash'arī* School

In this section, I will discuss the theory on *walī* in the *Ash'arī* school. I examined the masterpieces of the following eight theologians: Ibn Fūrak (d. 1015), al-Baghdādī (d.1037), Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazāli (d. 1111), al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153), Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1209/1210), al-Ījī (d. 1356), and al-Jurjānī (d. 1413).

I will focus on the following three aspects: (a) a discussion on *walī*, (b) the explanation of *karāma*, and (c) the context of the discussion. I will first discuss the third point. *Ash'arī* theologians have discussed *walī* in the context of the discussion on *nabī*. In this context, they have compared the concept of *nabī* with that of *walī*. Further, they have always concluded that a *nabī* is superior to a *walī*. For instance, al-Baghdādī stated that "our companions and many people in the community (*'umma*) agreed that every *nabī* is superior to every *walī* who is not a *nabī* (*kull nabī afḍal min kull walī laysa bi nabī*)[11]."

There is also a similar problem with regard to the definition of *karāma*. All the above theologians regarded *karāma* as an authentic concept, and stated that *karāma* is destruction of the customs (*khāriq al-'ādāt*, pl. *khawāriq al-'ādāt*) that appears through the *walī*. As far as *khawāriq*

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[10] I do not adopt a positive attitude in that I discuss both the *Hanbalī* school and *al-Wahhābīya* in the same section. Since I only discuss one theologian from *al-Wahhābīya*: Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, I can not discuss *al-Wahhābīya*'s theory in one section. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, I discussed his work in the same section as the *Hanbalī* school, which is believed to have influenced him.

[11] al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Istānbūl: Maṭba'a al-Dawla, 1968, p. 298.

al-ʿādāt are concerned, *muʿjizāt* and *karāmāt* are the same[12]. However, if both these terms are identical, it is not possible to clearly distinguish between *muʿjizāt* and *karāmāt*. In addition, this would lead to confusion between the terms *nabī* and *walī*. If this is the case, a *nabī* cannot be claimed to be superior to a *walī*. In fact, *al-Qadarīya* and the *Muʿtazila* school denied the concept of *karāma* based on this point of view[13].

In order to solve this problematic issue, theologians have attempted to distinguish the characteristics of the two terms. According to them, *karāma* lacks two aspects that *muʿjiza* possesses: a challenge to opponents and the claim of *nubūwa* (prophethood). al-Ījī states that "They [*muʿjiza* and *karāma*] are distinguished by [the existence of] the challenge to *nubūwa* and the lack of it (*bi taḥaddī maʿa iddaʿāʾ al-nubūwa wa ʿadam-h*)[14]."

Opponents would appear before a *nabī* and attempt to perform a similar action as the *muʿjiza*. Furthermore, they would state that they are *anbiyāʾ*. Confronted with these opponents, a *nabī* must make his opponents' actions and claims powerless, and prove that he is a *nabī* and that his mission is true. In order to reveal these aspects, a *muʿjiza* appears after the claim made by the *nabī* against his opponents.

On the contrary, a *walī* does not need to contest his opponents' acts, and prove that he is a *nabī*. This is because they do not have the same mission as a *nabī*. In comparison with *nabī* and *muʿjiza*, a *walī* and *karāma* are always explained by the logic of lack.

Lastly, I will discuss what the term *walī* means. All theologians have assumed the existence of the concept of *walī*; therefore, almost all of them have not provided a clear definition of the term *walī*. However, in this section in particular, I focus on the explanations provided by al-Shahrastānī and al-Jurjānī. According to the former, a *walī* is one who proves the sincerity of a *nabī*. He states that "If the *walī* follows, in his *muʿāmalāt*, the *nabī* and all things that appear with respect to him [*nabī*], he [*walī*] is the evidence of the sincerity of his teacher (*ustādh*) and the owner of the law (*ṣāḥib al-sharīʿa*) [that is, *nabī*][15]."

As the latter has mentioned, a *walī* is also one who knows *Allāh* and His attributes (*al-ʿārif bi*

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[12] E.g., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, p. 170.

[13] For example, al-Baghdādī criticized the *Qadarīya*. Further, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Ījī pointed out the falsity of the *al-Muʿtazila* school. See al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, p. 175; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Arbaīn fī Usūl al-Dīn*, al-Qāhira: Maktaba al-Kullīyāt al-Azharīya, 1986, p. 199; al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*, Bayrūt: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1983, p. 370.

[14] al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*, p. 370.

[15] al-Shahrastānī, *Kitāb Nihāya al-Iqdām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*, n.p.: Maktaba al-Thaqāfa al-Dīnīya, n.d., p. 497.

Allāh ta'ālā wa ṣifāt-h) in so far as it is possible for him [the *walī*] to devote himself [to *Allāh*] (*al-muwāẓib 'alā al-ṭā'āt*), to avoid disobedience (*al-mujtanib 'an al-ma'āṣī*), and to abstain from becoming engrossed in his ego and his desires (*al-mu'riḍ 'an al-inhimāk fī al-dhāt wa al-shahawāt*)[16]. For this, he is granted *karāma*.

A summary of the discussion on the concept of *walī* in the *Ash'arī* school is as follows. A *walī* faithfully follows *Allāh* and the *nabī*, and he always obeys *al-sharī'a*, without succumbing to his ego and his desires. Consequently, he is bestowed with *karāma* by the grace of *Allāh*. Moreover, according to many theologians, *khawāriq al-'ādāt* reveal the sincerity of the person who is granted these blessings[17].Therefore, the appearance of *karāma* reveals the credibility of a *walī*.

Once it has been proved that the *walī* is trustworthy, the *nabī* and all the things related to him are simultaneously confirmed. In other words, the *walī* is not only a person who obeys *Allāh* and the *nabī*, but also one who provides conclusive evidence for the *nabī* and his law.

3. The Theory on *Walī* in the *Māturīdī* school

In this section, I will discuss the theory on *walī* in the *Māturidī* school. I attempt to develop this theory based on the masterpieces of the following seven theologians: al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 933), Abū Mu'īn al-Nasafī (d. 1114), Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Nasafī (d. 1142), al-Ghaznawī (d. 1197), al-Taftāzānī (d. 1389/90), Mullā 'Alī al-Qārī (d. 1606), and al-Bayāḍī (d. 1687).

Here, I will also explain the theory on *walī* from the abovementioned three points of view. First, I consider the two types of definitions of *walī*. The first is the broader definition provided by al-Ṭahāwī and al-Ghaznawī: All the believers (al-*mu'minīn kull-hum*) are *awliyā'* of the Merciful (al-Raḥmān) [i.e., *Allāh*][18]. The second is the narrower definition provided by al-Taftāzānī: a *walī* is one who knows *Allāh* and His attributes (*al-'ārif bi Allāh ta'ālā wa ṣifāt-h*) in so far as it is possible for him [the *walī*] to devote himself [to *Allāh*] (*al-muwāẓib 'alā al-ṭā'āt*), to avoid disobedience (*al-mujtanib 'an al-ma'āṣī*), and to abstain from becoming engrossed in his ego and his desires (*al-mu'riḍ 'an al-inhimāk fī al-dhāt wa al-shahawāt*)[19]. Furthermore, al-Bayāḍī[20] and Mullā 'Alī

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[16] al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-Ta'rīfāt ma'a Fihrist*, Bayrūt: Maktaba al-Lubnān, 1990, p. 275.

[17] E.g., al-Shahrastānī, *Kitāb Nihāya al-Iqdām*, p. 498.

[18] al-Ṭaḥāwī, *al-'Aqīda al-Ṭaḥāwīya*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmīya, 1993, p. 20; al-Ghaznawī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmīya, 1998, p. 306.

[19] al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafīya*, al-Qāhira: Maktaba al-Kullīyāt al-Azharīya, 1987, p. 92.

[20] al-Bayāḍī, *Ishārāt al-Marām min 'Ibārāt al-Imām*, Miṣr: Sharika maktaba Matba'a Muṣṭafā, 1949, p. 338.

al-Qārī[21] provided similar definitions.

There seems to be huge gap between these two definitions; however, they share a common point: devotion to *Allāh*. As al-Ṭahāwī has mentioned, *īmān* implies belief in *Allāh*, His angels (*malā'ika*), His books (*kutub*), His messengers (*rusul*), the Last Day (*yawm al-qiyāma*), and the decree (*al-qadar*)[22]. Further, *mu'min* is a man who possesses *īmān*. Therefore, in the case of the former definition, we can state that a *walī* devotes himself to *Allāh* and all things related to Him. In the latter definition, it is obvious that the *walī* is devoted to *Allāh*. Therefore, devotion to *Allāh* can be considered as one of the fundamental elements of the concept of *walī*.

There is another important aspect to the concept of *walī*, namely, the proof of the *nabī*. Abū Mu'īn al-Nasafī stated the following: "That he is a *walī* is a proof (*dalīl*) of [the fact] that he is right in his [*rasūl*'s] creed, and [the fact] that he is right in his creed is…a proof of rightness (*ṣiḥḥā*) of his *risāla* (messengerhood); His [*walī*'s] benefits are…the confirmation of his *risāla*[23]." Moreover, Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī stated that "He could never be a *walī* unless he is right (*muḥiqq*) in his [*rasūl*'s] religion[24]." In other words, a *walī* plays an important role in confirming *risāla* or *nubūwa*; he also provides the evidence of the *nabī*. To sum up, a *walī* possesses two fundamental attributes: devotion to *Allāh* and proof of the *nabī*.

Second, I will focus on the explanation of *karāma*. In this context, the relationship between the concepts of *walī* and *nabī* is also very important. The *Mu'tazila* school denied *karāmāt* because they thought that approving *karāmāt* complicated the differentiation between the terms *nabī* and *walī*[25]. However, according to the *Māturīdī* school, this attitude is misleading. *Karāma* does not lead to confusion with *mu'jiza*, and does not lead to *walī* into being mistaken for *nabī*; rather, it can be distinguished from *mu'jiza* by the lack of two elements: the challenge to opponents and the claim of *nubūwa*[26]. Moreover, *karāma* becomes a sign (*'alāma*) for confirming the sincerity of the *nabī*[27], as Mullā 'Alī al-Qārī mentioned.

Finally, I would like to consider the context of the concept of *walī*. In the *Māturīdī* school, as

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[21] See Mullā 'Alī al-Qālī, *al-Sharḥ 'alā al-Fiqh al-Akbar li Abī Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān ibn Thābit al-Kūfī*, Sharika Maktaba wa Maṭba'a Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa Awlādi-hi, 1955. p. 79.

[22] al-Ṭahāwī, *al-'Aqīda al-Ṭahāwīya*, p. 20.

[23] Abū l-Mu'īn Maymūn b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-Adilla*, 1, Damas: Editions d' Amérique et d' Orient, 1990, p. 538.

[24] Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī, *al-'Aqīda al-Nasafīya*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmīya, 1993, p. 27.

[25] See Abū l-Mu'īn al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-Adilla*, p. 536; al-Bayāḍī, *Ishārāt al-Marām min 'Ibārāt al-Imām*, p. 338.

[26] E. g., al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafīya*, p. 92; al-Bayāḍī, *Ishārāt al-Marām min 'Ibārāt al-Imām*, p. 338.

[27] Mullā 'Alī al-Qālī, *al-Sharḥ 'alā al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, p. 79.

well as the *Ash'arī* school, *walī* is discussed in the context of the discussion on the concept of *nabī*. In this context, theologians attempted to reveal that a *walī* is inferior to a *nabī*. For example, Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī stated that a *walī* never achieves the rank of *anbiyā'* (*lā yablughu daraja al-anbiyā'*)[28]. Moreover, according to al-Ghaznawī, a *walī* is not superior to a *nabī*; however, one *nabī* is superior to the assembly (*jamī'*) of the *awliyā'*[29]. After expressing a similar opinion, al-Bayādī also compared *nubūwa* with *walāya* and stated the following: "*walāya*…is not superior (*afḍal*) to *al-nubūwa*[30]." In short, there is no doubt that a *nabi* is superior to a *walī*, and his attributes in themselves also exceed those of a *walī*.

4. The Theory on *Walī* in the *Hanbalī* school and *al-Wahhābīya*

In the preceding studies, it is stated that the *Hanbalī* school and *al-Wahhābīya* have criticized saint veneration as one of the deviations from Islam. Ibn Taymīya is, for instance, regarded as one of the most prominent critics of sainthood[31], and many researchers have always emphasized the fact that he criticized saint veneration[32]. *al-Wahhābīya* is also known to be critical of saint veneration[33].

In this section, I will deal with the theory on *walī* by the schools that are usually regarded to be severely critical of saint veneration. I considered three scholars: Ibn Taymīya (d. 1326) and Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Saffarīnī (d. 1774), who are scholars of the *Hanbalī* school, and Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1791).

At a glance, we can easily point out that these scholars have not discussed a *walī* and his *karāma* as a deviation from Islam; rather, both are considered part of an authentic belief in Islam or the framework of Islam.

I will start by mentioning the discussion on *walī* by Ibn Taymīya. He based his definition of *walī* on *al-Qur'ān*. First, he defined *awliyā'* as those who believe in [*Allāh*] and fear [*Allāh*] (*al-mu'minūn wa al-muttaqūn*)[34], by quoting verse 62 of the *Sura Yunus* from *al-Qur'ān*. He then

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[28] Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nasafī, *al-'Aqīda al-Nasafīya*, p. 29.

[29] al-Ghaznawī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn*, p. 163.

[30] al-Bayādī, *Ishārāt al-Marām min 'Ibārāt al-Imām*, p. 338.

[31] L. Clarke, "Sainthood," J. L. Esposito ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, pp.460–462.

[32] E. g., U. Memon, *Ibn Taimīya's Struggle against Popular Religion: With an Annotated Translation of His Kitāb Iqtiḍā' al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm Mukhālafat Aṣḥāb al-Jaḥīm*, Mouton: The Hague, 1976.

[33] Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 71–72.

[34] Ibn Taymīya, *Kitāb al-Furqān bayna Awliyā' al-Raḥmān wa Awliyā' al-Shaytān*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmīya, 1982, p. 5.

divided the *awliyā'* into two categories: the first comprises *sābiqūn* (people who take the lead) and *muqarrabūn* (close companions [to *Allāh*]), and the other category comprises *aṣḥāb al-yamīn* (those on the right) and *al-muqtaṣidūn* (those who adopt the middle course). These terms are also derived from *al-Qur'ān*[35]. The former category implies people who approach *Allāh* by performing their religious duties (*al-farā'id*)[36]. On the other hand, the latter category indicates people who approached (*taqarrabū*) *Allāh* by performing additional deeds (*al-nawāfil*) after observing their religious duties[37].

Based on his understanding of *walī*, we can define *walī* as follows: the term *walī* not only refers to people who believe in *Allāh* and fear Him, but also to those who (although the *aṣḥāb al-yamīn* and *al-muqtaṣidūn* are more eager than the *sābiqūn* and *muqarrabūn*) perform their religious deeds; therefore, they are people who are approaching or have already approached *Allāh*.

Further, Ibn Taymīya has also discussed the relationship of the term *walī* with *nabī*. A *walī* is a person who follows a *nabī*. He stated that *awliyā' Allāh*…are those who follow Muḥammad (*al-muqtadūn bi Muḥammad*). According to him, Muḥammad is the foremost among the prophets of the *awliyā' Allāh*.

In his creed, Ibn Taymīya also discussed *karāma* as follows: the belief (*taṣdīq*) in *karāmāt al-awliyā'* is among the principles (*uṣūl*) of the people of *al-Sunna*[38]. He also stated that it [*al-karāma*] exists (*mawjūd*) until the Last Day (*ilā yawm al-qiyāma*)[39].

Second, I considered al-Saffārīnī. He regarded a pious person (*insān ṣāliḥ*) as a *walī*, that is, a person who knows *Allāh* and His attributes (*'ārif bi Allāh and ṣifāti-hi*)[40]. Further, he also claimed that *karāmāt* appear on a person who is the servant (*'abd*) of *Allāh*, is obliged to follow a *nabī*, and loves his [*nabī*'s] *sharī'a*[41]. From this, it is obvious that the term *walī* refers to such a person.

Finally, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb stated the following about a *walī* and his *karāma*: "If He [*Allāh*] declares, 'truly *awliyā' Allāh*, no fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow,'[42] this is true (*ḥaqq*)…Your duty (al-wājib) is the love (*ḥubb*) for them [*awliyā'*], the adherence (*itbā'*) to

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[35] See Sūra al-Wāqi'a, Verses 7–12 and Sūra Fāṭir, Verse 32.

[36] Ibn Taymīya, *Kitāb al-Furqān bayna Awliyā' al-Raḥmān wa Awliyā' al-Shaytān*, p. 16.

[37] Ibn Taymīya, *Kitāb al-Furqān bayna Awliyā' al-Raḥmān wa Awliyā' al-Shaytān*, p. 16.

[38] Ibn Taymīya, *al-'Aqīda al-Wāsiṭīya*, Kadūnā: Jam'īya izāla al-Bid' wa Iqāma al-Sunna, n. d, pp. 26–27.

[39] Ibn Taymīya, *al-'Aqīda al-Wāsiṭīya*, Kadūnā: Jam'īya izāla al-Bid' wa Iqāma al-Sunna, n. d, pp. 26–27.

[40] Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Saffārīnī, *Kifāya al-Abrār min Lawāmi' al-Anwār*, Bayrūt, Dimashq & 'Ammān: al-Maktaba al-Islāmī, 2004, p. 119.

[41] Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Saffārīnī, *Kifāya al-Abrār min Lawāmi' al-Anwār*, p. 120.

[42] Sura Yunus, Verse 62.

them [*awliyā'*], and the assurance of their *karāmāt*. And only heretics and people straying from the right way (*ahl al-bid'a wa al-ḍalāl*) reject *karāmāt al-awliyā'*[43]."

To sum up their arguments, we can find that scholars of the *Hanbalī* school and *al-Wahhābīya* also accept *walī* and his *karāma* as authentic concepts. According to them, a *walī* is one who not only believes, loves and fears *Allāh* but also obeys the *nabī* and his *sharī'a*.

4. Conclusion: What is *walī*?

The aim of this paper is to clarify the concept of *walī* in Sunnite theology. I would like to summarize the explanation I have provided thus far, in accordance with three points of view: (1) the discussion on *walī*, (2) the explanation of *karāma*, and (3) the context of the discussion.

With regard to the third argument, we can point out that some theologians discuss a *walī* and his *karāma* in the context of the theory on *nabī*, while others emphasize the relationship between *walī* and *nabī*. Although *karāma* shares the idea of the destruction of customs (*khawāriq al-'ādāt*) with *mu'jiza*, the former is clearly distinguished from the latter by means of the logic of lack. Moreover, many theologians have emphasized that the *nabī* is superior to the *walī*. In this sense, *walī* seems to be the object of comparison in order to prove that *nabī* is the excellent existence and possesses the important mission of conveying prophecies.

The second argument, the explanation of *karāma*, is also closely related to the above point. In all positions, *karāma* is the evidence that a *walī* is a man of sincerity. Further, a *walī* devotes himself to *Allāh* and the *nabī*, and always obeys his law. As a result of that, he is bestowed with *karāma* as the grace of *Allāh*. Further, the appearance of *karāma* implies that the *nabī* and all the things related to him are confirmed.

Finally, I would like to conclude my discussion on the concept of *walī*. In summary, a *walī* possesses the following six qualities: (a) a person who believes in *Allāh* and all things related to Him, (b) one who knows *Allāh* and His attributes so intimately that it is possible for him to devote himself to *Allāh*, (c) one who obeys the *nabī* and his laws, (d) a person who believes in and fears *Allāh*, (e) a person who performs his religious deeds toward *Allāh* and follows Muḥammad and his law, and (f) one who can approach *Allāh*.

These six qualities are not independent of each other; rather, they are combined in the theory on

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[43] Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, *Kitāb Kashf al-Shubuhāt fī al-Tawḥīd*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Qalam, 1986, p. 23.

walī. Further, we can point out that these qualities have persisted from the classical to the modern period. We then attempted to derive the fundamental definition of *walī* from the above qualities: a *walī* is a person who continues to have belief in *Allāh* and be in awe of Him, and be faithful to the *nabī* and his law; moreover, he approaches *Allāh* and knows Him and His attributes through such devotion.

The research to clarify the concept of a saint in Islam has merely begun, and we must conduct a comparative study of the theories or concepts that are interpreted as the term saint in Islam. Nevertheless, I believe that this paper will serve as a small but significant step toward a comprehensive understanding of this concept.

Transformation of the Islamic Network between the Middle East and the Malay-Indonesian World: A Historical Observation

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Contents

Introduction

Introduction

For many years, Islam in the Malay-Indonesian world has been excluded from the discourses of Southeast Asian studies in Japan. Since this region embrace more than 2 hundreds million Muslims, it is evident however, that Islam is one of the important and dynamic aspects of this region. Therefore, for the purpose of understanding Southeast Asia in a more comprehensive manner, this paper focuses on Islam as an essence of the region. In addition, when considering Islam in this region, it needs to be viewed not only in the context of Southeast Asia but also in relation with the Middle

East. This is because Southeast Asian Islam is not a self-established religion; it has developed through a network of Islamic worlds, particularly through ties with the Middle East.

Western scholars and scholars living in Southeast Asia have focused more frequently on Islam in this region. The first study conducted by western scholars can be traced back to the colonial period. Yet most of the previous researches have overlooked this issue. Moreover, 3 trends have been occupying the argument of Southeast Asian Islam in western studies; it is an example of syncretism; and that its doctrines were deviant from orthodoxy; it is "islams" against "Islam" [Bowen 1995: 64-71][Johns 1995: 183].

Nevertheless, there are some researchers who have focused on the Islamic network in this region.

Azra (2004) primarily studied the intellectual networks from the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. He focused on *tarīqa silsirah* and its succession in the Malay-Indonesian world. Further, his study includes explanations on the ulama in the Middle East and Malay-Indonesia world.

Riddell (2001) examined Southeast Asian Islam primarily from the viewpoint of the transformation of theological thought in the region. He focused on the theological trends not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Muslim world as a whole, and paid attention to the transformation of theological thought in the Malay-Indonesian world up until the twentieth century.

With regard to the contemporary era, Abaza (1994) researched Indonesian students studying Islam in Cairo. She adopted an anthropological method and revealed their lives as Muslims in Cairo and their networks with Indonesia.

These preceding researches are considerably beneficial for thinking the Islamic network. However, these studies were based on one-sidedly influences from Middle East to Malay-Indonesian world.

This paper attempts to observe whether there is an indication of influences from Malay-Indonesian world to Middle East and to clarify the characteristics of the Islamic network between in these regions. The arguments presented extend over the following 3 periods: the late sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, and the contemporary era (1950s onwards). Further, each argument will be analyzed from 3 different perspectives, namely, religious intellectuals, revivalism[1],

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[1] There are several arguments pertaining to the usage of revivalism. In this paper, it has been adopted in the discourse on the Malay-Indonesian world. In the late sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the term "reformism" has been employed; the term "revivalism" has been used to study the period from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, which was considerably affected by the Middle East. From the 1950s onwards, the term "resurgent" has been adopted, particularly after the late 1970s [Nagata 1984].

and politico-economic aspects, and their interrelations will be discussed. In each chapter, these 3 trends will be discussed focusing on relations with the Middle East. Finally, the concluding remarks have been included at the end of the paper.

Chapter 1 examines these trends based on the transformation of historical backgrounds, i.e., from monarchical to colonial rules, from the late sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. The ideas of religious intellectuals and reformists have been discussed by focusing on their theological thoughts and doctrines. Further, the politico-economic dimension has been observed through their trading activities at the time.

Chapter 2 considers the modern era from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. It deals with the abovementioned factors during the colonial period. Primarily, the emergence of revivalism and anti-colonialism has been argued in this chapter. Further, Indonesian scholars have been regarded as religious intellectuals for this period. In addition, revivalism has been examined in both the Malay-Indonesian world as well as the Middle East. Later, the Malay-Indonesian people began the movement of revivalism in this region; this as well as its political aspects has also been discussed.

Chapter 3 deals with the contemporary relations between the 3 perspectives by focusing on Islam in the nation states. This chapter studies the period from the 1950s onwards, highlighting the changes in the 3 trends. Political and resurgent movements have been argued alongside and the thoughts of some religious intellectuals who have been introduced in this chapter.

The concluding remarks suggest the future prospects of this network and also underline the problems regarding the study of the Islamic network.

1. Network between the late sixteenth and nineteenth centuries

Islam arrived in the Malay-Indonesian world around the late thirteenth century; it is believed that Islam was brought to the region by traders. Initially, Islam was adopted in the port areas, and gradually, it spread to various other kingdoms in the region. At first, since the royal courts of these regions were primarily Hindu or Buddhist, Islam was regarded as one of the factors of Court's rituals. Thereafter, centuries later, many scholars traveled to the archipelago. Some of them settled there and preached Islam to the court families and also to the indigenous people of the region [Caspair & Mabbett 2004: 333].

1.1. Religious Intellectuals

This section will focus on the religious intellectuals who contributed development of internal and external aspects of Islam.

In the late sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, Ḥamza Fanṣūrī (dates unknown‒1590) and Shams al-Din Samatrānī (date unknown–1630) preached *waḥdat al-wudjūd* declared by Ibn 'Arabī. Despite the fact that personal data about these scholars is considerably ambiguous, it is evident that Fansūrī apparently originated from Sumatra and traveled through Ḥaramayn to Ache. He was a *khalīfa* of *tarīqa Qādirīya.* Samatrānī was a disciple of Fansūrī and served as *Shaikh al-Islām* in the kingdoms of Ache. In addition, both scholars wrote much about Sufism and emphasized the internal aspects of Islam [Johns 1995: 176].

al-Rānīrī[2] (date unknown –1658) came from India and was Samatrānī's successor. He was the *Shaikh al-Islām* from 1637 to 1644. Although his personal data is uncertain, it is known that during his reign, there were considerable disputes between him and the new scholars. Eventually, al-Rānīrī lost the power struggle and returned to his homeland.

'Abd al-R'auf Al-Sinkili (1615–1693) was born in Ache; when he was in his twenties, he left for Aramayn. There he studied with Amad al-Qushāshī[3] (date unknown –1661) and his disciple Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī[4] (date unknown –1690); he was given the status of a *khalīfa* of some *tarīqa* by his masters[5]. After he returned to Ache, he served as the *Shaikh al-Islām* and began writing. Most of his writing deals with the reconciliation of ẓair and bātin [Azra 2004: 70-71].

Muhammad Yūsf al-Maqasārī (1627–1699) is regarded as one of the prominent intellectuals of the second generation. Originally from Makassar, he traveled to the Middle East, passing through the entire region before reaching Ḥaramayn. There he studied with Tāj al-Dīn al-Hindī [6](?–1642) and was initiated into some *tarīqa*[7]. After

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[2] He was a member of *tarīqa Rifā'iyya, Aydarūsīyya* and *Qādirīya.* His uncle Muhammad al-Jīlānī al-Rānīrī traveled along the trading routes and supposedly visited Ache. Al-Rānīrī came to Ache because of his uncle's recommendation [EI2: 1233].

[3] He was a prominent Indian scholar in Macca. He insisted on both the internal as well as external aspects of Islam. When he was young, he changed his school from Mālikī to Shāfi'I, and taught the mystical and spiritual aspects of Islam according to al-Sinkili [Trimingham 1971: 130].

[4] He taught the various external aspects of Islam according to al-Sinkili, such as *fiqh* and *Sharīa.*

[5] *Tarīqa Shaṭṭārīyya and Qādirīya.*

[6] He was born in India and became a prominent master of *Naqshbandīyya.* He migrated to Macca after his master's death. He initiated some famous scholars in Macca and translated the Persian texts of *Naqshbandīyya* into Arabic; it was widely read at the time [azra 2004: 76].

[7] *Tarīqa Kharwatīyya, Naqshbandīyya.* According to Azra, he was also a *khalīfā* of *tarīqa Qādirīya, Shaṭṭārīyya and Rifā'īyya;* he preached their ideologies in South Africa [Azra 2004: 102–103].

completing his studies, he returned to Banten and participated in the anti-colonial war. As soon as he was arrested, the Dutch sent him to Sri Lanka[8]. There he continued his writing and his books were brought back to the Malay-Indonesian world by traders and pilgrims, who disseminated them in the entire region. The Dutch feared his continuous influence on the archipelago; therefore, they sent Al-Maqqasārī along with some of his followers to South Africa, where he eventually died[9].

The last generation of scholars from the eighteenth century includes al-Palimbānī (1704–1789), Muhammad Arshad al-Banjārī (1710–1812), Muhammad Nafis al-Banjārī (1735– date unknown), and al-Fātānī (1740– date unkno); all of them studied with al-Sammānī (date unknown －1775)[10] in Ḥaramayn[11]. al-Palimbānī never returned to the archipelago and taught many students from the Malay-Indonesian world and other regions [Winstedt 1969: 152].

1.2. Reformism

In the context of reformism, Al-Rānīrī attempted to amend Fansūrī and Samatrānī's declaration of *wada al-wujūd*. He claimed that it was deviant from the orthodoxy. That is there are 2 types of *waḥdat al-wudjūd*: the true and false, and he accused that both Fansūrī and Samatrānī were false. Then he issued *fatwā*, which allowed the arrest and execution of its supporters. According to Azra, rumors about this *fatwā* reached as far as Ḥaramayn. However, despite his radical protest against the supporters of the *waḥdat al-wudjūd*, it remained popular in the region [Azra 2004: 59–60].

Al-Sinkili wrote much about reconciliation between the external and internal aspects of Islam, while his predecessors were more concerned with the bātin aspects of Islam. It should be noted that his *tafsīr* book, *Tarjumān al-Mustafīd* was widely read in the region and was even published in some of the Middle Eastern countries around the eighteenth century [Riddell 2001: 165].

On the other hand, Al-Maqqasārī endeavored to expel the Dutch authorities from the archipelago; he asserted the advocacy of Islamic values to oppose the colonial government. Moreover, as a *Sufi,* his writings were invariably based on *Sharīa*-oriented Sufism and strongly denied *waḥdat al-wudjūd*.

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[8] He stayed in Sri Lanka as a deportee for almost 10 years.

[9] He stopped writing in South Africa and devoted his time to preaching Islam, particularly *tarīqa*. Today, his grave in Cape Town is regarded as sacred and as a place of veneration. He is known as Karāmat Shaykh Yusuf [Azra 2004: 103].

[10] He was a prominent scholar and Sufi in Macca and Madīna.

[11] All of them were the members of *tariqā Sammāniyya*.

1.3. Politico-economic Aspects

Politico-economic networks were equally prevalent during this period. Some kingdoms such as Mataram (late sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries) and Banten (mid-sixteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries) communicated with the ruler of Macca to obtain certificates to rule and to employ certain Muslim titles; however, no continuing relationship was apparently sought [Federspiel 2007: 40–41]. Needles to say, trading activities, mediated particularly by Arab traders, had been active till the European countries acquired all rights concerning trading activities. Many trading ships from places such as Aden and Jeddah arrived at various ports in the Malay-Indonesian world. They bought abundant spices, tins, and other natural resources from indigenous traders.

Further, we must not overlook the existence of pilgrims, or the so-called *haji*. In the early periods of this era, only the extremely affluent people could afford to go on a pilgrimage, or *haj*, such as the sultans and bureaucrats. As stated in a Qura'n (3:97)[12], *haj* is one of the 5 pillars of Islam; hence, people who went for a pilgrimage were respected by the entire community. Undoubtedly, the sultans and bureaucrats belonged to this category and were honored. Therefore, they were tried to conduct pilgrimages to acquire considerable power and authority [Reid 2001: 246][Federspiel 2007: 65-67].

In this period, the religious network was maintained by such prominent scholars. Reformist thoughts were brought to the Malay-Indonesian world through them, and their influence was evident not only in the kingdoms but also among the indigenous societies. On the other hand, trading activities were notable in the politico-economic context. Traders from all over the world, particularly Arabs, played a crucial role in connecting both the regions and bringing Islam to the archipelago. It should be noted that while the traders from the Middle East brought religion as well as the concept of trading to the region, it was the scholars who refined Islamic thought throughout the era.

2. Network between the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries

With the rise of European powers, the authorities of the monarchy declined.

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[12] "Therein are clear signs and the scared site of Abraham. Whoever enters will be secure. It is duty to Allāh incumbents on those who can, to make the pilgrimage to the House. But with respect to those who disbelieve, Allāh has no need of all mankind."

Consequently, the colonial government gained authority over the entire Malay-Indonesian region. Malaysia became a British colony; Indonesia, a Dutch one[13]. The policies with regard to Islam differed between the two colonies.

The British government did not oppress Islam. They entrusted all matters related to Islam to the sultans and appointed them as chiefs in the colony. In actuality, however, the administration of the colony was entirely controlled by the government [bin Hassan 2007: 296].

On the other hand, the Dutch initially imposed several restrictions on Islam; however, their policies toward Islam were not consistent and frequently changed. This suggests that they struggled against Islam to some extent [Steenbrink 2006: 60-63].

2.1. Religious Intellectuals

During this era, many students traveled to Macca, Madīna, and Cairo to study Islam. There were some prominent Indonesian religious intellectuals, particularly in Cairo.

Djanan Tayeb[14] (date unknown–1945) was born in Java; he obtained his degree from Al-Azhar University in 1924. Subsequently, he moved to Macca in 1926, where he spent the remaining years of his life. He was an active participant in the Welfare Association of Jawa Students at Al-Azhar University. [Roff 1970: 73]. In Macca, he served at the Harām mosque and established the Madrasah Indonesia Al-Makkiah[15].

Abdul Kahar Muzakkar (1903–1965) was born in Yogyakarta; he enrolled into Cairo University in 1925. He actively participated in all student activities as well as anti-colonial movements. He was a leader of the International Association of Muslim Youth. Later, he became involved in political activities such as the gathering of members of the Muslim Brotherhood and was personally acquainted with Sayyed Qutb who was also his teacher [Abaza 1994: 75-76]

2.2 . Revivalism in the Malay-Indonesian World

During this era, Islamic revivalism began emerging, particularly in Egypt. There were some prominent ideologues such as Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Riḍā, and al-Afgānī.

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[13] Before the colonial period, the Portuguese, as opposed to other European countries, had considerable influence over the Malay-Indonesian world. However, they were expelled from the region and lost their authority around the eighteenth century [Fukami 1999: 14-15].

[14] His name is sometimes written as Djanan Thaib or Jalaludin Thaib. I have followed Abaza's writings with regard to his name. [Abaza 1994]

[15] This school existed for more than 40 years.

In the Malay-Indonesian world, periodicals such as *al-Imām*[16] and *al-Munīr*[17] began to be published, quoting many articles from the *al-Manār*. These publications proclaimed the need to purify Islam in the region[18]. They were brought back into the Malay-Indonesian region by returning pilgrims [19][Tawada 2005: 75].

In Indonesia, some organizations which were deeply influenced Revivalism thoughts in Egypt.

Muhamadīyāh, one of the Islamic organizations established in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan, was considerably affected by 'Abduh's ideologies and adopted a secular-oriented educational system, with an emphasis on technological training. The main objectives of this organization were (1) to adapt to modernization and (2) to provide educational opportunities to both women and men. In 1917, a school for girls was established with the aim of fostering women who would uphold the Islamic values in their roles as wives and mothers.

Another organization, *Nahudatul Ulama*, established in 1926 by Kiyai Hāshim Asha'ari , regarded traditionalists and revised its educational system to a more general one that incorporated more technological subjects as opposed to religious ones. In 1912, *Sarekat* Islam[20] was founded for promoting Islam; it actively promoted a political campaign. The Dutch severely opposed this organization and prohibited Muslims from joining it [Imanaga 1992: 80-81].

In Malaysia, the existence of two groups toward Islamic legitimacy can be observed: the *Kaum Muda* (younger generation) and *Kaum Tua* (older generation). The former was considerably affected by revivalism, and it condemned the Islam preached by the *Kaum Tua*, or traditionalists, as being heretical. According to Tawada, the aim of the *Kaum Muda* was to purify the existing Malay Islam. Further, he argued that the *Kaum Muda* challenged the religious hierarchy comprising sultans and traditional *ulama*. Simultaneously, the *Kaum Tua* criticized the activities of the younger

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[16] Published in Singapore from 1906 to 1977.

[17] Published in Padang from 1911 to 1916.

[18] あ l-Munīr was also published in the Malay-Indonesian world, particularly by the Hadrami Arabs. They advocated *Salafī* Islam and resisted the western-oriented educational system as well as secularism [Nagata 1984: 20].

[19] Restriction imposed on pilgrimages differed in each colonial state. In Indonesia, for example, Snouck, an officer of the Dutch government, often changed his assessment with regard to pilgrimages. The ongoing World War I made Snouck believe that the subjects of the Dutch Indies should no longer be allowed to travel to the Hijaz. On the one hand, he wanted to "save them from dangers"; on the other, he feared that "their impressionable minds might be adversely affected by witnessing the Turk's humiliating treatment of such previously respected foreigners as the British and French" [van Bruinessen 1995: 123].

[20] *Sarekat* Islam was also the first political organization in Indonesia; they published newspapers and periodicals and held political gatherings and forums. They were successful in mobilizing the masses. They had more than 200 branches all over Indonesia; the central part of the organization was unable to control their activities. At first, their aim was merely the liberation of Indonesia, not anti-colonialism; however, later, some of their branches began anti-colonial movements [EI2: 51-53].

generation and took legal actions against it, such as prohibiting the publishing of material and holding of religious assemblies without the permission of the sultans. These conflicts were witnessed throughout Malaysia [Tawada 2005: 75–77].

2.3. Political and Revivalism Movements by the Malay-Indonesian People in the Middle East

In the Middle East, students from the Malay-Indonesian world actively participated in political activities. Some students participated in the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood or the *Ḥizb al-Wafd* party and attended their gatherings in Cairo, while others contributed to newspapers and magazines suppressing the rise of colonialism.

In universities in Cairo, particularly in al-Azhar University, students published the following magazines for the same purpose: *Seruan al-Azhar* [21] (*al-Azhar's* cry), *Semangat Islam* (the spirit of Islam), and *Pilihan Timor* (the choice of the East). Moreover, the *mukims*, who had settled in Macca or Madīna after their pilgrimage, established the *Perkumpulan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (PKI, Association for the Liberation of Indonesia) in Macca and declared the liberation of Indonesia. When the Dutch government suppressed *Sarekat* Islam, both the *ulama*, Muhammad Muchtar bin Attarid from Java and Ahmad al-Khatib from Minangkabau, stressed the importance of the organization to counter foreign, including Dutch, influence. The writings of Afmad al-Khatib and Muchtar bin Attarid spread to Indonesia through returning pilgrims and were used in al-Azhar as textbooks [Noer 1973: 186] [Diederich 2005: 132–133].

Thus, it can be stated that within the cross-regional Islamic network during the colonial era, a religious scholar was formed who either adhered to Western modernism or to internal aspects of Islam, and was influenced by the intricacies of the discourse on Islam and modernity as it emerged in Egypt in the second half of the nineteenth century [Abaza 1994: 10–11].

In this period, the network incorporated both anti-colonialism and Islamic revivalism. Religious intellectuals, such as Muchtar bin Attarid and Ahmad al-Khatib, actively participated in political activities. Further, it should be noted that students and pilgrims from the Malay-Indonesian world also played important roles in conveying

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[21] The Chief Editor of the magazine was Djanan Thaib, whom I have referred to in the previous section. Many students, who later became prominent intellectuals in Indonesia, such as Kahar Muzakkir and Raden Fauth al-Rahman Kafawi, were engaged in its publishing. Kafawi was born in Java and graduated from Al-Azhar University [Abaza 1993: 5].

anti-colonial thoughts as well as revivalism. Moreover, most of them became ideologues on returning to their homeland or served as important officials in government and political parties. People in the region experienced a strong wave of revivalism by these ideologues. In addition, it can be stated that in this period the 3 factors, religious intellectuals, politico-economic aspects, and revivalism were intertwined with each other.

3. Network from the mid-1950s onwards

In this period, Islam played a crucial role in the independence of the Malay-Indonesian world. Malaysia became independent from the British rule in 1957[22], and Islam was established as a federal religion by law[23]. Indonesia became independent in 1945, on the other hand, regarded Islam as being similar to other religions, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Confucianism, and did not give it any particular status.

The period after the late 1970s can be referred to as the period of Islamic Resurgence. During this period, many Islamic groups were established; they declared the legitimacy of Islam. Moreover, the economic ties with oil-producing countries were strengthened.

3.1. Religious Intellectuals

In this period, religious intellectuals were active not only in the political sphere but also in the educational arena; the inclination of their educational backgrounds transformed into Western-oriented.

Muhammad Rashīdī (1915–2001) was born in Yogyakarta; he studied at Muhammadiya School. Thereafter, he traveled to Cairo and studied at al-Azhar University[24]. On returning to Indonesia, he served as a chairman of the Islamic library in Jakarta and also taught in *Pesantren*[25]. In the 1950s, he obtained a Ph.D. from Sorbonne University and began working at McGill University. In his lifetime, he also

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[22] Malaysia became independent in 1957 as Malaya Federation. In 1963, Singapore and Borneo Island, both still under the British control were added the Federation. Finally in 1965, Singapore became independent and Malaysia Federation was established.

[23] According to the Constitution of Malaysia, Article 3, Section 2, Islam is defined as the religion of the Federation; however, it also states that other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation [Hassan 2007: 292].

[24] When he was in Cairo, he was also taught by Sayyed Qutub and participated in gatherings of the Muslim Brotherhood.

[25] Traditional Islamic boarding school.

served as an ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan [Abaza 1993: 6].

Harun Nasution, (1919–1998) is regarded as another intellectual of this period. Born in Sumatra, he joined the faculty of theology at Al-Azhar University in 1940. Subsequently, post World War II, he re-entered the American University in Cairo and majored in social science. He actively participated in various political gatherings[26]. On returning to Indonesia, he propagated the theology of neo-Mu'tazila[27].

3.2. Resurgence and Politico-economic Aspects

In the contemporary era, networks were institutionalized, particularly in the political sphere. Under Soekarno and Nasser, Indonesia and Egypt allied with each other in order to form a coalition against the established Saudi Islam.

Nasser declared that Islam should be based on not only Pan-Arabism but also socialism. Together with Soekarno, he established the Islamic World Organization in Jakarta in 1965. Further, under Nasser's regime Al-Azhar University was also revived; it played an important role in preaching Islam and popularizing science in Africa and Asia. The regime designated these preachers as religious ambassadors to the Afro-Asian countries. On the other hand, Saudi advocated *Salafī* and capitalist-oriented Islam; it organized a large conference in 1962 to further strengthen its religious beliefs. At this conference, 111 religious scholars, politicians, and intellectuals from 31 countries gathered together and confirmed their support of *Wahhāb* Islam.

However, during the late 1960s to 1970s, the confrontation between socialist and capitalist-oriented Islam rapidly changed. Many oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, offered various scholarships to students from the Malay-Indonesian world and accepted them in their own countries[28] [Azra 2005: 8-10].

In addition, the Iranian revolution in 1979 gave considerable impetus to the Malay-Indonesian world. Although almost all the Muslims in the region had adopted Sunni Islam, the revolution promoted resurgence movements such as the Dakwah

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[26] He obtained a Ph.D. from Mcgill University in 1968; his dissertation was titled "Abduh's Theology: Its Impact on his Theological System."

[27] Nasution argued that neo-Mu'tazila school has relevance for Indonesia in the late twentieth century. And he clearly identifies himself with such a school of thought. In embracing Mu'tazilite thought in so overt a manner, he is demonstrating a certain measure of courage which characterized his writing throughout his long career. Furthermore, the fact that Nasution could so identify himself and remain a powerful force on the Indonesian Islamic stage for so long is a testimony to the eclectic nature of Indonesian Islam and the relatively tolerant spirit resulting from Indonesian state philosophy of Pancasila [Martin 1997: 188-191][Riddell 2001: 233].

[28] Most of the Muslims in Indonesia believed in Sunni Islam. Some Shi'ite Muslims would visit Iran to study Shi'te Islam during these periods.

movement [Hamid 2007: 445] [Nagata 1986: 40-41].

For certain examples of institutionalization, I would focus on Malaysian case. In Malaysia, certain NGOs, such as ABIM, were also affected by the momentum that had built up and declared their legitimacy of Islam[29]. This movement made government to entry of Dakwah movement. During Mahathir's reign, the government began sponsoring the Dakwah movement and established some institutions in the country such as the Islamic Bank and the International Islamic University (IIU), both in 1983; moreover, Islamic values were taught to the government officers and daily prayers were broadcast from the national mosque [Mutalib 1993: 33].

In the context of economy, it should be noted that many Indonesian women had been working as housemaids in the oil-producing countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. This number increased post World War II. However, during the latter half of the twentieth century, the condition of these migrants resulted in tensions between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. First, their working conditions were considerably inferior, regardless of the activities of the NGOs in both countries. Second, most of the workers did not understand Arabic, and hence, they could hardly communicate with their employers.

During the 1970s to 1980s, some terrible news concerning the ill-treatment of housemaids by their employers was reported. Consequently, India and Bangladesh stopped sending migrant workers to the region; however, the Indonesian government did not stop the inflow of migrant labor and contrarily, sent more workers to fill the shortage. The Indonesian government did not wish to pressurize the Saudi Arabian government as it wanted to ensure continued access to Macca and Madīna. Although Saudi Arabia proclaims the unity of Islam, its society does not grant equal status to the Muslims from other parts of the world [Diederich 2005: 134; 136]. This dilemma was faced by other Muslim countries as well, who feared the sudden suspension of subsidies from the Middle Eastern countries.

There were various aspects to the intellectual discourses during this period. As aforementioned, many students had been studying in the Middle Eastern countries, and not all of them were studying religious subjects. In Egypt, students from the Malay-Indonesian world enrolled not only into al-Azhar University but also into the American University in Cairo, or 'Ain Shams University, to study social sciences, technology, and medicine. Some of them would then go to the Western countries for further education after obtaining their degrees. Such students believed that government service careers would ensure a brighter future [Abaza 1994:

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[29] ABIM was one of the prominent organizations established by the students in 1971. Some of its members cooperated with the Islamic opposition party, PAS, in late 1970s. However, after the famous ideologue Anwar Ibrahim was absorbed into the leading party UMNO in 1982, ABIM was divided into 2 factions: pro-Anwar and anti-Anwar [Torii 2006: 26].

120-121],[Othman 1998: 146-148].

In this period, Islamic networks were institutionalized. As is evident from the above discussion, the issues around Islam varied considerably between the 1960s and the 1980s. The 1960s to 1970s witnessed the birth and subsequent growth of Pan-Arabism in Egypt; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia resisted the expansion of socialism and made several attempts to amend this school of thought with respect to Islam.

On the contrary, in the 1980s, the third-world ideology and secularism were questioned and people were eager to pursue these religious values as their authorities.

In the context of Malay-Indonesian world, 60's and 70's were struggling era for both Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia had to resolve the interracial discord between Muslims and Chinese. And Indonesia tried to find new prospect under the Soeharto's New Order regimes. On the other hand, in 80's, They tried to intensify the relation between Middle East and economic and political ties are becoming more strengthened.

Conclusion

The Islamic network between the Middle East and Southeast Asia changed in each period. It appears that this network transformed from the perspective of the 3 factors, namely, religious intellectuals, revivalism, and politico-economic aspects, and as a result of the highly controlled state politics in both regions.

From 1970s onwards, ties with the oil-producing countries strengthened because considerable support in terms of capital was provided to the Southeast Asian countries, including those with Muslim minorities as well majorities, in the educational, humanitarian and infrastructural spheres. The Southeast Asian countries depended considerably on the financial support provided by the oil-producing countries, and Saudi Arabia firmly secured all right to the pilgrimages.

In the future, the nature of the Islamic network will be closely associated with economic factors mainly in terms of businesses involving religion. Moreover, religious intellectuals will continue to move in a unidirectional manner from the Middle East to the Malay-Indonesian world. This study focused on the Islamic network from perspective of the Malay-Indonesian world. For a comprehensive understanding of this network, it is necessary to pay more attention to the Middle Eastern perspective as well.

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Session 2 (Feb. 1　16:55-18:25)

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　"State Legitimacy and Secession Calls in the South of Yemen"

・YASUDA Shin (Kyoto University)

　"The Pilgrimage to the Shi'ite Mausoleums in Contemporary Syria"

・HIRAMATSU Aiko (Kyoto University)

　"Islam and Democratization in Kuwait"

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Presentation Title
State Legitimacy and Secession Calls in the South of Yemen

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Presentation Abstract
The resurfacing of a secessionist agenda in Yemen started to create a growing political unrest in the newly born Yemeni state. Although it is difficult to measure the size of support to the calls for secession of the South, some political elites have succeeded in mobilizing some significant support. One of the various signals of popularity of such calls was the demonstration that took place in Aden, January 2008 and ended violently with the killing of at least three civilians and one policeman[1]. The changing nature of this phenomenon has political significance as it represent a increasing tensions that could evolve into more severe clashes that have destabilising effects on the country.

Mainstream analysis, in both local and regional media, focuses on the two-month civil war of 1994. The war that broke up between the armies controlled by the Yemeni Socialist Party (former ruling party in the South and the People's General Congress (former ruling party in the North) is projected as an explanation of the current discontent with government policies. It is also suggested that it is the "Victor Mentality" that is behind a "Northern domination", "biased distribution of resources" and "economic failure".

However, this presentation will argue that the 1994 civil war, despite the damaging effects it had, it eliminated rivalry between two armed forces and political elites of the former (South and North). It thus resulted in more stable security conditions with one warring party winning the conflict as compared to other scenarios of continuous conflict between two parties, secession or maintaining two tensioned armies in the country.

Nonetheless, the modern nation-state is expected to perform certain functions in order to keep it away from failure or collapse. They are the very same functions that enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. It is the very weakness in performing such functions that is generating a wide rage which could in return pose a serious threat on the Yemeni state.

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[1] Arab Times, Kuwait - 13 Jan 2008

State Legitimacy and Secession Calls in the South of Yemen

G-COE international Workshop on Islamic System,
Modernity and Institutional Transformation,
Kyoto, Japan
1-2 February 2008

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Some Facts

- 5.6 million to 50 million small arms (population is 21.6 million)
- 1962-1970 civil war republicans against monarchy
- 1963-1967 struggle against British occupation
- 1972 Border War South and North
- 1979 Border War South and North
- 1986 Civil War 1986 (South) 12 days
- 1994 "Secession War" 2 months

Outline

- Secessionist Campaign
- Unity Campaign
- Modern Nation-States Core Functions
- Pre-Unification States (North-South)
- Yemen 1994 War
- 1. Security Function of the State
- 2. Democracy and Nationalism Function of the State
- 3. Wealth and Welfare Function of the State
- Policy Implications

Secession Campaign

- Recent violent demonstrations.

- Focus on the different political history between the South and North

- 1994 forced unification – not voluntary anymore

- Resources in the South are exploited by the North

- Repressive rule

- Lack of access to key services in the South

Unity Campaign

- Historical references as one country

- Language, culture, ethnicity and religion

- Unity was voluntary – secession was to be forced

- Calls for secession is betrayal of the country

- Increased number of infrastructure projects in the South

- Representing the south strongly in the government

- Fighting corruption is ongoing

Three Main Functions of the Modern Nation-State

- Security and Protection

- Nationalism and Democracy

- Wealth and Welfare

Pre-Unification State (The North)

- 1962 Revolution of the republicans against the Royalists

- 1970 End of civil war

- 1978 President Salih managed to sustain the regime through a network of alliances with local tribes

- Tribes role in the state has been vital (arguably at the expense of central state institutions)

- Population in 1990 11 million*

Pre-Unification State (The South)

- 1963 Revolution against the British occupation

- 1967 Britain withdrew from the South

- 1970 Nationalisation and adapting Marxist principles

- Strong central state

- Poor economic performance

- Population in 1990 2.5 million*

Republic of Yemen

Yemen 1994 War

- Power sharing agreement after unification

- Armed forces did not merge

- Parliamentary elections 1993 results: 301 seats
  (PGC 123, Islah Party 62, YSP 56)

- Political Crisis and Different Visions (Mutual Distrust)

- Full scale two month war

- Forces under the president succeeded in eliminating the forces
  under the YSP

Security Function of the State

- Maintaining Security from internal and external threats.

- Two armies in one state

- Military power not flexible to adapt to political change.

- Political differences pose a military threat

- Victory of one party achieved a monopoly over the legitimate use of force

Democracy and Nationalism Function

- No consensus on what legitimizes the state
- Several ideas roamed around democracy and representation
- Yemeni National Identity
- Political opening following unification
  (1989 unity accords, 1991 constitution, 1990 press law, 1991 political parties law, 1992 elections law)
- 1997 elections seen as less democratic compared to 1993 one
- 2000 constitutional referendum (presidential terms from 5 to 7 years, parliament 4-6 years, establishment of 111 member consultative council)
- Tightening of political freedoms at the expense of respect of rule of law and human rights
- Incidents of challenging the state and violent protest

Wealth and Welfare Function (1)

- Welfare function of the state goes back to 19th century
- Welfare is represented services such as education, health and pension
- spread throughout W. Europe and N. America
- Now associated with the concept of citizenship and membership in the national community
- United Yemen born economically troubled with the gulf war
- Suspension of Foreign Aid from Gulf States US$ 200 Million and reduction of US Aid 20.5 to 2.9 million
- Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 labourers (economic burden + loss of remittances)

Wealth and Welfare Function (2)

- Largely rural 70% of population in Agricultural sector
- 54% Illiteracy rate
- 46 % of children suffer from malnutrition
- Oil resources: 2002 only 500,000 barrel per day (main source of income following unification)
- GDP per capita US$ PPP 889 compared to 29,632 in Australia, 22,420 in UAE, 4,004 in Morocco, 6,180 in Namibia and 1,776 in Mauritania.
- Limited resources
- Corruption
- Policies such as SAP affected state capacity – some media focus on the South e.g. Sep. 2007 riots
- Vicious cycle of instability and poor economic performance

Policy Implications

- Despite the lack of a clear-cut ethnic, religious or language division, such a division is being constructed
- Use of the legacy of former strong southern state capable of enforcing the rule of law
- Poverty, corruption and political dominance facilitates construction of a group identity in the south
- Security is not an issue yet but could escalate
- Democracy although has no magical effect is important
- Minimal welfare function is essential despite limited resources
- Efficient use of resources as well as search for new resources

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The Pilgrimage to the Shi'ite Mausoleums in Contemporary Syria

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This presentation is an interim report on the pilgrimage to the Shi'ite mausoleums in contemporary Syria. In this presentation, I will mainly discuss Sayyida Zaynab bint 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and her mausoleum located in the south of Damascus, which is the Shi'ite religious center in Syria.

In Shi'ite Islam, the pilgrimage, called *ziyāra*, to the mausoleum of the *Imām* and his relatives is widely known and undertaken by a large number of Shi'ites. There are some famous pilgrimage places such as Najaf and Karbalā in Iraq, and Qom and Mashhad in Iran, which many researchers have surveyed. However, in the last thirty years, new pilgrimage sites have been developed including this is the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab and many other Shi'ite mausoleums in Syria. The number of the people undertaking the pilgrimage to the Shi'ite mausoleums in Syria is growing tremendously, and this pilgrimage has become a source of great interest in the Islamic world.

In this report, I will discuss four points. First, I will portray the character of Sayyida Zaynab. Then, I will survey the historical transition of her mausoleum in Damascus from what was used to be when the mausoleum was just built to what it is today. In particular, I will discuss two periods: the period from 1950 to 1966, which was the period during which the mausoleum was reconstructed, and the period from 1979 to 1988, during which it was renovated as per Iranian traditions. Finally, I will present the viewpoints of many researchers and indicate the problems with their research. Then, I will propose a hypothesis about this topic.

Sayyida Zaynab bint 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was born in 629 in Medina. She was the daughter of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the first *Imām*, and Fātima al-Zuhrā, the daughter of prophet Muḥammad. When she came of age, she was married to Ja'far Ṭayyār, her cousin, and bore five children. She led a peaceful life until her last years, when a significant incident befell her.

In 680, Sayyida Zaynab's brother Ḥusayn went to Kūfa with his relatives and companions in responce of the request of the inhabitants of Kūfa. Sayyida Zaynab accompanied them. However, they were surrounded by the army of Yazīd, the Umayyad caliph in Damascus, and all of them were massacred in Karbalā on the 10th of *Muḥarram*, except for 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidīn, the fourth *Imām*, and women and children. Sayyida Zaynab did not participate in the battle, but was captured and taken to Damascus with her relatives. They were held captive in Damascus for a while, after which

they were released. However, it is not clear where Sayyida Zaynab went after the release. There are varying beliefs with regard to this. Some believed that she died in Damascus in 683, whereas others believed that she died in Cairo; still others believed that she died in Medina[1].

In the Shi'ite descriptions, Sayyida Zaynab is a well-respected woman because she was born as *ahl al-bayt*, the descendant of prophet Muḥammad. She is well-respected also because she did two important things. First, she protected 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidiīn from the army of Yazīd. Second, she condemned Yazīd in public, saying that he had committed a terrible act by massacring Ḥusayn and his companions in Karbalā[2]. Moreover, Shi'ites claim that Sayyida Zaynab and her brother Ḥusayn shared a close relationship and that she had great affection for him.

After Sayyida Zaynab's death, a tomb was built for her. However, it is difficult to determine when exactly the construction of her mausoleum began. It is believed that the mausoleum had already been built in a village named Rāwiya in the seventh century; however, there is no historical evidence to corrocorate this. Ibn 'Asākir, the local historian of Damascus in twelfth century, stated that a person from Aleppo named Qarqūbī built the mausoleum next to a mosque in 1106[3]. Ḥusayn Mūsā b. 'Alī al-Ḥusaynī al-Shāfi'ī, the *muftī* of Bālbek, commented that in 1366-67, the mausoleum got *waqf*. This is the oldest script pertaining to the mausoleum and this fact is adequate to confirm the existence of the mausoleum.

In the medieval period, some travelers and local historians including Ibn Jubayr and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who are still considered as very famous travelers in the Islamic world, wrote about the mausoleum. In their books, they noted that the mausoleum was holy because the lady buried in the tomb was holy. However, they did not comment on whether the mausoleum was famous in the Islamic world. Al-Harawī, a local author of Damascus in the twelfth century, commented in his book that the mausoleum was located in a village named Rāwiya; however, again he did not specify whether it was famous[4]. Yāqūt, a local historian in Damascus in the thirteenth century, mentioned in his book that the tomb of Sayyida Zaynab was in Rāwiya; however, like the other historians, he failed to mention whether it was famous[5]. However, it is said that the mausoleum was honored by the Shi'ites in Jabal 'Āmil, located south of Lebanon[6]. Therefore, it was not famous in the Islamic world

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[1] The controversy whether the mausoleum is in Damascus, Cairo or Medina still continues. Many researchers and non-researchers have discussed this issue, but they have been unable to prove the authenticity of their claims. Michelle Zimney discuss it in her article. (See the following article: Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, pp.695－703.)

[2] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.702.

[3] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.697.

[4] Al-Harawī, Abī ibn Abī Bakr, Meri. J. W. tr., *A Lonely Wayfarer's Guide to Pilgrimage: 'Aī ibn Abī Bakr al-Harawī's Kitāb al-Ishārāt ilā Ma'rifat al-Ziyārāt.* Princeton, 2004, p.26.

[5] Ibn Yāqūt al-Rūmī, 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, 7 vols., Bayrūt, 1993, Vol.3, pp.20-21.

[6] Hourani, A., "From Jabal 'Āmil to Persia," *Bulletin of the School of Orient and African Studies*, Vol.49, 1986, p.133.

untill the nineteenth century, except for in *bilād Shām*.

The mausoleum gained the status of a great institution in the beginning of twentieth century. The number of pilgrims not just from *bilād Shām* but also from the Gulf, Iran, and South Asia gradually increased. Thus, by and large, from this period onward, the number of pilgrims to the mausoleum began increasing. In 1950, the number of pilgrims was more than 100, 000[7].

In 1950, the mausoleum gained recognition as a great institution. Muḥsin al-Amīn al-Āmilī, one of the well-known Shi'ite *'ulamā'* in *bilād Shām*, established a committee for the reconstruction of the mausoleum. The committee comprised Muḥsin al-Amīn, the Murtaḍā family, the administrator of the mausoleum, businessmen, and social elites in Damascus. The purpose of the project was to raise funds to reconstruct and maintain the mausoleum, improve traffic infrastructure, and promote the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab from various parts of the Islamic world. The committee attempted to get donations for the project by using the networks of the Shi'ite *'ulamā'* to appeal to people to make donations for the project. Some Shi'ite *Mujtahid*s professed *fatwā*s to encourage donations for the project[8]. They also called upon the local people to donate whatever they could[9]. After the project, the mausoleum was changed from a brick building to a huge concrete. This project was massive and turned out to be a success.

Another huge project was implemented from 1979 to 1988. This project was undertaken by the government of Syria. Iran collaborated in this project by providing financial and decorative aids. The mausoleum was renovated as per the traditional Iranian façade. The newly built mausoleum had blue tiles and a golden dome. Two large prayer halls and two 50-meter blue-tiled minarets were also built. After the project was completed, the infrastructure facilities such as hotels and restaurants surrounding the mausoleum were rapidly developed[10],

In the 1990s, Shi'ite mausoleums in Syria were widely developed through the official projects and financial and decorative aids from Iran. Some Shi'ite mausoleums such as Sayyida Ruqayya, Sayyida Sukayna, and 'Abbās b. Abī Ṭālib were renovated. Many of these mausoleums had been the pilgrimage sites for Sunnis. However, after the project was completed, the significance of mausoleums changed, and the number of pilgrims increased significantly. During this period, pilgrimages to Shi'ite mausoleums in Syria were widely developed[11].

At present, there are many Shi'ite mausoleums that serve as pilgrimage site in Syria. These mausoleums are located in places such as Raqqa, Aleppo, Hamā, Ḥoms, Damascus, Darayya and Sayyida Zaynab. The places attract many people, who enjoy their religious travels. The number of

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[7] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.699.

[8] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.700.

[9] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM,* Vol.19, 2007, pp.700-701.

[10] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.699.

[11] Ababsa, M., "Les mausolées   invisibles: Raqqa, ville de pèlerinage chiite ou pôle étatique en Jazîra syrienne? ," *Annales de Géographie*, Vol.622, 2001, p.650.

pilgrims continues to rise, and in 2007, the number of the visitors to Sayyida Zaynab was more than 2, 000, 000[12]. As for the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab, it plays host to a variety of conferences, poetry readings, exhibitions, and most notably, *'Āsūrā'* commemorations[13].

By the end of the 1980s, many researchers began to survey the mausoleum and pilgrimages to the Shi'ite mausoleums in Syria. Almost all of them focused on the project implemented in the 1980s. With regard to this project, the following three points were focused on.

First, the researchers took notice of the power of Iran and Shi'ite Islam. They insisted that Iran wanted to promote the Shi'ite Islam ever since the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has provided considerable financial aid to the mausoleums of Sayyida Zaynab, Sayyida Ruqayya and other mausoleums in Syria. Iran also promotes pilgrimages to Syria, and in doing so, demonstrates its strength and attempts to expand Shi'ite Islam (Mervin 1997, Ababsa 2001, Pingo 2007).

Second, the researchers focused on the Syrian government and its religious policy. With regard to this point, they insist that the Syrian Ba'th government controlled religion by relating positively to the mausoleums and maintaining them. Moreover, the government manifested its authority by controlling religion, and by doing so, controlled the nation (Mervin 1997, Böttcher 1997, Ababsa 2001, Pingo 2007).

The researchers also point out that Syria and Iran share a close political relationship. The researchers insisted that during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, and Iran and Syria cooperated because they agreed that an anti-Iraq policy would have political benefits for both governments. Moreover, till today, the two governments share a good relationship. The development of the pilgrimage sites in Syria is one of the best examples illustrating the relationship between Syria and Iran (Ababsa 2001, Pingo 2007).

However, these viewpoints contain three problems, which pertain to geographical area, history, and disciplines. First, the researchers only argue about the relationship between Syria and Iran. However, many people come for the pilgrimage from *bilād Shām*, the Gulf, and South Asia. Many Shi'ites from these areas go to Syria for the pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims from these areas is probably equivalent to the number of pilgrims from Iran. Therefore, researchers should also focus on these other areas from where pilgrims undertake the pilgrimage to Syria.

Second, researchers have focused only on the project implemented in the 1980s. Although this project undoubtedly brought about a great change in the mausoleum, the project implemented in the 1950s is also important. Although the character of these projects is different, it is necessary to consider the project of the 1950s. Moreover, since the mausoleum was developed from the beginning

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[12] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.695.
[13] Zimney, M., "History in the Making: The Sayyida Zaynab Shrine in Damascus," *ARAM*, Vol.19, 2007, p.699.

of twentieth century, the number of pilgrims gradually increased in this period. Thus, we should consider the fact that the mausoleum did not develop suddenly and that has been known among people for a long time.

Third, researchers only focus on the political aspects and do not examine other aspects in the case of Syrian pilgrimage. A pilgrimage is always sustained by pilgrims. Pilgrims go on pilgrimage with many motives and for various reasons; therefore, a pilgrimage cannot be viewed solely from the political aspect. A pilgrimage comprises many other aspects such as those related to economics, traffic, tourism and religious significance. Thus, it is necessary for researchers to focus on pilgrims and survey many other aspects relating to a pilgrimage. Now, I will itemize the various factors pertaining to these aspects.

With regard to the economic aspect, pilgrims bring about huge economic benefits. They spend large sums of money on donations to the mausoleums, eating, buying souvenirs, and entertainment.

With regard to the traffic, the relation between the development of traffic infrastructure and the pilgrimage is one of the important factors that has led to a rise in number of pilgrims. Nowadays, many people use buses and airplanes when they go for pilgrimages, and the time and money required for the journey has decreased considerably, compared to what it was before.

From the tourism perspective, contemporary pilgrimages are systemized by mass tourism, tour agencies and companies. Agencies offer a variety of package tours and offer help to people who wish to go on pilgrimages. By availing of the services of these tour agencies, pilgrims can easily tour the mausoleums and gain considerable information from their guides.

From the religious viewpoint, the pilgrimage is sustained by its religious significance. Pilgrims usually go on the pilgrimage with the religious motives. Many people endorse this opinion for the case of Shi'ite Islam. In particular, the pilgrimage to Karbalā has been noted by some researchers. In their view, the memory of Karbalā is the core of the identity of Shi'ites. They remember the incident of Karbalā, renew their identity, and share their collective memory and identity through rituals such as *'Āsūrā*, *'Arba'īn*, and the pilgrimage to Karbalā[14].

However, no researcher has indicated the exact religious significance of the pilgrimage to the Shi'ite mausoleums in the case of Syria. Thus, the religious significance of these pilgrimages should be investigated.

In conclusion, I present one hypothesis with regard to the case of the Syrian pilgrimage. In contemporary Syria, the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab is the focal point of the pilgrimage to the Shi'ite mausoleums. Moreover, many Shi'ite mausoleums in Syria have become pilgrimage sites in

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[14] Nakash, Y., "The Visitation of the Shrines of the Imams and the Shi'i Mujtahids in the Early Twenties Century," *Studia Islamica*, Vol.81, 1995, p.155.

the last thirty years. Most of these mausoleums that have become famous are those in which the person buried there is related to the martyrdom of Karbalā or to Sayyida Zaynab. For example, today, 'Abbās b. 'Abī Ṭālib and Sayyida Ruqayya are very famous due to the fact that they feature in stories about the martyrs of Karbalā, and their tales about them are frequently related.

Through this point, I intend to delve into the character of the pilgrimage in contemporary Syria. By visiting the mausoleums that are related to the martyrdom of Karbalā, the pilgrims recollect the martyrdom. Karbalā represents the view of Ḥusayn. The mausoleums in Syria represent other views such as those of Sayyida Zaynab, Sayyida Ruqayya, or various other people related to the martyrdom. By experiencing the pilgrimage, the Shi'ite pilgrims view the martyrdom from many aspects and affirm their collective memory and identity. In this aspect, the pilgrimage to the Shi'ite mausoleums in contemporary Syria is regarded as "second Karbalā" for the Shi'ites.

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Islam and Democratization in Kuwait

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Introduction

Kuwait is a very important country in international society in the view of its rich oil deposits. Moreover, after the Iraq War in 2003, considerable attention has been paid to democratization in the Gulf as well as in Iraq. Since Kuwait's independence in 1961, the National Assembly with legislative powers was established, and all male citizens aged 21 or above were granted suffrage. The literature on Kuwaiti politics, however, has concluded that Kuwait is still not a democracy, or that democracy is imperfect in Kuwait.

The most important underlying problem is that both Islam and the "tribal" nature of Kuwaiti society are viewed as traditional and conservative factors that hinder the process of democratization. Moreover, women without suffrage were regarded as a symbol representing the shortcoming of Kuwait's parliamentary system. The conservative nature of Islam and the tribes of Kuwaiti society have been often held responsible for this shortcoming. Apparently, this view reflects a liberal-democratic bias against the inherent nature of the Gulf countries. Can Kuwait be "truly" democratic only when it overcomes its very fundamental and inherent social factors?

In order to address this issue, in this paper, I seek an alternative approach by which we can examine democratization and Islam by focusing on the characteristics and dynamics of Kuwaiti society.

I   History of Democratization and the Social Change in Kuwait

Since its independence from Britain in 1961, the National Assembly of Kuwait gained legislative power, and all male citizens were granted suffrage. The origin of the parliament in Kuwait, however, can be traced back to the merchant's parliamentary movement in 1921. In the pre-oil era, merchants had considerable power in the economic, social, and political arenas. In 1921, they insisted on the establishment of a consultative body, and in 1938, on that of a council with legislative powers against the then-ruler, Ahmad al-Jabir. Although both the consultative body and the council were terminated in a short period of time, the ruler was reluctant to accept them because he could only exercise power using the tax paid by the merchants. The merchants were the main employers of people in the pre-oil era; therefore, at the same time, they enjoyed autonomy against the rulers and had considerable influence in society.

The economic, social, and political situation had dramatically changed since the discovery of a oil well in 1938, particularly, after oil began to be exported in 1946. The income from oil exports was earned by the rulers and not the merchants, and it increased every year. In the view of the increase in oil revenues and decline of the pearl industry, the merchants gradually lost their economic power, while the rulers gained power. The rulers also divested the merchants of their

social power by providing social services such as education, free medical care, and employment in public sector companies to the Kuwaiti people.

The constitution adopted in 1962, provides for the establishment of the National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) with legislative powers and whose members were to be elected through general elections held once every four years. Kuwait was the most democratic government in the Gulf because, in addition to possessing a legislative body, all male citizens were granted suffrage, although female citizens did not acquire this right until 2005. The parliament, however, was also suspended by the ruler on two occasions. It was first suspended from 1976 to 1981, and then from 1986 to 1992. During the second suspension of the assembly, Kuwaiti citizens criticized the ruler and held meetings and demonstrations, demanding restoration of the assembly [Tétreault 2000]. In the eve of the Iraq invasion to Kuwait, citizens' voices were highly increasing. Following the Gulf War and the liberation of the country, the National Assembly was restored, and the election was held in 1992. The National Assembly has continued to function since 1992. In 2005, it passed a law granting all female citizens the right to vote and run for office. Thereafter, the first election that included women voters was held, and the first female minister was appointed in 2006.

II The Question of Analytical Perspectives

The literature on democratization in Kuwait could be categorized into certain types based on the approaches adopted in each argument. The first category is the argument developed using the rentier theory [Crystal 1990; Ismael 1993; al-Dekhayel 2000]. The researchers argue that oil revenues obstruct democracy in rentier states whose incomes largely depend on these revenues. Their contentions can be summarized in the phrase "no representation without taxation." Kuwaiti citizens enjoy a variety of free social services without taxation; hence, by contract, the people accept the repressive regime. These searchers argue that there is no demand for participation in the political process in the rentier states; however, the people had resoundingly voiced their claim for the democratization of Kuwait immediately prior to the Iraqi invasion in 1990. The rentier states theory pays little attention to Kuwaiti people and their society. With regard to Islam, some researchers argue that Islamic rhetoric is used to legitimate the repressive regime [al-Dekhayel 2000]. In this sense, al-Dekhayel regarded Islam as a hindrance to democracy.

The second argument is based on political culture [Kedourie 1994; Lewis 1993; Sharabi 1998]. These researchers insisted that the political culture characterized by local factors such as Islam hindered democratization. These arguments treat the culture as so static that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy. The arguments invited many criticisms [Salamé 1994; Bromly 1994].

The third argument explains the internal changes within Kuwait by emphasizing the external factors, which are referred to as the "impact-response theory." To present a typical example, some works explain that the political reforms for democratization after the 1990s in Kuwait were a result of the Gulf War [Hudson 1991; Aarts 1992]. I agree that the Gulf War set the stage for the demand for democratic reforms; however, it is also important that Kuwait is a country with a long history of democracy, as mentioned above. Therefore, we have to remember the internal factors responsible for the rise of democracy, and analyze this issue by combining both the external and internal factors.

The fourth argument is the monarchical theory that focuses on the ruling family and its political institutions [Herb 1999]. Herb argues that in monarchies, the effective method for establishing democracy is not through radical changes such as a revolution but through a moderate transformation to a constitutional monarchy, such as that observed in some European monarchies. His explanation of the vitality and resilience of Middle Eastern monarchies in today's world is plausible. Regarding democratization, he analyzes it in terms of political institutions and the role of the ruler. The monarchical theory pays little attention to the dynamics of a society itself. Similar to the impact-response theory, this theory, too, does not refer to Islam in the analysis of democratization.

The final is an analysis of the parliamentary system [Herb 2004; Nonneman 2006]. These researchers present a positive evaluation by stating that among the Gulf States, Kuwait is the most democratic country and its parliamentary system is the most developed. However, they continue by stating that the Kuwaiti parliament has crucial defects such as a ban on political parties, refusal to grant women suffrage and hereditary power of the ruler. Therefore, they conclude that Kuwaiti democracy is not perfect. The underlying assumption is that the Western model of the parliamentary system is the ideal one, and that all the parliaments in the world should be developed according to this model. However, in order to understand the real situation of Kuwaiti politics, it is meaningful to examine how the current parliamentary system works and how it is implemented in the context of Kuwaiti society.

Tétreault offers a much better analysis. She describes the democratic process by focusing on the interrelationship between society and politics in Kuwait [Tétreault 2000]. In her book, she also criticizes the viewpoint based on political culture, which considers culture or society to be static, and shows how Kuwaiti society and its politics have changed. At the same time, she successfully describes Kuwaiti citizens as active challengers to the ruler, demanding for the resumption of parliamentary democracy at the time of the suspension of the National Assembly. This view of Kuwaiti citizens is rather different from that of the theory of the rentier states, whereby the people acquiesce to the repressive regime. However, Tétreault opines that democracy in Kuwait is imperfect, with special reference to gender issues such as women's suffrage, which Islamic fundamentalists have insisted on rejecting. Her argument is full of insights; however, the notion that Islam hinders democracy is inevitable and remains a disputed issue.

The political system in Kuwait, as well as that in other Arab countries, has always been viewed as an imperfect democracy or even far from a democracy, because Both Islamic discourse and tribalism legitimate such the repressive regime. Kuwaiti politics continues to be described negatively from this viewpoint. In order to overcome such a dilemma, I will examine the utility of the theory of Islamic civil society while analyzing contemporary Kuwaiti politics in the next section.

III An Alternative Approach and Islamic Civil Society in Kuwait

The theory of Islamic civil society has a basic notion that an autonomous civil society based on Islam can be constructed against the modern state. Islamic society has traditionally possessed the ability to maintain various social institutions guaranteed by Islamic law. This is because Islamic law, in principle, is superior to the statutes of the state, and the scope of its applicability is so wide that it

encompasses the whole society. By applying the term "civil society" in a broader analytical sense, and without confining it to a narrower Western or liberal sense, Islamic civil society can be defined as a politico-social space in which various social groups and institutions operate between the state and the individuals. Thus, it enables the citizens to achieve political participation based on Islamic culture [Kosugi 2006: 530–531].

From this perspective, Islamic revival movements are perceived as attempts to reconstruct Islamic civil society in the context of contemporary situations. Many Islamic societies experienced a crisis in the disruption of Islamic social institutions in the era of colonialism and the process of modernization since the nineteenth century. Islamic revival movements began to spread when modern states started withdrawing their welfare policies in the mid-1970s. They provided a variety of social services in compensation for the social space with which the state no longer concerned [Kosugi 2006: 534–535].

In Kuwait, the modernization of the state's apparatus since the late 1930s and the exporting of oil led to the creation of a very powerful modern state in the mid-twentieth century. As a result, the state began to play a larger role in its citizens' lives by providing them with jobs, education, medical care, and so on. The society that was autonomous in the pre-modern era and mainly controlled by merchants had changed; however, it had not weakened but rather reorganized itself in keeping with the contemporary situation. In fact, many social organizations have been established since the mid-twentieth century.

Among these social organizations, some have developed as political organizations and exert influence in the National Assembly today. They are of three types. The first category comprises the organizations of the merchant class. The Democratic Forum and National Democratic Alliance are categorized under this type. The Democratic Forum was founded by Arab nationalists. The second category is composed of Islamist groups. This category comprises the following groups: Islamic Constitutional Movement, Society for the Preservation of Islamic Heritage, Scientific Salafi Movement, and a Shiite Islamic organization, the National Islamic Association. These groups became particularly active in politically after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The third category comprises tribal forces. They led a nomadic life until the early twentieth century and began to settle during the process of modernization.

These groups have been described as quasi-political parties in much of the literature. However, they not only function as political parties but also undertake a wide range of primary social responsibilities. Therefore, it is more meaningful to consider that these organizations are main actors constituting civil society rather than merely serving as quasi-political parties. They were organized in response to the rise of the powerful modern state, and have become important actors in the present parliamentary system. Given the significant functions these organizations have already fulfilled in the National Assembly, it is not true that Islam obstructs democracy. Islamist movements in Kuwait represent attempts to restore the autonomy of the society based on the principles of Islam.

IV Women's Political Rights as a Contentious Issue

The issue of women's suffrage has long been the most disputative point in democratization of Kuwait. Apparently, Islam has been considered as the most influential factor that hinders the fulfillment of women's political rights. Rizzo challenges this discourses by examining some organizations run by Kuwaiti women. She cites examples wherein women Islamist leaders agree with women's suffrage, and concludes that this discourse is not true [Rizzo 2005].

The notion that Kuwaiti women are suppressed represents a biased and one-sided view in this issue. It is also necessary to consider the context of social change and the attempts by women to regain their autonomy in society. Crystal explains that women had autonomy and the power to decide on matters in their homes in the pre-modern era, when the pearl industry constituted the main economic base of Kuwait. In modern era, however, the employment of servants to perform their housework decreased the women's autonomy in their homes. Moreover, the growing number of men who went abroad to study increased the number of unmarried women. The suffrage granted to all male citizens was also responsible for the inferior status of female citizens, who were denied the right to vote and to run for office. In response to such conditions, many political movements were organized by women in order to claim political rights for themselves [Crystal 1996].

However, multiple measures have been undertaken to improve women's status. To demand suffrage is not the only manner in which women's groups in Kuwait have campaigned to improve the status of women. As society changed, women's status too changed; therefore, their methods to obtain autonomy were also varied. There are organizations based on Islam that provide social services to women, and they believe that the realization of an equitable society according to the principles of Islam would raise the status of women. Moreover, among them, some activists agree with women's suffrage even though it does not necessarily constitute the main purpose of their activities [Rizzo 2005]. From this perspective, Islam is an obstruction neither to the elevation of women's status nor to democratization.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have focused on the problem in analyzing democracy in Kuwait, in which Islam has been treated as an obstacle or a factor unrelated to democratization. The issue of women's rights was always perceived as a symbol indicating that democracy in Kuwait is imperfect. The perspective of the Islamic civil society is useful to overcome this problem and to understand the political situation in contemporary Kuwait. Islamic movements have adjusted to the contemporary social and political situation. They seek to restore the autonomy of society by utilizing the parliamentary system. Islam is, therefore, one of the important factors composing the modern society and politics in Kuwait.

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Session 3 (Feb. 2　13:30-15:00)

・YAMAO Dai (Kyoto University)

　"Cooperation and Rivalry among the Iraqi Islamic Parties: An Analysis of Ideological and Political Orientations in the 1980s"

・HORINUKI Koji (Kyoto University)

　"Islam, Arabness and State Formation: A Debate on the Demographic Imbalance in the UAE "

・Housam DARWISHEH (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

　"Political Activism under Mubārak's Authoritarian Electoral Engineering in the 1980s"

Cooperation and Rivalry among the Iraqi Islamic Parties:
An Analysis of Ideological and Political Orientations in the 1980s

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> It [the Iranian revolution] was made through a set of cultural and organizational forms *thoroughly socially embedded in* the urban communal enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah. … that is because a culture conducive to challenges to authority, as well as politically relevant networks of popular communication, are *already historically woven into* the fabric of social life [Skocpol 1994: 249-250] (*italics* added).

I.   Introduction

This paper aims at clarifying ideological similarities/differences between the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s, and examining reasons for these similarities/differences in order to analyze the manner in which these similarities/differences as well as pressures from the Iranian authority impacted the directions and policy orientations of every Iraqi Islamic party thereafter.

The Shi'ite Islamic parties attracted enormous attention after the Iraqi War in 2003. It is often argued that they have a strong linkage to the Iranian authority and are controlled by them. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-A'lā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-'Irāq; hereafter referred to as SCIRI)[1] is a representative example of these arguments. This understanding between the Shi'ite Islamic parties and the Iranian authority or, more precisely, the likely and stereotyped-understanding arises from the fact that a majority of the Iraqi Islamic parties conduct their activities in Iran during the 1980s; this was mainly because they had to evacuate from Iraq in the face of severe oppression by the Ba'thist regime. Furthermore, the largest organization, the SCIRI, was created within Iran.

On account of this backgrounds, a large number of scholars stressed, essentially, strong Iranian influences on Iraqi Islamic parties. Academic researches on Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s, in particular, can be divided into two categories: those that focus on the indirect influence of the Iranian authority [Bengio 1985: 12: Keddie and Cole 1986: 21; Baram 1994: 548; Fuller and Francke 1999: 109-111; Nasr 2006: 187], and those that stress the direct influence of the Iranian authority and view Iraqi Islamic parties as "puppets" of the Iranian authority or tools of the

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[1] SCIRI has changed its own name to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (al-Majlis al-A'lā al-Islāmī al-'Irāqī; it is now often abbreviated as SIIC, SCII, or SICI from capital letter of its English name) in 12th May 2007.

"exportation of revolution" policy in Iran [Chubin 1987; Sachedina 1991; Nasr 2006: 143].

However, remarkably insufficient research has been conducted on the ideologies and activities of the Iraqi segment of Islamic movements, particularly in the 1980s. Furthermore, detailed information on Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s continues to be missing to a large extent. In other words, almost all the researches on Iraqi Islamic parties asserted that these parties were under great influence of Iran, or even worse, they were "puppets" of the Iranian authority without understanding their ideologies and activities.

Needless to say, numerous Iraqi Islamic parties have been under the great influences of the Iranian authority as well as the Shi'as of Iran. However, the case is not as simple as it appears. Revolution cannot be exported, nor can it control the movements of countries other than that of its. Moreover, the abovementioned arguments paid scant attention to the conditions prevailing within Iraq, in which Islamic parties or movements had been actively struggling against the oppressive Ba'thist government. Furthermore, the matter of gravest concern was that these "Iranian influence models" did not provide any explanations for the multitude of directions adopted by Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1990s and thereafter.

Hence, this paper will shed light on Iraqi Islamic parties, particularly those of the Shi'a, in their exile era in Iran in its entirety. In order to deconstruct this "Iranian influence models," the following research questions are answered in this paper:

First, what are the similarities/differences between the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s in the ideological sphere[2], which has been one of the most controversial issues of the Islamic movements of contemporary Iraq. Second, what was the cause of these similarities/differences? Third, in what manner did these similarities/differences as well as pressures from the host country, Iran, affect the policy orientations of each Iraqi Islamic party thereafter?

The hypothesis put forward in this paper is as follows: Ideological differences found between Iraqi Islamic parties and the Iranian revolution were caused by variability in the socio-political structures of Iraq and Iran. Each Iraqi Islamic party in the 1980s had to face the pressure of the Iranian authority that possessed similar Islamic ideology but was restricted to Iranian contexts, maneuvering to reconstruct their Iraqi-Islamic identities. Examining ideological similarities/differences between the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties reflects the reconstruction of the *Iraqi nation* by Iraqi Islamic parties in the diaspora. Differences in capabilities of maneuvering between reconstruction of the *Iraqi nation* and pressure from the host country brought about cooperation and rivalry among the Iraqi Islamic parties as well as their resultant policy orientations.

In the course of argument, I will partly rely on Theda Skocpol's argument that social revolution deal with reconstruction of national identities, as well as Benedict Anderson's concept of "*long-distance nationalism*" [Skocpol 1994; Anderson 1998]. Skocpol argues that social revolution is not only historically woven into the fabric of social life, but is also concerned with national identities in a modern world [Skocpol 1994: 249-250, 295]. On the other hand, Anderson stresses that nationalism can be observed among groups that are away from their own country. I would like to apply Skocpol's concept to the analysis of revolutionary ideologies and activities, not revolution itself, of Iraqi Islamic parties that were in exile. In concrete terms, I will focus on the aspect that revolutionary ideologies are

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[2] It seems considerably difficult to review ideologies of all parties which devoted to the Iranian revolution. Moreover, as ideologies of the Iranian revolution have been changing from1979 [Moaddel 1993], I cannot review all of them, and covering all the ideologies of the Iranian revolution is not main focus of this paper. Hence, I will specify mainstream of ideologies from immediately after the revolution 1979 to the mid 1980s. To be more precise, I define ideologies of the Iranian revolution as "the collective ideologies of the revolution, which is represented by the leader of the revolution Khomeini during 1979 and the mid 1980s" in this paper. I will rely on secondly sources in analyzing ideologies of the Iranian revolution.

restricted by socio-political structures; moreover, such ideologies are concerned with national identities. In this aspect, Anderson's "*long-distance nationalism*" must be reconsidered in analyzing Iraqi Islamic parties. In other words, emphasis on the nation by Iraqi Islamic parties must be understood as not only something concerning the existing nation, but also reconsidering, or even reconstructing of the concept of nation itself.

In order to answer the abovementioned questions, the second section will overview backgrounds of this paper; namely, the process of exile to Iran after the Iranian revolution, the process of segmentation, which were found mainly in the Da'wa Party (Ḥizb al-Da'wa al-Islāmīya), and the process of the attempt to integrate the separated Iraqi Islamic parties. The third section will clarify ideological similarities/differences between Iraqi Islamic parties and the Iranian revolution by presenting comprehensive information and comparing ideologies of the two parties[3]. Finally, the fourth section will analyze the reason behind the similarities/differences and the manner in which these similarities/differences as well as pressures by the host country impacted the Iraqi Islamic parties.

II. Segmentation of the Da'wa Party: Seeking Unity of Iraqi Islamic Parties

First, this section will explain segmentations of Iraqi Islamic parties on account of their evacuation to Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Second, the struggles for unification among the separated Iraqi Islamic parties will be overviewed.

1. Segmentation of the Da'wa Party

In the late 1970s, Iraq witnessed intensive confrontations between the Ba'thist regime and Islamic oppositional movements, with the Da'wa Party helm of the confrontations [Yamao 2008][4]. The Da'wa Party increased its influence to encompass the Iraqi society by maintaining a cooperative relationship with the Shi'ite religious establishment[5] since its formation [Yamao 2006]. The Ba'thist regime had to stand against this cooperation with increasing inclination for authoritarianism. In these circumstances, the Da'wa Party changed its policy orientation from political participation to revolutionary movement [HDI 1981-89: vol.4, 198-199; MIID 1999: 26-27; Yamao 2008].

In these circumstances, the Iranian Islamic revolution was accomplished in neighboring Iran in February 1979. This significant event accelerated the revolutionary drive of the Da'wa Party. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, spiritual leader of the party and supreme authority in the Shi'ite religious establishment, openly asserted his support for the Iranian revolution [Ra'ūf 2000: 137-138; al-'Āmilī 2007: vol.4, 8-13]. The Da'wa Party and al-Ṣadr organized

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[3] There is no collective information or sources on ideologies of Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s. Hence, I will use primary sources such as pamphlets and leaflets of them which were mainly published in Teheran and Qom in the early 1980s (See primary sources of bibliography).

[4] The Da'wa Party was founded inside Iraq in 1957. It declared formation of Islamic state based on political thought of Muḥammad al-Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-80), a reformist 'ulamā' and one of the most important figure of Islamic movements in Iraq. The party's leadership was composed by reformist clerics and lay members (mostly middle class intellectual or merchants in the Shi'ite shrine cities), and there were both Sunni and Shi'a, at least in the beginning. It is the oldest Islamic party and has longest experience in Iraq. Detailed information can be found in [al-Mu'min 1993; al-Khursān 1999; Shubbar 2005; 2006; Yamao 2006; 2007a; 2008] (see also Table 6).

[5] The Shi'ite religious establishment can be tentatively defined in this article as following; "it is generic term that indicates religious schools, academic institutions, or research centers that are established, managed, and administrated by the religious authority and senior clerics ('ulamā' or jurisprudences) in the holy place of the Shi'ite shrine cites".

Iraqi masses to overthrow the Ba'thist regime [Ra'ūf 2001: 163]. The Da'wa Party declared that this was crucial for accomplishing Islamic revolution in Iraq, which must be guided by the party itself [SI Sep 3, 1980]. The fear that al-Ṣadr and the party had huge potential for mobilizing the Iraqi masses toward the Islamic revolution brought the Ba'thist regime a growing sense of crisis, and subsequently led to the secret execution of al-Ṣadr in April 1980.

This chain of events forced a majority of the leading members of the Da'wa Party and Islamist organizations to leave their own country. A large number of the leaders headed to Iran[6]. The Iran-Iraq War broke out in September 1980. After the loss of the charismatic leader and withdrawal of support from Iraqi masses within their country, the Da'wa Party and other Islamist organizations had to accommodate regional and international politics for their survival.

It was in these circumstances that separations within the Da'wa Party became tangible. Segmentation itself had begun under severe oppression from the Ba'thist regime from the mid 1970s onward[7]. However, this separation of 1980 caused serious segmentation not only within the Da'wa party, but also within movements of Iraqi Islam as a whole. It is argued that the main reasons for these segmentations were (1) competition for selecting leadership of the party, (2) conflict of opinions on revolutionary movements (comprehensive or incomprehensive) against the Ba'thist regime, and (3) differences with regard to the methodology to be adopted for revolution (whether or not it must be conducted through army and security apparatus), which were based on antagonism among senior leaders [al-Khursān 1999: 370-371, 386-389][8].

Table 1 presents comprehensive data pertaining to Iraqi Islamic parties/organizations, from which Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s can reasonably be classified into three groups: (1) parties/organizations separated from the Da'wa Party, (2) newly founded Islamic parties/organizations inside Iran, and (3) other parties/organizations, such as important Islamic parties in the Karbara linkage of 'ulamā', Munaẓẓama al-'Amal al-Islāmī (Islamic Task Organization; hereafter referred to as MAI)[9], Sunni parties, and small Islamic organizations.

In addition to these segmentations, the Iraqi Islamic parties had to face two other serious difficulties. First, they were cut-off from supporters in the form of Iraqi masses because of their evacuation to Iran. Second, they united Iranian armies against the Iraqi Ba'thist regime because of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War[10]. The Iraqi Islamic parties had to fight against their own country. In brief, in the 1980s, Iraqi Islamic parties had to face the challenge of segmentations within the parties, handle withdrawal from their support within Iraq, and fight against their own country.

[Table 1: Typology of Iraqi Islamic Parties in the 1980s]

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[6] In addition to those who evacuated to Iran, there were a great number of students from Lebanon studying under al-Ṣadr and committing in activities of the Da'wa Party. Many of them, after coming back to Lebanon, joined to the Islamic movements there and became members of Amal Movement (Afwāj al-Muqāwama al-Lubnānīya) and Ḥizb Allāh afterword [Norton 2007: 30-32].

[7] As a result of execution of high-ranked 'ulamā' of the Da'wa Party in 1974 [al-Mu'min 1993: 115-123; al-Khursān 1999: 211; Shubbar 2006: 125-145], leadership of the party was divided into two parts: *Iraqi Committee* (Lajna al-'Irāq) which played active role inside Iraq, composed of relatively new leaders; and *General Leadership* (al-Qiyāda al-'Āmma) which was composed of senior leadership outside Iraq [al-Khursān 1999: 212-217], whereby *dual leadership* was created [Yamao 2008].

[8] Faleh A. Jabar mentioned, in a sense too excessively, that Iraqi Shi'ite groups were extremely divided; they lacked any mechanism for pan-Shi'ite, let alone pan-Iraqi, cooperation and representation [Jabar 2003: 235].

[9] Almost all of the Iraqi Islamic parties are spitted from the Da'wa Party, which was created based mainly on the linkage of clerics in al-Najaf and al-Kāẓimīya. On the other hand, MAI depends on Karbarā' network of clerics, hence MAI is considered to be unique Islamic organization of Iraq to some degree.

[10] For instance, SCIRI issued communiqués supporting Iran in the War [MECS 1986: 380].

2. Struggle for Unity of the Iraqi Islamic Parties

In view of these circumstances, each Islamic party began to attempt unification. The first effort of these Islamist parties was to form an alternative Islamic organization in order to integrate various Islamist factions[11]. Various attempts were made to integrate Islamic parties by the Iraqis themselves on the one hand, and the Iranian authority attempted to intervene to these attempts on the other.

For example, the Union of Iraqi Militant 'Ulamā' (Jamā'a al-'Ulamā' al-Mujāhidīn fī al-'Irāq) was established and comprised approximately 80 'ulamā' under the command of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm and Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī——both were former members of the Da'wa Party and significant disciples of the charismatic leader Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr. The Iranian authority also committed to these attempts. All these processes led to the establishment of the SCIRI on November 17, 1982 [SCIRI 1983: 4-5; Jabar 2003: 235]. The SCIRI is considered to be an *umbrella organization* of Iraqi Islamic parties that is under strong influence of the Iranian government [Jabar 2003: 239]; can be categorized as type (2) according to the classification above (see Table 1). Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm stated the following in Teheran at the creation of SCIRI from "*the Declaration of SCIRI Formation*" (al-Bayān al-Ta'sīsī li-l-Majlis al-A'lā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-'Irāq; officially announced in 17 November 1982):

"We are desperate for Islamic revolution. … It is indispensable to have a unified axis that guides the struggle effectively, and integrate divisions of Islamic groups under a unified model, one banner, and one method. … In order to achieve these aims, SCIRI was established" [SCIRI 1983: 18-19].

It was created as an umbrella organization encompassing almost all the Shi'ite Islamic parties, Kurdish, and a few Sunni Islamic parties[12]. Indeed, the SCIRI was an umbrella organization without fixed membership or a regulation of political party [Ra'ūf 2000: 364]. From the viewpoint of organization, the SCIRI had the *Advisory Council* (Majlis al-Shūrā), which was equivalent to a collective leadership and was comprised 17 members. This organizational structure, however, changed in the assembly held in 1986; the Council was divided into two parts, namely, the *Central Advisory Council* (Majlis al-Shūrā al-Markazīya) and *General Organization* (al-Hay'a al-'Āmma). In addition, the chairman, spokesman, and *Executive Committee* (al-Lajna al-Tanfīdhīya) were selected [Ra'ūf 2000: 312]. These organizational shifts in the general assembly of SCIRI in 1986 tended to weaken the involvement of the Da'wa Party and retained the family monopoly of al-Ḥakīm in the organization [Jabar 2003: 243] (see Table 2). In accordance with this change, the SCIRI came to have a single-party like organizational structure[13]. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War, it began to be regarded, at least by the Da'wa Party and MAI, as an independent organization [Baram 1994: 548].

[11] First of all, Murtaḍā al-'Askarī, former supreme leader of the Da'wa party, tried to integrate the Da'wa Party and Iraqi Hujāhidīn Movement (Ḥaraka al-Mujāhidīn al-'Irāqīyīn), but failed because he was the senior leader of the Da'wa Party [Jabar 2003: 236].

[12] On the parties which attended to the SCIRI general assembly, see [Ra'ūf 2000: 221-226, 305-316; Ra'ūf 2002: 279-282; Jabar 2003: 239-248] (see also Table 2).

[13] Following to this SCIRI's changes, main Iraqi Islamic parties such as the Da'wa Party and MAI stopped contributing to SCIRI's activities [Ra'ūf 2000: 317-319]. Jabar mentioned that the Da'wa Party, MAI, and SCIRI has been sending their respective delegates as independent organizations in different events of political negotiations [Jabar 2003: 249]. Amatzia Baram mentioned that Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm's growing self-aggrandizement, which made cooperation with other movements difficult, found expression in the introduction during the late 1980s of a traditional ceremony in which delegations "renew an oath of allegiance" to him by giving him the traditional Islamic *bay'a* [Baram 1994: 549]. It should be mentioned, however, SCIRI constructed so to call great coalition after the Iraqi War 2003, and tended to be an umbrella organization again.

In the course of attempts to unify, certain Iraqi Islamic parties attempted to utilize the Iranian authority for the reconstruction of their power and survival strategies. Undoubtedly, the Iranian authority attempted to influence the Iraqi Islamic parties because it adopted the ostensible "export of Islamic revolution" policy. Hence, the Iranian authority exerted itself to support Iraqi Islamic parties for its own purposes. The SCIRI maintained a close relationship with the Iranian authority [SCIRI 1983: 35]. Likewise, MAI asserted its position as follows; "the ideology in the document [of Munaẓẓama al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī] was constructed based on *Wilāya al-Faqīh* proposed by al-Khomeini" [MAI 1980: 3].

In short, Islamic parties or organizations that were founded after evacuation from Iraq were not necessarily only under Iranian influences; these parties were also attempting to utilize the Iranian influence. The formation of the SCIRI must be considered, therefore, both from the viewpoints of (1) the desire for unity, which can be found within Iraqi Islamic parties, and (2) strategies of the Iranian authority for exporting Islamic revolution to Iraq and other neighboring countries.

[Table 2: Members of the SCIRI Central Council]

III.   Iranian Influences, or Iraqi Characteristics?

This section will outline the all-encompassing image of the ideologies of the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s. The argument aims to clarify the common and diverse features between the ideologies of the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties.

1. Ideologies of the Iranian Revolution

For the purpose of comparison, the ideologies of the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties will be overviewed by classifying them into five categories: (1) foreign relations, (2) domestic policies, (3) social relations, (4) Islamic revolution, and (5) others.

 (1) Foreign relations:

The first target of the Iranian revolution in terms of foreign relations was rhetoric against the imperialism of the United States. It labeled the United States as the "*Great Satan*" and its embassy as a "*spy nest*" [Moaddel 1993: 209]; moreover, slogans such as "*death to the United States*" [Yoshimura 2005: 106-131] were created. Mansoor Moaddel stressed the effectiveness of the symbols and workability of the metaphors that were found in the Iranian revolution in enabling to become a dominant ideology, which defined "*world imperialism*" and the "*Great Satan*" as the main enemies of the revolution [Moaddel 1993: 216]. Besides anti-imperialism against the domination of the United States[14], Khomeini also rejected the political systems of both the West and East (slogan of "*Neither the East nor the West*") [MECS 1983-84: 453; Moaddel 1993: 154].

 (2) Domestic policies:

The Iranian revolution rejected monarchy. It claimed the anti-Islamic nature of the institution of monarchy and the necessity of creating a republic [Abrahamian 1993: 21; Moaddel 1993: 154]. This ideology clearly arose from political, social, and economic failure of the exceedingly westernized monarchy of Shah as well as its oppression. That is the reason that Khomeini termed the monarchy of Shah as an "*agent of imperialists*," and thus defined its

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[14] Khomeini was deeply distressed by Western domination of the Islamic world, by repeated Israeli victories over the Arab world [Milani1994: 87].

slogan as "death to the Shah" [Fischer 1980: 197; Yoshimura 2005: 126]. Mohsen Milani clearly asserted that the Islamic Revolution was essentially the rejection of the monarchy [Milani 1994: 154].

 (3) Social relations:

The Iranian revolution asserted that a majority of the Islamic world was under oppression from the West. In other words, it emphasized the concept that underdevelopment and economic inequality is related to Western cultural domination [Moaddel 1993: 154]. On account of this rationale, Khomeini depicted society as sharply divided into two warring classes —— the *mostazʻefīn* (disinherited/oppressed people) against the *mostakberīn* (oppressors) [Abrahamian 1993: 26]. He, then, popularized the concept of the *mostazʻefīn* [Milani 1994: 146][15]. He reasoned that this was the reason why it is crucial to construct an Islamic society, which is depicted as an equal society in which the poor must accept their lot and not envy the rich; the rich should thank God, avoid conspicuous consumption, and donate generously to the poor [Abrahamian 1993: 26].

 (4) Islamic revolution:

The ideology of the main Iranian revolution asserted that Islam was a revolutionary and anti-imperialist ideology [Moaddel 1993: 154]. Khomeini articulated his arguments for the establishment of an Islamic government based on the theory of *Velāyat-e Faqīh* (government by the jurisprudent) [Moaddel 1993: 146]. Furthermore, the policy of "export of the Islamic Revolution" began to be followed [Yoshimura 2005: 154]. According to these revolutionary features of Islam, the Iranian authority utilized the concept of revolutionary *martyr* (shahīd) during the Iran-Iraq War [Abrahamian 1993: 27; Moaddel 1993: 157][16].

 (5) Others:

One of the most important characteristics of the ideologies found in the Iranian revolution other than these four discussed above is related to ethnicity and nation in the Islamic state. Under the rhetoric of Islamic revolution, which asserted that the country must be governed based on religion not nation, differences of ethnicity and nation came to be less important, even further, did not exist [Matsunaga 2005: 117]. This is why the authority continued to stress that no ethnic distinctions exist within the Muslim community [MECS 1982-83: 537].

This is a rough sketch of the ideologies that can be abstracted in the Iranian revolution in terms of five categories (c.f. see Table 3).

2. Ideologies of Iraqi Islamic Parties in the 1980s

The ideologies of the Iraqi Islamic parties will be analyzed here. The important ideologies of the Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s are presented in detail in Table 3. These ideologies can be characterized in the following manner:

 (1) Foreign relations:

With regard to foreign relations, a large number of Iraqi Islamic parties asserted that the United States represented imperialism in the contemporary world, and was the "*Ḥizb al-Shayṭān*" (Party of Satan) [JUMI n.d.a: 31-32]. According to them, the United States as a colonial state attempts to oppress the movements of the weak by force, for example, by imposing economic blockades [UDMI n.d.b: 57; n.d.c: 7-8; HMIy 1980: 12]. That is why it is crucial for Islamic movements to struggle for liberation of Islamic states from colonial dominations and strengthen the abilities of the Islamic revolution [HDI n.d.b: 14; UDMI n.d.b: 62-63], and "we should abolish exploitation by

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[15] Khomeini proclaimed 1983-1984 the "*year of the mostazʻefīn*" [MECS 1983-1983: 528; 1983-1984: 450]. It is also argued that for the *mostazʻefīn*, Khomeini was the symbol of the revolution and a source of their hopes [MECS 1989: 336].
[16] For example, there was *Fedāʼīyān-e Eslām* (Organization of Partisan for Islam), which considered being fighter who risks his life recklessly for Islam and the Iranian revolution [MECS 1983-84: 435].

colonialism" [KITI n.d.: 12]. These symbols and metaphors provide an insight into the influences of the Iranian revolution.

(2) Domestic policies:

Among Iraqi Islamic parties, authoritarianism or what is termed "dictatorship," not monarchy, was the crucial issue. All the parties made a common claim to overthrow the Ba'thist regime. For example, the Union of Iraqi Militants 'Ulamā' expressed the ultimate goal of its activities as overthrowing the Ba'thist dictatorship, asserting that it can be achieved only through armed struggle [JUMI n.d.a: 42: n.d.b: 14, 29; n.d.c: 3][17]. Since the Ba'thist regime was supported by Western imperialism/colonialism [SCIRI 1983: 7, 34; HDI 1983: 9; JUMI n.d.c: 25-26], numerous parties considered that fighting against the Ba'thist regime represented the struggle against American colonialism and unbelief [JUMI n.d.c: 6]. More importantly, they recognized the Ba'thist regime as the main causes of ethnic and sectarian conflicts. They criticized the Ba'thist regime as attempting to divide the Iraqi people on sectarian or ethnic lines and intentionally create a sectarian cleavage, which was not tangible thus far [HDI n.d.c: 27; KITI n.d.: 2, 27].

(3) Social relations:

The assertions of the Iraqi Islamic parties with regard to social relations are similar to those of the Iranian revolution to a large extent. Iraqi Islamic parties stressed that Islamic movements were parts of the struggle of the *mustaḍ'afīn* (disinherited/oppressed people)[18], and endeavored to struggle for liberating the *mustaḍ'fīn* [SCIRI 1983: 35, 37; KITI n.d.: 5; HDI n.d.d: 32; UDMI n.d.b: 56]. Thus, it was evident that Khomeini must be the leader of the struggle of the *mustaḍ'fīn* [MAI n.d.c: 17; HDI n.d.d: 31; UDMI n.d.d: 3; JI 1987: 10].

(4) Islamic revolution:

All the Iraqi Islamic parties sought to achieve an Islamic revolution, and considered this to be extremely important [MAI n.d.b: 12, 18; JUMI n.d.a: 17]. It must be, however, indicated that their theoretical arguments were not entirely similar to those of Khomeini's theory of the *Velāyat-e Faqīh* (discussed later)[19]. It is not unreasonable to state that the attitudes of Iraqi Islamic parties toward the leadership of Khomeini can be divided into two groups: (i) Complete support for Khomeini and the Islamic revolution considering him as the supreme leader——"guidance of Imam Khomeini is ideal model of mujtahid"[JUMI n.d.c: 5; MAI 1980: 3; HDSI 1982: 14]——the SCIRI asserted that it was ready to enter into an alliance with the Iranian authority [SCIRI 1983: 35], and (ii) Partial support. The Da'wa Party expressed a sort of ambivalent attitude toward Khomeini. It asserted that the party had been supporting his activities inside Iraq and the Iranian revolution. Moreover, it was prepared to create a cooperative relationship with the Iranian authority [HDI n.d.d: 30-31]. At the same time, the Da'wa Party withheld complete support for Khomeini, as is evident from the following statement:

> "The Da'wa Party is not out of Khomeini's supreme domination. The party, however, consults individual problems, which are specific to the party to other jurisprudence (al-faqīh al-jāmi' li-l-sharā'iṭ) of the party" [HDI n.d.b: 148-149].

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[17]   Some of them asserted that rules of the Ba'thist regime were similar to those of Fascism or Nazism [HMI n.d.d: 5, 12-13].

[18]   This concept corresponds to what Khomeini called the *mostaz'efīn* (Persian translation of the Arabic word).

[19]   For example, MAI claimed originally that Islamic state should be led by *Leaderships of Supreme Religious Authority* (al-Qiyāda al-Marja'īya) [MAI n.d.b: 7] (not necessarily sole authority), and the Da'wa Party followed Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr's theory that stressed systematic leadership of the Islamic state [Yamao 2007b: 172-176]. Moreover, the Da'wa Party maintained that it was indispensable to construct cooperative relation between supreme authority in the religious establishment and leadership in the party headquarter [HDI n.d.b: 70] (see also section IV).

(5) Others:

There are three important ideological agendas found in the pamphlets of the Iraqi Islamic parties. First, they underlined the urgent need of integration of the Iraqi Islamic parties. For instance, they asserted that it was significantly important to unify all Islamic parties/organizations, including numerous non-Islamist Iraqi organizations such as Kurdish parties and Marxist movements, in order to create a unified Iraqi oppositional front [SCIRI 1983: 18, 36; HDI n.d.c: 13-19; KITI n.d.: 28]. Moreover, they also stressed that Sunni Islamic parties must fight together with Shi'ite parties[20]. That is why a large number of Islamic parties openly expressed that they were welcome to join any party [JUMI n.d.c: 11-12, 28].

Second, a majority of them rejected any ethnic discriminations or sectarian differences [JUMI n.d.c: 21; HFI n.d.: 63; KITI n.d.: 8, 10, 19]. The SCIRI asserted the following:

"SCIRI does not represent any particular sects and school of Islam. The crucial object of our movement is the struggle for an anti-Ba'thist regime, which is imperialistic and unbelieving, not conflict between Sunni and Shi'a" [SCIRI 1983: 21].

On the other hand, the Da'wa Party protested against the sectarian society by stating:

"We are addressing to abolish any segmentation of ethic and sectarian divisions, and those that create any ignominious relationships based on these cleavages" [HDI n.d.c: 6].

Third, the role of the Iraqi masses and their mobilization were underlined in order to achieve revolution. The SCIRI openly advocated that it relied on the Iraqi masses [SCIRI 1983: 35, 39], and MAI stressed the necessity of *revolution of the masses* (al-thawra al-sha'bīya) [MAI n.d.c: 4, 15, 50]. The Da'wa Party advocated that it was indispensable for the purpose of establishing *vanguard* (ṭalī'a), leading the masses in creating an Islamic society in the struggle against the dictatorship based on *the Center of Calling in the Society* (Markaz al-Da'wa fī al-Mujtamu') [HDI n.d.b: 13, 19, 41-42]. The others insisted on the necessity of armed struggle [JUMI n.d.a: 17-18; n.d.b: 17]. Detailed information on the ideologies of Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s is presented in Table 3.
[Table 3: Ideologies of Iraqi Islamic Parties in the 1980s]

3. Iraqi Characteristics in the 1980s: An Inquiry into the Similarities/Differences between the Iraqi Islamic Parties and the Iranian Revolution

Comparing the ideologies of the Iraqi Islamic parties with those of the Iranian revolution in accordance with the abovementioned five categories, three common and three different agendas can be highlighted (see Table 4).
(1) Similarities:
   (i) The effort toward an anti-imperialism struggle on account of the belief that the United States is an imperialist and colonialist country in this modern era. This was not emphasized by the Iraqi Islamic parties prior to the Iranian revolution (see Table 5).

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[20] Union of Iraqi Militant 'Ulamā' asserted that it was necessary to establish an organization of re-approaching of the Islamic Schools such as the Organization of Re-approaching the Islamic Schools (Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib; headquarter is in Egypt) under the banner of Khomeini [JUMI n.d.a: 40-41].

(ii) Islamic movements are intended to liberate the *mustaḍ'fīn*[21].

(iii) They considered their principle aims to the achievement of Islamic revolution, formation of an Islamic state, and solidarity of Islam.

(2) Differences:

(i) Minor differences: anti-monarchy expressions, *export of the Islamic revolution*, and integration of Islamic parties. These differences are considered to be minor because Iraq possessed rather different political system; Iran remained a westernized monarchy on the one hand, and Iraq had experienced the republic revolution in 1958 on the other. The latter two aspects are related to whether or not they were rulers of the Islamic state in Iran.

(ii) Small differences: small differences in the arguments that asserted the role of 'ulamā' in politics.

(iii) Large differences: arguments with regard to ethnicity or sects——Iran ignored, more precisely pretended to ignore, the differences of ethnicity whereas Iraqi Islamic parties highlighted the importance of cooperation and coexistence between different ethnic and sectarian groups[22].

This will be much clearer if we compare the historical transformation of ideologies that were shaped in Iraqi Islamic parties, which are represented by those of the Da'wa Party[23]. Table 5 presents the ideological shifts of the Da'wa party. A comparison of the ideologies of the Da'wa Party in the 1960s and 70s reveals that it did not assert to fight against the imperialism of the United States (1-i), nor did it claim the liberation of the poor using idioms such as *mustaḍ'fīn* (1-ii). On the other hand, the party began to assert the achievement of Islamic revolution from the mid 1970s onward (1-iii) [Yamao 2008][24]. With regard to the differences, the party has never claimed anti-monarchy (2-i); however, it continued to assert the political and social roles of 'ulamā' (2-ii). With regard to ethnicity and sect, the Da'wa Party mentioned them fleetingly in the party document[25]; however, they were not emphasized (2-iii). It is reasonable to presume that the party began to underline this ethnic-sectarian argument in the 1980s.

Therefore, the main characteristics of the Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s can be stated as (a) anti-United States imperialism, (b) usage of idiom such as *mustaḍ'fīn*, and (c) increasing emphasis of Islamic revolution and ethnic-sectarian difficulties. These are termed "Iraqi characteristics in the 1980s." Furthermore, it should be noted that there are certain differences among the Iraqi Islamic parties with regard to the number of similarities/differences among them. Generally, as will be examined in the next section, factions of the Da'wa Party have more differences with the Iranian revolution, while the parties or organizations that were founded after 1979 in Iran have more similarities with the Iranian revolution. Then, the reason for the emergence of these differences should be argued.

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[21] The elevation of the rhetoric *mustaḍ'fīn* seemed common in almost all of the Shi'ite region from Lebanon to Iran in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, especially after the Iranian revolution in which Khomeini popularized this rhetoric. See [Ṭāhā 2003].

[22] For the purpose of appealing to the Arab stats, however, the Iranian authority proclaimed that there was no dispute between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam; rather both were brothers in stressing Islamic solidarity and unity in the Conference of 90th anniversary of the death of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, which was held in May 1984 [MECS 1983-84: 456].

[23] Here I cited the Da'wa Party as examples of the ideologies of Iraqi Islamic parties before 1980s. This is because we can trace the root of most, if not all, modern Iraqi Islamic parties to the Da'wa Party. Furthermore, it was only the Da'wa Party that maintained putting out ideologies in the 1960s and 1970s.

[24] The party's official document stressed in 1978 that it was crucially important to make a strong cooperative relationship with al-Ṣadr in order to struggle together against the Ba'thist regime, to achieve Islamic revolution, and to construct an Islamic state [HDI 1981-89: vol.4, 171-172].

[25] For instance, the party's official document set objects of its activities of socio-political reformation that mainly aimed at integrating Iraqi people who were divided along ethnic, sectarian, and tribalism cleavages [HDI 1981-89: vol.1, 83-85] (sentences I cited were published in 1976 [HDI 1981-89: vol.1, 79]). Moreover, the Da'wa Party recognized that these cleavages were the legacies of British colonialism [HDI 1981-89: vol.1, 434-441] (sentences I cited were published in 1976 [HDI 1981-89: vol.1, 313]).

In short, a detailed comparison of the ideologies of the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties clarified that there were three similarities: (i) anti-imperialism, anti-United States, (ii) liberation movements for the *mustaḍʿfīn*, and (iii) Islamic revolution and its solidarity. In addition, there were three differences: (i) anti-monarchy expressions, export of Islamic revolution, and integration of Islamic parties, (ii) the role of 'ulamā' in the political arena, and (iii) arguments on ethnic and sectarian agenda. From the arguments, three Iraqi characteristics in the 1980s were as follows: (a) anti-United States imperialism, (b) usage of idiom such as *mustaḍʿfīn*, and (c) increasing emphasis on Islamic revolution and ethnic-sectarian problems. The reason behind the emergence of these similarities/differences will be addressed this inquiry in the next section.

[Table 4: A Comparison of Iraqi Islamic Parties and the Iranian Revolution]

[Table 5: Ideological Shifts in the Da'wa Party]

IV.   Beyond the Islamic Revolution and Existing Iraqi Nation: Distress of the Iraqi Islamic Parties

First, this section examines the reason behind the emergence of the similarities/differences in the ideologies of the Iranian revolution and the Iraqi Islamic parties, and the manner in which these reasons are related to the emphasis of difficulties in Iraq by the Iraqi Islamic parties. Second, it focuses on pressure from the Iranian authority and capabilities of acquiring independence of the Iraqi Islamic parties in order to clarify the manner in which the struggle between the reconstructions of the Iraqi nation and pressures from the host country created differences in policy orientations among the Iraqi Islamic parties subsequently.

1. Reconstruction of the Existing Iraqi Nation: Struggle of the Diaspora Islamism

Detailed analyses of the ideologies of both the Iraqi Islamic parties and the Iranian revolution indicated that they have three agendas in common and three that differ. The reasons for these three differences will be examined individually in order to reveal the implication of the Iraqi characteristics in the 1980s.

(III-3-2-i) The reasons for the first differences can be explained effortlessly. The Iraqi Islamic parties did not claim an anti-monarchy slogan because they had already experienced the revolution of 1958 and became a republic; moreover, they did not assert *exporting of the Islamic revolution* because it was them who sought to achieve the revolution. They had different circumstances in terms of political systems and experiences of revolutions.

(III-3-2-ii) The reasons for the second difference with regard to the role of 'ulamā' are as follows: In the 1970s, Iraq created brilliant Islamic political thinkers such as Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (Objective Authority; *al-Marjaʿīya al-Mawḍūʿīya*), Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh (Institutionalized Authority; *al-Marjaʿīya al-Mu'assasa*), and Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (Assembly of Authorities; *Shūrā al-Marājiʿ*). They (re-)constructed Islamic theories that 'ulamā' should lead the state and politics [Ra'ūf 2000: 84-85; Yamao 2007b: 172-173]. For example, al-Ṣadr attempted to construct an institutionalized leadership for the religious establishment by establishing councils of authorities [al-Ṣadr 1989: 387][26]. The members of Islamic parties, in particular the Da'wa Party, were under his

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[26] Furthermore, al-Ṣadr tried to combine the Islamic parties to this leadership by asserting: "I am now convinced that Islamic movement cannot accomplish its own purpose without aids from the religious establishment. At the same time … It is crucially important for the religious establishment to cooperate with Islamic movement in order to accomplish its mission. … The relationship between the party and the religious establishment should be organized tightly in order not to be destroyed by the regime". Al-Ṣadr's words cited in [al-Mu'min 1993: 125-126].

influence. This backdrop provided Iraqi Islamic parties a background for the theories related to the political role of 'ulamā'. Moreover, their own theories are slightly different from those of Khomeini[27].

(III-3-2-iii) The reasons for the third difference arise from the variance of social structures between Iraq and Iran. The Iranian authority can ignore the difference of ethnicity because their legitimacy of rule is based on Islam. Theoretically, Islam does not discriminate against ethnic diversity. Moreover, Shi'ite Muslims are in a majority——approximately 70% of the population in Iran. Hence, the ranian authority can also ignore sectarian diversity. On the other hand, Iraq is a diverse country in terms of ethnicity and sectarianism, with approximately 60% Shi'a Arabs, 20% Sunni Arabs, 15% Kurds (most of them are Sunni), and other minorities such as Turkmen, Yazidis, and Christians[28]. The Iraqi Islamic parties cannot ignore ethnic-sectarian differences since this reflects problems of national identities; in other words, these problems are related with the reconsideration of the Iraqi nation and state. The Iraqi Islamic parties were in distress with regard to the manner in which to (re-)construct Islamic movements and its revolution in the context of the Iraqi society. Therefore, they repeatedly claimed that they had to create equal society in terms of ethnic-sectarian consideration.

In short, the reasons for the differences between the Iranian revolution and the Iraqi Islamic parties arise from the dissimilarities of each society, experience of revolution, and national identities. It can be implied that the Iraqi Islamic parties were restricted by the socio-political structure of Iraq, even if they were in diaspora and were under relatively strong influences of the Iranian revolutionary authority. This was the main reason behind the differences in ideologies of the two parties.

The argument put forward by Skocpol theoretically supports this analysis. She argued that "social revolutions are less about class struggles of 'modernization' than about *state building* and the forging of *newly assertive national identities* in a modern world that remains culturally pluralistic even as it inexorably becomes economically more interdependent" [Skocpol 1994: 295] (*italics* added). According to her argument, the Iranian revolution was restricted by its own socio-political and economic structure, and is closely related to the reconstruction of Iranian identities[29]. The Iranian revolution was absolutely an Islamic revolution because it emphasized Islamic ideologies and used Islamic idioms. However, or at the same time, it was an Iranian revolution that was restricted by the socio-political structure of Iran at that time. Matsunaga Yasuyuki aptly asserted this aspect as "*Islamic revolution of Iranian nation*" [Matsunaga 2005]. It is evident that Iraqi Islamic parties had to face *the Iranian characteristics* of the Islamic revolution in the 1980s.

The perception that *even* the Islamic revolution was restricted by the socio-political and economic fabric of the country, as Skocpol argued, can be reinforced by what Kosugi Yasushi terms the concept of "*Islamization/ localization*" [Kosugi 1999]. According to Kosugi, *Islamization* is not a one-directional process in which certain areas

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[27] Most significant differences are about (a) process of building up argumentation, (b) structure of jurisprudence rule of state: (a) al-Ṣadr used the combination of two concepts, namely "*deputyship*" (*khilāfa*) and "*righteous-guidance*" (*shahāda*) [al-Ṣadr 2000: 127-160], while Khomeini argued "*guardianship*" (*wilāya*) in building us his theory; (b) al-Ṣadr asserted institutionalized mechanism of rule by the collective religious authority [al-Ṣadr 2005b], while Khomeini assumed single supreme leadership. On detailed arguments, see [Yamao 2007a].

[28] The most confidential data shows that Iraq has ethnically 71.1% of Arab, 19% Kurds, 1.2% Persian, and 2% Turkmen; religiously/sectarian 93% Muslim, 3.1% Christian, 2.6% Jewish, 0.8% Yazidis, and 0.2% Sabians; compoundly 51.4% Shi'ite Arab, 19.7% Sunni Arab, 18% Sunni Kurds, and 0.6% Shi'ite Kurds: estimated based on [Batatu 1978: 40; Jabar 2003: 55]. There is, however, no comprehensive census after 1947.

[29] Misagh Parsa stressed socio-political and economic structure in analyzing the Iranian revolution, using Skocpol's theoretical framework [Parsa 1989]. Moaddel also pointed out that the Shah's economic, social, and cultural polities from the 1950s on, and the connection between his rule and the imperialist power, provided effective constraints on the ideologies of the opposition movement [Moaddel 1993: 50].

come to accept Islam and be more Islamic, but is a process of the incorporation of its indigenous elements into the Islamic institutions of that area; thus, making Islam local in a sense. *Islamization* and *localization* are both processes that occur in a complementary manner——*Islamization* of the region and the *localization* of Islam [Kosugi 1999: 143][30]. Furthermore, *re-Islamization* is related to indigenous contexts remaining an element of localization, although the contemporary situations of a certain area must be accommodated. In the same logic of this concept, Islamic ideologies held during the Islamic revolution of Iran were considered to be localized in the context of socio-economic fabric of Iran in the 1970s. Hence, these ideologies deserved to be different from those of the Iraqi Islamic parties.

The fact that the Iraqi Islamic parties were restricted by the socio-political structure of Iraq reflects that they were emphasizing issues concerning the "*Iraqi nation*". Indeed, a large number of Iraqi Islamic parties attached significant importance to the ethnic-sectarian cleavages among Iraqi people, and stressed that they had to reconstruct an equal society in terms of ethnic-sectarian consideration. In other words, they argued with regard to the manner in which the Iraqi society and concept of Iraqi people must be reconstructed, while they had ambivalent image toward their own country; they had antipathy and hostility toward the Ba'thist regime on the one hand, and were patriotic with regard to their country on the other. Following Benedict Anderson's concept of "*long-distance nationalism*" [Anderson 1998], the more distance one is from his own country, the more passionate one is in stressing the national identities he longs to have. What is important in this context, however, is not with regard to the strength of nationalism, but the manner in which the nation must be to (re-)defined, which should not be secular, not divided on ethnic-sectarian lines, and be harmonized with Islamism.

In other words, it is much more important for the Iraqi Islamic parties to reconstruct the *Iraqi nation* than strengthen the existing concept of nation. Furthermore, they were in exile within Iran where the Islamic state was established; however, this Islamism was different from that of the Iraqi Islamic parties. That is the reason that the Iraqi Islamic parties stressed *Iraqiness* and Islamism (of themselves, not of Iranians) in the course of reconstructing their own identities and the Iraqi nation[31].

Examining the ideological differences between the Iraqi Islamic parties and the Iranian revolution clarified that the Iraqi Islamic parties were restricted by the socio-political structure of Iraq and were maneuvering to reconstruct the *Iraqi nation* by combining *Iraqiness* and Islamism (of themselves), which outwardly appeared contradictory.

2. Impacts on the Subsequent Policy-making of Iraqi Islamic Parties

The fact that the Iraqi Islamic parties were attempting to reconstruct the *Iraqi nation* does not simply that the Iraqi Islamic parties were able to pursue these challenges without opposition. In the course of this reconstruction, however, the Iraqi Islamic parties had to face pressure from the Iranian authority, such as integration of the Iraqi Islamic parties in order to make them work to serve Iranian interests[32]. On account of these pressures, the Iraqi Islamic parties were often forced to reconsider and reconstruct their policies. In other words, the Iraqi Islamic parties were maneuvering

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[30] For all the arguments I cited, his main focus of argument is deconstruction of the Middle East/Arab centric image of Islam and presentation of concept which can make comparison among different areas of the Islamic world.

[31] Rend Rahim Francke exquisitely mentioned that Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s had two concerns which outwardly seem contradictory: (1) maintaining Iraqi identity; (2) approaching to the Iranian revolution as Islamic party [Francke 1994: 159]. In other words, this argument immediately brings to light the dichotomy of Islamism and national identities.

[32] For instance, the Shi'ite opposition was expected to play a part in instigating a Shi'i uprising inside Iraq. Thus Iran convened in Teheran "a conference of solidarity with Iraqi people" at the end of December 1986 [MECS 1986: 145, 380; 1987: 439].

both the reconstruction of Iraqi identities and manage pressures from the Iranian authority at the same time. Furthermore, it was their capacity for dealing with these two challenges that subsequently created differences among them. Thus, first, the shifts of Iranian pressures, and second, the capabilities of the Iraqi Islamic parties to handle the pressures will be examined.

There has been little reference thus far with regard to the shifts of Iranian policies toward the Iraqi Islamic parties. The counterpart of support by the Iranian authority drastically shifted from the Da'wa Party to the SCIRI from around 1982. It must be mentioned that the Iranian authority continued to provide asylum, financial, and organizational support to the Da'wa Party members, particularly before the formation of the SCIRI[33]. On the other hand, it was al-Ṣadr and the Da'wa Party that declared support of the Iranian revolution for the first time after it was achieved. From its headquarters in Teheran, the al-Da'wa Party issued anti-Ba'thist and pro-Iranian announcements and organized attacks on Iraqi facilities [MECS 1981-82: 603].

For certain reasons, however, it can be assumed that the Iranian authority changed its counterpart of support to the SCIRI, and this resulted in providing more financial support to the SCIRI as compared with any other party [Baram 1994: 548-549]. Apparently, Iran was uneasy with the stance adopted by the Da'wa Party and its secretive, Communist-like cell structure (see Figure 1). At one point, Iran's Ayatollah Ḥusayn 'Alī Montaẓerī even called for the disbandment of the Da'wa Party; however, he had to backtrack within a week [MECS 1987: 440][34]. In short, it is evident that there has been imbalance in the support provided by the Iranian authority to the Iraqi Islamic parties.

On account of such shifts in the attitudes of the Iranian authority, the Da'wa Party begun to suspect Iran even though it emphasized its sympathy toward the Iranian revolution[35]. On the other hand, the SCIRI was close to the Iranian authority, according to generous Iranian supporters. The Da'wa Party indirectly criticized the SCIRI for being too close to the Iranian authority. For instance, it attacked the SCIRI for the manner in which it had conducted the election [for the Assembly in 1986], its inactivity, and *not allowing "Iraqis and Islamic cadres" to take responsibility* for "their issue" [MECS 1986: 380] (*italics* added). It is also argued that while al-Da'wa Party insisted on retaining a margin of autonomous power, the MAI was more submissive or loyal to Teheran, thereby demonstrating its readiness to fulfill any mission assigned to it, either in Iraq or elsewhere [MECS 1987: 439-440].

From the arguments above, it may be assumed that the pressures by the host country, Iran, restricted the attitudes and activities of the Iraqi Islamic parties. However, the case is not as simple as that. What, then, made it possible for the Iraqi Islamic parties to adopt different methods? Attention must be paid to the capacities of the Iraqi Islamic parties. A comparison between the Da'wa Party and SCIRI will provide overview of this aspect.

The capabilities of the Iraqi Islamic parties with regard to the reconstruction of the *Iraqi nation* and ability to deal with the pressures of the Iranian authority will be analyzed. The analysis can be conducted from two perspectives: length of activities within Iraq and capacity of conducting activities independent of the Iranian authority.

 (1) Length of activities within Iraq: It is not unreasonable to assume that the longer a party conducts its activities within its own country, the more restricted it will be by the socio-political fabric of the country. Table 6 presents the general characteristics of the three largest Iraqi Islamic parties――the Da'wa Party, SCIRI, and MAI. The Da'wa

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[33] This is partly because charismatic leader of the Da'wa Party, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr had close relationship with Khomeini while he was exile in al-Najaf during the mid 1970s. Following his stance, the party supported Khomeini as well [Ra'ūf 2001: 295; al-'Āmilī 2007: vol.2, 42-51].
[34] The Iranian Prime Minister Ḥoseyn Mūsavī indirectly expressed his frustration with the Iraqi oppositional groups by saying "the oppressed Iraqi people expect more of you, and their expectation demands that your activities have greater variety and diversity and be based on greater expertise" [MECS 1986: 380].
[35] The party asserted that even though it was under Khomeini's leadership and that of the Iranian revolution, the party maintained to consult its own problems to other than Khomeini [HDI n.d.b: 148-149].

Party functioned within Iraq for 23 years. On the other hand, the SCIRI was created in Iran and was never active within Iraq. Members of the Daʿwa Party were able to find refuge in the zone under the control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) even after their exile to Iran [MECS 1984-85: 468]. It can be stated that the Daʿwa Party accumulated *Iraqiness* during its activities within Iraq[36].

(2) Capacity for conducting activities independently: This aspect refers to the capacity or incapacity of independent policy-making despite pressures from the Iranian authority. This will be examined from three perspectives: organizational structure, financial independence, and ratio of 'ulamā'.

(a) Organizational structure: The SCIRI was the umbrella organization, more precisely, the assembly-type organization in the beginning in particular[37], while the Daʿwa Party had a well-organized hierarchical structure. Figure 1 presents the organizational structure of the Daʿwa Party. It was reconstructed based on its strict regulations [HDI n.d.d]. This clarifies that the Daʿwa Party was influenced organizationally by the Baʿth Party, which was affected by the Iraqi Communist Party[38]. More importantly, this strict organizational foundation probably could guarantee independence of the Daʿwa Party from the Iranian authority (see Figure 1).

(b) Financial independence: While the SCIRI depended heavily on Iranian financial support, the Daʿwa party was self-funded [Baram 1994: 550][39]. Amatzia Baram surmised that this may be explained by the great disparity in the size of the two organizations: the Daʿwa party comprised hundreds, perhaps a thousand members, while the regular armed unit alone of the SCIRI comprised a few thousand members. It appears that the financial and organizational independence of the Daʿwa Party renders it more independent of Iranian political directions [Baram 1994: 550].

(c) Ratio of 'ulamā': As mentioned earlier, the leadership of the SCIRI was constructed by 'ulamā', who had a relatively strong connection with Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm. Moreover, the clerical ratio of the members increased from 1986 onward [Jabar 2003: 243] (see Table 2). On the other hand, Baram estimated, from his interview with activists of the party, that only 10% of the Daʿwa Party were "turbaned" ('ulamā'), while over 60% were lay professionals [Baram 1994: 541]. This was because of the deprivation of the senior 'ulamā' from around the late 1980s [Yamao 2008]. Specifically, *the Jurisprudence Council* (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī), which was established in February 1984 and occupied by senior 'ulamā' leadership [al-Khursān 1999: 410-411], was decided to be abolished in the assembly of the Daʿwa Party in January 1988. This implies that the senior leadership, which had relatively strong connections with the Iranian authority, was expelled from the party. Hence, the party was able to adopt policies relatively independent from the Iranian authority.

These differences of capacities and organization among the Iraqi Islamic parties gradually cultivated differences in the directions or policy orientations among them. Due to these elements, as well as changes in support provided by the Iranian authority, the Iraqi Islamic parties can be divided into three types, which will provide an effective picture in the consideration of Iraqi oppositional movements in the 1990s:

(1) Under strong Iranian influences: (i) strong Iranian influences, (ii) weak Iraqi identities, and (iii) compromised

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[36] Baram mentioned citing al-Ṣadr's last communiqué, which stressed cooperation between Iraqi Sunni-Shiʿite relationship that long history of Sunni rule, the Shiʿite of Iraq were more ecumenical [Baram 1994: 543]. This shows that the Daʿwa Party, which had been under al-Ṣadr's influences, was restricted by longer activities inside Iraq.

[37] SCIRI attempted to recruit Iraqi prisoners of war (around 50,000) and Iraqi exiles in Iran, to train them in special camps and then send them to the battle front [MECS 1983-84: 483].

[38] About organizational structures of the Baʿth Party and the Iraqi Communist Party, see [Batatu 1978; Makiya 1998].

[39] Beside the financial support from the Iranian authority, SCIRI's military apparatus called the Badr Army (Faylaq Badr) was under Iranian command [Jabar 2003: 253].

Iraqi identities with Islamism; typical examples of this model are the SCIRI and MAI[40].

 (2) Compromised: (i) weak Iranian influences, (ii) strong Iraqi national identities, and (iii) compromised Islamism with Iraqi identities in order to reconstruct the "Iraqi nation" without being contradictory; typical example of this model is the Da'wa Party[41].

 (3) Distant from Iranian Influences: (i) repelled from Iranian influence, (ii) strong Iraqi identities, and (iii) does not attempt to compromise between Iraqi identities and Islamism, but is western; typical examples of this model are parties that have strong influences of the Western world, in particular of the British, in the 1990s[42].

To recapitulate, the Iraqi Islamic parties were restricted by both the attitudes of the host country and their own capabilities for dealing with pressures from the host country. Due to the change in support by the Iranian authority from the Da'wa Party to the SCIRI, the Da'wa Party became distant from Iranian influences while the SCIRI maintained its distance. This also reflects the capacity of the Da'wa Party in reconstructing the *Iraqi nation*, and also reflects its capabilities of conducting independent activities, such as those for organizational stability, etc. These factors created a complex relationship of cooperation as well as rivalry among the Iraqi Islamic parties.

[Table 6: General Comparison――the Da'wa Party, SCIRI, and MAI]

[Figure 1: Organizational Structure of the Da'wa Party in the 1980s]

V. Conclusion

The Iraqi Islamic parties were indeed under the strong influence of the Iranian revolution in their exile during the 1980s. This does not imply, however, that their ideologies and activities were entirely under Iranian influence. There existed ideological similarities and differences between the parties and the Iranian revolution. The ideological differences found between them were caused by variability in the socio-political structures of Iraq and Iran. Each Iraqi Islamic party in the 1980s had to face pressure from the Iranian authority, which had a similar Islamic ideology, but one that was restricted to Iranian contexts; the Iraqi Islamic parties were faced with the task of reconstructing their Iraqi-Islamic identities. In other words, what they were attempting to construct was neither Islamism of the Iranian revolution nor the existing Iraqi nation.

Examining the ideological similarities/differences between the Iranian revolution and Iraqi Islamic parties

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[40] Because of the end of Iran-Iraq War and death of Khomeini, however, the Iranian authority gradually lost its incentive to support Iraqi oppositional organizations. Appealing to the Iraqi people, Hāshemī Rafsanjānī said that if Iraqi Islamic parties rose against the regime they could "free themselves" from their rulers though he did not promise Iranian support [MECS 1989: 366]. According to this decline Iranian's wills to support Iraqi oppositional organizations, even SCIRI had to seek another new patron in Syria, even though it maintained strong tie with the Iranian authority and headquarter was in Teheran. The SCIRI secretary general (chairman), Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm, met in October 1988 with Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad; he said he would open an office in Damascus and adopt a new strategy for fighting the Ba'thist regime both in Iraq and internationally [MECS 1988: 520].

[41] The Da'wa Party started to distancing from the Iranian authority form the end of 1980s, and emphasizing Iraqi nationalism form the beginning of the 1990s [Yamao 2008]. For instance, the party maintained in its document published in the 1992 that it was necessary to create a government of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people, and for the Iraqi people by saying "it is only Iraqi's right to select political system in the Iraqi government" [HDI 1992: 44], while it stressed its Islamic feature by asserting that it was crucially important to harmonize Iraqi identities with Islamic values [HDI 1992: 76].

[42] These parties are approaching to parties or organizations which claim democracy; for instance, The Association of Iraqi Democrats (Ittiḥād al-Dīmuqrāṭīya al-'Irāqīyīn), The Iraqi Democratic Union (al-Tajammu' al-Dīmuqrāṭī al-'Irāqī), and Iraqi Democratic Movement in Britain (Ḥaraka Tansīq Quwā al-Tayyār al-Dīmuqrāṭī al-'Irāqī fī Birīṭānīyā). See Table 2 in [Yamao 2008].

reflects a reconstruction of the *Iraqi nation* by the Iraqi Islamic parties. The Iraqi Islamic parties in the 1980s had been struggling to re-identify Islamism and the Iraqi nation in the face of pressure from the Iranian authority and the Ba'thist regime. Hence, stressing national identities in the diaspora period was about the reconstruction of the *Iraqi nation* to a much greater extent, which was compatible with Iraqi Islamism, than about the strengthening of Iranian Islamism and the existing Iraqi nation.

The attempts of reconstruction of the Iraqi nation as well as identities of the Iraqi Islamic parties were partly bereft by the pressures from the host country, which did not permit these activities without restraint. According to the changes in the counterpart of support by the host country from the Da'wa Party to the SCIRI, the Da'wa Party became distant from Iranian influences while the SCIRI maintained its distance. This reflects the capacity of the Da'wa Party of reconstructing the *Iraqi nation*, and also reflects its capacity of conducting independent activities, such as those for organizational stability, etc. These factors created a complex relationship of cooperation and rivalry among the Iraqi Islamic parties.

Suffice to say, the processes or capabilities of maneuvering between the reconstruction of the *Iraqi nation* and dealing with pressure from the host country subsequently brought about cooperation and rivalry among the Iraqi Islamic parties as well as differences of policy orientations among them.

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【Table 1: Typology of Iraqi Islamic Parties in the 1980s】

Group	Subgroup	Parties/Organizations	Found	Outlines/Characteristics	Core Members	Note
Factions from the Da'wa Party	Factions in Early Period	Soldiers of Imam (Jund al-Imām)	1970	Oldest faction of the Da'wa Party, which was caused by confrontation between Sāmī al-Badrī (in charge of east Karāda region) and 'Ārif al-Baṣrī (leadership of whole Baghdad branch). It started activities by al-Badrī from around 1977. It has a radical ideologies based on Sayyid Quṭb's *Jihād* theory, which is arranged to be consistent to Shi'ite jurisprudence. It asserts formation of Islamic state and preparation for the second coming of Imām al-Mahdī. Headquarters are in Damascus and Europe.	·Laṭīf Khaffājī (supream leader, living in Damascus), ·Izzat Shabandir (living in Damascus), ·Sa'ad Jawād (living in London), ·Abū Zayd (living in Holland)	Integrated to SCIRI
		Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement (Haraka al-Mujāhidīn al-'Irāqīyīn)	1980	Founded by militant factions of the Da'wa Party based in Teheran, but has relatively strong linkages to guerillas movements inside Iraq, which reported circumstances every month. It is incorporated into SCIRI structure from the mid 1980s.	·Mahdī al-Hakīm (assassinated in Khartum in 17 January 1988), ·Abd al-'Azīz al-Hakīm	
		Islamic Da'wa (Da'wa Islāmīya)	1982	Factions of the Da'wa Party which was based in al-Baṣra branch, and supported 'Ārif al-Baṣrī. It claims armed struggle. It starts to claim that the party should introduce electoral system for deciding leadership, and then split for autonomy.	n/a	
	Factions in Later period	Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī)	1988	Founded by the members of the *Jurisprudence Council* (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī) in February 1984. It is decided to abolish this Jurisprudence Council in the general assembly in January 1988, and its leader Kāẓim al-Hā'irī is defeated in election of leadership. He withdraws from the party and founds this council.	·Kāẓim al-Hā'irī ·Mahdī al-'Aṣifī ·Muhammad 'Alī al-Tashkhīrī (all living in Qom, Iran)	Mahdī al-Aṣifī is also spokesmen of the Da'wa Party itself until the 1990s
		Cadre of the Da'waParty (Kawādir Hizb al-Da'wa)	Jun 1991	Founded by intellectual young leaders of the Da'wa Party in 1991, asserting they should distance from Iranian influences and join process of integration of the Iraqi oppositional organizations. It declares Iraqi nationalism, modernist interpretation of Islam, democracy, political platform suitable to Iraqi society.	n/a	Renamed to Haraka al-Kawādir al-Islāmīya in 1996
Parties founded by Exile Iraqi 'Ulamā' in Iran	Subsidiary Parties of SCIRI	Union of Iraqi Militant 'Ulamā' (Jamā'a al-'Ulamā' al-Mujāhidīn fī al'Irāq)	1981	Founded by Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī and Muhammad Bāqir al-Hakīm in Qom, they declare armed struggle in July 2, 1981. It has organizations such as; (1) *Secretary Bureau* (Maktab al-Amāna al-'Āmma), (2) *Jihād Bureau* (al-Maktab al-Jihādī), (3) *Revelation Relation Bureau* (al-Maktab al-I'lāmī), (4) *Financial Bureau* (al-Maktab al-Māli), (5) *Public Relation Bureau* (Maktab al-'Alāqāt al-'Āmma), (6) *Interior Bureau* (Maktab al-Shu'ūn al-Dākhilīya). Composed of around 80 'ulamā', has electoral system of the leadership, but only M.B.al-Hakīm is designated. Core organization of SCIRI after 1982.	·Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī ·Muhammad Bāqir al-Hakīm ·Abd al-'Azīm al-Kindī (all living in Qom, Iran)	
	n/a	Iraqi Army for Liberation of Iraq (al-Jaysh al-Islāmī li-Taḥrīr al-'Irāq)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	n/a	Movement of Iraqi Refugee (Haraka al-Mahjirīn al-'Irāqīyīn)	n/a	Founded by Iraqi refugee in Iran.	n/a	n/a

Appendix (YAMAO)

		Date	Description	Key figures	Notes
SCIRI	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-A'lā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-'Irāq; SCIRI)	17 November 1982	Umbrella organization founded by Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm in Teheran. It dose not have fixed membership, and contains Sunni and Kurdish parties as well. Core organization is *Advisory Council* (Majlis al-Shūrā), which is divided into two parts in 1986; *Central Advisory Council* (Majlis al-Shūrā al-Markazīya), which contains more than 80 members, and *General Organization* (al-Hay'a al-'Āmma). Most of the power is in al-Ḥakīm's hand, and it comes to have single-party structure.	·Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī (leader) ·Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm (sporksman) [al-Ḥakīm took al-Hāshimī's place in1986]	
Non-SCIRI	Militant 'Ulamā' in Iraq ('Ulamā' al-Dīn al-Mujāhidīn fī al-'Irāq)	Before 1981	It seems to have supporters in central area of the Euphrates river, especially in Kūt. Militant faction of this organization increases power calling itself *Islamic Fath Movement*. This movement occupies the organization itself in 1982, and renames to *Militant 'Ulamā' in Iraq*. It recognizes 1920's Uprising as an ideal opposition, and claims to form *United Islamic Front* (Jabha Islāmīya Muttaḥida).	·Fāḍil al-Mūsawī ·Khālid al-Mūsawī	
Other / **MAI and Subsidiary Parties of MAI**	Islamic Task Organization (Munazzama al-'Amal al-Islāmī; MAI)	1976	Organized by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī based on the *Marja'īya Movement* which was started by Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī in the 1960s. Based in Karbarā'. It criticizes "political party" for being too western, and conducts its activities based on traditional networks of 'ulamā' and the religious establishment. *Advisory Council* (Majlis al-Shūrā) is core organization. Most of the power is in al-Mudarrisī's hand.	·Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī, ·Muhsin al-Husaynī, ·Kāzim al-Asadī	Muḥammad al-Husaynī and Kāzim al-Asadī withdraw from MAI in the late 1980s, and form new factions
	Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain (al-Jabha al-Islāmīya li-Taḥrīr al-Baḥrayn)		Founded by Hādī al-Mudarrisī in Bahrain. It attempts Islamic revolution in 1981, hence becomes illegal, punished to outside of Bahrain.	·Hādī al-Mudarrisī	Non-Iraqi party
Sunni + Shi'a	Islamic Bloc for Liberation of Iraq (al-Kutla al-Islāmīya li-Taḥrīr al-'Irāq)		Political bloc contains both Sunni and Shi'ite parties. It contains; (1) *Iraqi Islamic Movement* (al-Haraka al-Islāmīya fī al-'Irāq), (2) *Iraqi Islamic Party* (al-Hizb al-Islāmī al-'Irāqī), (3) *Kurdish Islamic Army* (al-Jaysh al-Islāmī al-Kurdī), (4) *Muslim Brotherhood* (Haraka al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn), (5) *Movements of Muslim Officers* (Haraka al-Dubbāṭ al-Muslimīn).	·Abū Aḥmad al-Rikābī	Iraqi Islamic Party start to independent activities from around 1991
	Islamic Alliance for Iraqi Students (al-Ittiḥād al-Islāmī li-Ṭalaba al-'Irāq)		Student organization which conducts guerilla activities against the Ba'thist regime inside and outside Iraq.	n/a	
Small Parties	Movement of Blood of Islamic Martyrdom (Haraka Damm al-Shahīd al-Islāmīya)	Before 1980	Founded inside Iraq. It changes name to *Call to the God* (al-Da'wa ilā Allāh) temporary, but backs the former name.	n/a	
	Movement of Islamic Agreement (Haraka al-Wifāq al-Islāmī)	1980	n/a	·Jamāl al-Wakīl	

Source: Made by presenter based on [SCIRI 1983; MAI 1980; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; JUMI n.d.a; n.d.c; n.d.d; UDMI n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; HFI n.d.; HMI 1980; n.d.d; n.d.e; KITI n.d; HMIy 1980; HDSI 1982; IITI 1982; JI 1987; HKI 1996; 1997; al-Khursān 1999: 410-420; Ra'ūf 2000: 253-294, 312-364, 375-380; MECS 1990: 417-419; Baram 1994; Jabar 2003: 221-241, 257-259; Sakai 1995: 74; 1997; 1999: 76].

【Table 2: Member of the SCIRI Council】

Member	Occupation	Affiliation	From	Based in	1st[1]	2nd[1]	Ethnic	Note
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm	'ulamā'	SCIRI	al-Najaf	Tehran	○	○	Arab	Chairman of SCIRI; killed in August 2003
Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī	'ulamā'	independent[2]	al-Najaf	Qom	○	○	Persia	Spokesman of SCIRI
Ḥusayn al-Ṣadr	Lawyer	independent	al-Najaf	London	○		Arab	
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Nāṣirī	'ulamā'	The Da'wa	al-Nasiriya	Qom	○		Arab	Secretary-general of Union of Iraqi Militant 'Ulamā'
Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī	'ulamā'	The Da'wa	al-Najaf	Qom	○		Arab	Core member of Jurisprudence Council of the Da'wa Party
'Abd al-'Azīz al-Ḥakīm	'ulamā'	SCIRI	al-Najaf	Tehran	○	○	Arab	Chairman of SCIRI after 2003
Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī	'ulamā'	MAI	Karbara	Tehran	○	○	Arab	Supreme leader of MAI
Muḥammad Mahdī al-Āṣifī	'ulamā'	The Da'wa	al-Najaf	Tehran	○	○	Persia	Member of Jurisprudence Council of the Da'wa Party
Jawād al-Khāliṣī	Engineer	independent	al-Kazimiya	Damascus	○		Arab	
Akram al-Ḥakīm	Professor	SCIRI	Karbara	London	○	○	Arab	
'Alī al-Mūsawī	Engineer	independent	al-Najaf / Baghdad	London	○		Arab	
Ibrāhīm al-Ja'farī	Physician	The Da'wa	Karbara	London	○	○	Arab	Leader of the Da'wa Party (until May 2007)
Ṣāliḥ Adīb	Engineer	The Da'wa	Karbara	Tehran	○	○	Arab	
Ḥusayn Faraj Allāh	'ulamā'	independent	al-Basra	Khusestan	○		Arab	
Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qabānjī	'ulamā'	n/a	al-Najaf	n/a	○		Arab	
Shihāb Abū Ḥaydar	Engineer	The Da'wa	al-'Amara	n/a	○		Arab	
Muḥammad Najīb Bārzānjī	'ulamā'	HI[3]	Harabja	London		○	Kurds	
Muḥammad al-Ḥaydar	'ulamā'	independent	Baghdad	Tehran		○	Arab	
'Abd al-Ẓahra 'Uthmān	Teacher	The Da'wa	al-Basra	Tehran		○	Arab	
Muḥammad Taqī Mawlā	'ulamā'	HI	Kirkuk	n/a		○	Turkmen	
Sāmī al-Badrī	'ulamā'	Jund al-Imām	Baghdad	n/a		○	Arab	
n/a	n/a	The Badr Army	n/a	n/a		○	Arab	Leader of the Badr Army

Note: 1) indicates members of 1st Period (Assembly of *Advisory Council* in1982), 2nd Period (Assembly of *Central Advisory Council* in 1986-90)

2) independent indicates members who are pro-al-Ḥakīm family, or pro-SCIRI

3) HI indicates Kurdish organization of Islamic Movements (al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmīya)

* Ratio of increased around 8% from 56% in the 1st Period (9 out of 16) to 64% in the 2nd Period (9 out of 14)

Source: Made by presenter based on [Ra'ūf 2000: 221-226, 305-316; Ra'ūf 2002: 279-282; Jabar 2003: 239-249] and other news information

Appendix (YAMAO)

【Table 3: Ideologies of Iraqi Islamic Parties in the 1980s】

Parties/Organizations	Foreign Relations	Domestic Policies: the Ba'thist regime	Social Relations: the *mustaḍ'afīn*	Social Relations: Masses in Iraq	Islamic revolution	Other
<Factions of the Da'wa Party> The Da'wa Party (Ḥizb al-Da'wa al-Islāmīya)	· liberation from colonial dominations	· supported by imperialism, injustice regime · no legitimacy · tries to divide Islamic movements of Iraq · tries to divide ethnic and sectarian groups · overthrow the regime	· support for movement of the *mustaḍ'fīn*, that in Palestine of particular · stress the liberation of the *mustaḍ'fīn*	· liberation of Iraqi people from the oppressive regime	· achievement of Islamic revolution · the party is under Khomeini's domination, but consults its own problems to party's own 'ulamā' · support to Khomeini and ready to cooperate with him	· formation of *vanguard* (ṭal'a) · collective leadership · cooperation between the religious establishment and Islamic parties · cross ethnic-sectarian integration · call for joint struggle with Kurdish and Marxist organizations · ethnic sectarian equal society
Soldiers of Imam (Jund al-Imām)					· strong support to Khomeini	
Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement (Ḥaraka al-Mujāhidīn al-'Irāqīyīn)		· dictatorship, Fascism or Nazism-like regime		· necessitiy of development compatible to Iraqi society		· succession of Muḥamma Bāqir al-Ṣadr's legacy · criticism toward tribalism
<SCIRI and its Subsidiary> Union of Iraqi Militant 'Ulamā' (Jamā'a al-'Ulamā' al-Mujāhidīn fī al'Irāq)	· enemy = Party of Satan = the United State · struggling against the Ba'thist regime is struggle against American colonialism in order to protect Islam	· tries to divide Islamic movements · overthrowing the Ba'thist regime is primary object · overthrowing the regime can be achieved only be armed struggle	· revolution of the *mustaḍ'fīn*		· support to *Wilāya al-Faqīh* theory of Khomeini · ideal Islamic regime was established in Iran · achievement of Islamic revolution · Khomeini is ideal leader	· cooperation between 'ulamā' and Islamic movements · necessity of militia · formation of *vanguard* (ṭal'a) and organization of masses · integration of Islamic movements · cross ethnic-sectarian co-struggle
SCIRI (al-Majlis al-A'lā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-'Irāq)	· struggling against the United State is struggle against international imperialism	· injustice regime supported by colonialism · overthrow the dictatorship	· part of the struggle of the *mustaḍ'fīn*	· Iraqi state must be ruled by Iraqi people	· alliance with Khomeini · 'ulamā' must lead Islamic movements	· integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements · cross ethnic-sectarian mobilization and organization
Movement of Iraqi Refugee (Ḥaraka al-Mahjirīn al-'Irāqīyīn)	· against imposing economic blockade	· supported by the United State				· Iraqi refugee has been produced by the regime policy that has been trying to divide ethnic-sectarian groups

86

Appendix (YAMAO)

<Non-SCIRI> — Militant 'Ulamā' in Iraq ('Ulamā' al-Dīn al-Mujāhidīn fī al-'Irāq) [1]

- the United State imperialism is hostile to Islamic revolution, tries to use containment policy by forces
- against American imperialism and colonialism
- struggle against Communism and American imperialism
- the regime enters into alliance with world wide imperialism
- distortion of Islamic belief
- dictatorship, Fascism or Nazism-like regime
- liberation of the tribes of mid Euphrates river
- liberation of the *mustad'fīn* is Islamic mission
- liberation of the *mustad'fīn* under regionalism
- denial of ideal regime
- struggle for Islamic liberation of Iraq from the individual interests of each organization
- cooperation with *Umma*
- Islamic revolution of Iran is ideal revolution and establishes ideal regime
- urgent need of revolution and individual interests of each organization
- •Khomeini is leader of Islamic by Iraqi people
- •1920's Uprising is ideal opposition
- •'ulamā should have political sense
- •integration of oppositional movements
- •overcome factionalism and ...

<MAI> — Islamic Task Organization (Munazzama al-'Amal al-Islāmī)

- *Jāhilīya* typed regime
- overthrow the dictatorship
- ethnically sectarian *mustad'fīn*
- exclusive nature
- state terrorism
- revolution of the *mustad'fīn*
- formation of leadership of the Iraq
- mass movement in Iraq
- •support to *Wilāya al-Faqīh* theory of Khomeini
- •formation of Islamic state
- •each country should have elected by the people
- •importance of mass revolution
- •regional Islamic readership
- •political party ×, organization ○
- •leadership of religious authority has ultimate legitimacy
- •members of leadership should be elected by the people

<Sunni-Shi'a> — Islamic Front for Liberation of Iraq (al-Kutla al-Islāmīya li-Tahrīr al-'Irāq)

- remove exploitation by the State colonialism
- supported by the United State colonialism
- part of the struggle of the *mustad'fīn*
- dispatch delegation consisted of representatives from movements and each organization inside Iraq to Iran
- •Iranian regime is responsible for adjusting all the Islamic movements and developing Muslim solidarity
- •hope to revolution, now that conditions already exist
- •demand for security and human rights
- •administration should be conducted by *Shūrā* whose member is elected by people
- •denial of all ethnic and sectarian discriminations in all agendas

<Small Parties>

Movement of Blood of Islamic Martyrdom (Haraka Damm al-Shahīd al-Islāmīya)

- support to other Islamic movements trying to liberate from domination of colonialism or dictatorship
- agitates racism and sectarianism
- extremely oppressive
- •Khomeini is leader of all Islamic movements regardless to ethnic and sectarian groups
- •support to *Wilāya al-Faqīh* theory of Khomeini
- •voice of martyrdom is precious

Islamic Alliance for Iraqi Student (al-Ittihād al-Islāmī li-Talaba al-'Irāq)

- •organize *mujāhidīn* inside Iraq
- •formation of *vanguard* (talī'a) by students

Note: 1) included ideology of Islamic Fatah Movement, because Militant 'Ulamā' in Iraq changed it name to Islamic Fatah Movement in 1982

Source: Made by presenter based on [HDI 1981; 1981-89; 1982; 1983; 1984; n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; JUMI n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; UDMI n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; SCIRI 1983; MAI 1980; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; HFI n.d.; HMI 1980; n.d.d; n.d.e; KITI n.d; HMIy 1980; HDSI 1982; IITI 1982; JI 1987]

【Table 4: Comparison of Ideologies between Iraqi Islamic Parties and Iranian Revolution】

Ideologies	Iranian rev. [1]	HDI [2]	SCIRI [3]	MAI [4]	JUMI [5]	UDMI [6]	HMI [7]	KITI [8]
Foreign Relations								
➤Struggle for anti-imperialism	○		○	○	○	◎		◎
➤the United State＝imperialist/colonialist	◎	○	○		◎	◎		◎
Domestic Policies								
➤Anti-monarchy (i)	◎	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
➤Anti-dictatorship (i)	○	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
➤Regime/old regime supported by colonialism	○	○	○	○	○	◎	○	◎
Social Relations								
➤Liberation of the *mustaḍʻafīn/mostazʻefīn*	◎	◎	○	◎	○	◎		○
➤Construction of Islamic society	○	◎	○	◎	○	○		○
➤Equal society, denial of classes	○	○					○	○
➤Cooperation with masses inside Iraq		◎	○	○		◎	◎	◎
Islamic Revolution								
➤Islamic state should be republic	◎	○	○	○	○	○		○
➤Revolutionary spirits and martyrdom	◎	○	○	○	○	◎		
➤Utilizing Islamic/Shiʻite symbols (i)	◎	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
➤Export of revolution (i)	○	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
➤*Wilāya al-Faqīh/Velāyat-e Faqīh*	○	△	○	△	○	○		✓
➤Khomeini is leader of Islamic revolution	◎	△	○	○	◎	◎		△
➤ʻUlamā's role to rule the state (ii)		○	◎	◎	◎	◎		○
Other								
➤Integration of Islamic movements		◎	◎		◎	◎		○
➤Ethnic differences is not exist (iii)	○	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
➤Ethnic sectarian equality (iii)	✓	◎	◎		○	○		◎
➤Mobilization of mass, formation of vanguard	○	◎	○	◎	◎	◎		○

◎＝strongly stress, ○＝stress, △＝approval, ✓＝no reference (confirmed), Blank＝no reference (without confirmed), ×＝denial

Note: 1) it shows the collective ideologies of the Iranian revolution, which are represented by those of the leader of the revolution, Khomeini, during 1979 and the mid 1980s

2) HDI; Islamic Daʻwa Party (Ḥizb al-Daʻwa al-Islāmīya)

3) SCIRI; Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-Aʻlā li-l-Thawra al-Islāmīya fī al-ʻIrāq)

4) MAI; Islamic Task Organization (Munaẓẓama al-ʻAmal al-Islāmī)

5) JUMI; Union of Iraqi Militant ʻUlamā' (Jamāʻa al-ʻUlamā' al-Mujāhidīn fī al-ʻIrāq)

6) UDMI; Militant ʻUlamā' in Iraq (ʻUlamā' al-Dīn al-Mujāhidīn fī al-ʻIrāq)

7) HMI; Iraqi Mujāhidīn Movement (Ḥaraka al-Mujāhidīn al-ʻIrāqīyīn)

8) KITI; Islamic Bloc for Liberation of Iraq (al-Kutla al-Islāmīya li-Taḥrīr al-ʻIrāq)

Source: Made by presenter based on [HDI 1981; 1981-89; 1982; 1983; 1984; n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; SCIRI 1983; MAI 1980; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; JUMI n.d.a; n.d.c; n.d.d; UDMI n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; HFI n.d.; HMI 1980; n.d.d; n.d.e; KITI n.d; Fischer 1980; Abrahamian 1993; Moaddel 1993; Milani 1994; Tomita 2002; Matsunaga 2005; Yoshimura 2005].

【Table 5: Ideological Shifts of the Da'wa Party】

Agendas of Ideology	Turn to revolutionary movement — Turning point ①	Exile — Turning point ②	Incline to Iraqi nationalism — Turning point ③	Iraqi War and turn to ruling party — Turning point ④	
	1957~74	1975~79	1980~88	1990~2003	2003~
Comprehensive socio-political reform by Islam					
Political role of the religious establishment					
Decision making in *Advisory Council* (Majlis al-Shūrā) [1]					
Secretive methods of activities					
Four stages of activities (reform, politics, revolution, rule)					
Peaceful political participation					
Political role of 'ulamā'/leadership of authority [1]					
Overthrow of the Baʻthist regime					
Mobilization of masses, formation of *vanguard* [2]					
Applying Islamic law					
Formation of Islamic state					
Armed struggle for Islamic revolution					
Achievement of Islamic revolution					
Anti-colonialism, anti-the United State imperialism [3]					
Liberation of the *mustad'afīn* (oppressed people)					
Ethnic-sectarian equal society					
Integration of Islamic parties/organizations					
Integration of Iraq					
Iraqi nationalism					
Decentralization [4]					
Expel of occupying military					
Democracy; approval of plural values					

Note: 1) The party firstly asserted political participation based on decision of *Advisory Council*, then followed legal opinions of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr's *Rule of Objective Authority* theory, then opinions of the *Jurisprudence Council* headed by Kāẓim al-Ḥāʼirī from 1984, and finally most of the mainstream followed legal opinions of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh from 1988 [al-Khursān 1999: 418, 420].

2) *Vanguard* (talīʻa) meant the party itself in its document in the early days [al-Ṣadr 2005a: 707]; the bylaws of the party in the 1980s stressed the importance of *vanguard of masses* as well [HDI n.d.a: 120].

3) The party opposed firstly to colonialism in general, then to the United State imperialism in the 1980. After the Gulf War, however, it strongly criticized America for not helping their Shaʻbān Uprising.

4) Their decentralization is to avoid ethnic and sectarian conflicts, not to establish federal state that the Kurdish parties, for instance, want to after the Iraqi War 2003.

Source: Made by presenter based on [HDI 1974; 1981-89; 1983; 1984; 1992; n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; n.d.d; n.d.e; al-Khursān 1999; al-Ṣadr 2005a], homepage of the Da'wa Party (http://www.islamicdawaparty.com/)

【Table 6: General Comparison of the Da'wa Party, SCIRI, and MAI】

	The Da'wa Party	SCIRI	MAI
Founded in	October 1957	November 1982	1976 (as movement from the 1960s)
Place of foundation	Al-Najaf/Karbara'	Teheran	Karbara'
Leadership	'ulamā'→lay	'ulamā'	'ulamā'
Composition of leadership	'ulamā'+lay intellectual	Mostly 'ulamā' (+lay intellectual)	'ulamā'
Network of 'ulamā'	Al-Ṣadr family (al-Kazimiya/al-Najaf)	Al-Ḥakīm family (al-Najaf)	Al-Shīrāzī and al-Mudarrisī families (Karbara')
Organizational structure	Highly organized, pyramid-typed hierarchical structure	Umbrella organization → single party	Traditional network-typed, based on the Shi'ite religious establishment
Membership	Intellectual+mass	Mass+ intellectual	Elites
Mobilization type	Ideology	Ideology+ family network	Ideology+ family network
Headquarters/branches	Teheran/Damascus/London	Teheran/Qom/Damascus	Teheran
Type of Islamism	Pan-Islamism	Pan-Islamism (strong pan-Shi'ism)	Pan-Islamism (relatively strong pan-Shi'ism)
Relation with Iran	Relatively independent	Strong dependent	Dependent
Period of activities in Iraq[1]	23 years	0	4 years (as movement 15 years)
Period of activities in Iran	8 years (23 years) [2]	21 years	23 years
Iraq nationalism	Strong	Relatively weak	weak

Note: 1) calculated years form their foundation until the Iraqi War 2003 (however, each parties conducted activities in Kurdistan region and southern marsh after the exile in 1980, which periods are excluded)

2) headquarter of the Da'wa Party moved from Teheran to Damascus in 1988 (number in the parentheses shows the years of Teheran branch)

Source: Made by presenter based on various sources

【Figure 1: Organizational Structure of the Daʿwa Party in the 1980s】

Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhī)

General Leadership (al-Qiyāda al-ʿĀmma)

Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyāsī)

Central Committee of Thought (al-Lajna al-Fikrīya al-Markazīya)

Central Committee of Organization (al-Lajna al-Tanzīmīya al-Markazīya)

Central Committee of Unity (Lajna al-Ittihādāt al-ʿĀmma)

Central Committee of Finance (al-Lajna al-Mālīya al-Markazīya)

Central Office of Student (Maktab al-Talaba al-Markazī)

Central Office of Labors (Maktab al-ʿUmmāl wa al-Kusba al-Markazī)

Central Office of Arrangement (Maktab al-Mutābaʿa wa al-Tansīq al-Markazī)

Central Office of External Relation (Maktab al-ʿAlāqāt al-Khārijīya al-Markazī)

Central Organization of Estimation (al-Hayʾa al-ʿĀmma li-l-Indibāt wa al-Taqyīm al-Hizbī)

General Conference of the Party (Muʾtamar al-Daʿwa al-ʿĀmm)

Regional Leadership (al-Qiyāda al-Iqlīmīya)

Regional Conference of the Party (Muʾtamar al-Daʿwa al-Iqlīmī)

Regional Committee of Jurisprudence (al-Lajna al-Fiqhīya al-Iqlīmīya)

Regional Committee of Thought (al-Lajna al-Fikrīya al-Iqlīmīya)

Regional Committee of Politics (al-Lajna al-Siyāsīya al-Iqlīmīya)

Regional Committee of Organization (al-Lajna al-Tanzīmīya al-Iqlīmīya)

Regional Organization of Estimation (al-Hayʾa al-Indibāt wa al-Taqyīm al-Hizbī)

Regional Office of Student (Maktab al-Talaba al-Iqlīmī)

Regional Office of Labors (Maktab al-ʿUmmāl wa al-Kusba wa al-Muwazzafīn al-Iqlīmī)

Regional Office of Religious Person (Maktab Rijāl al-Dīn al-Iqlīmī)

Regional Office of External Relation (Maktab al-ʿAlāqāt al-Khārijīya al-Iqlīmī)

Area Committee (Lajna al-Mintaqa)

Local Committee (al-Lajna al-Mahallīya)

Core Cell (al-Kaliya)

Cell (al-Halqa)

(…)

Arrow labels: Election, Estimation, Designation, Party Selection, Selection, Coordination, Attendance

Source: Made by presenter based on [HDI n.d.a, vol. 2, n.d.b: 95-202; al-Khursān 1999: 367-368, 390-395, 521-537, 583-623]

Islam, Arabness, and State Formation: A Debate on the Demographic Imbalance in the UAE[*]

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I.   Introduction

Since its independence from the British protectorate in 1971, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become one of the oil-rich countries in the Arabian Gulf.   Former president Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1918–2004), who was famous for being a "charismatic leader," attempted to build the UAE into a modern state through distributing oil money.   As a result of the developing processes and globalization, the UAE became a diverse and unique state: although it is an Arab-Islam country, politically and economically stable, more than 80% of the population includes expatriates who belong to more than 130 countries.

Most of the expatriates are not "immigrants" but guest workers and their families[1].   They support all aspects of the UAE life, from being a national family's maid to a top company's CEO. They bring their own language and culture to the UAE society, where English is de fact lingua franca, though the national language is Arabic.   If we walk in Dubai, which is the most active and growing city in the Middle East, we will not be able to find a UAE national or Emirati, but instead see an Indian or a Pakistani.   Males constitute about more than 70% of the population because most of the workers cannot bring their family to the UAE for financial reasons[2].   This situation is similar to the other Gulf countries such as Qatar and Kuwait.

Ten years after the establishment of the UAE, the problem of expatriate workers and demographic imbalance became one of the political issues for the UAE.   At present, these problems, related to the national identity problems, are considered as serious and prioritized to be resolved.   Since the UAE government believes that the present UAE is not a "salad bowl" but a

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[1] The UAE. government does not consider these laborers as "immigrants," but guest workers or temporary workers.

[2] Expatriates who want to bring their families are required to provide income verification of a monthly salary of more than AED 4,000.

"melting pot," it apprehends the disappearance of the core of the state, such as its own national, religious, and cultural identities.   Therefore, the UAE attempts to build and retain their national identity through education, social development activities, and cultural policies.

Many detailed studies on the history and state formation process of the UAE [Abudullah 1979; Heard-Bey 2004 (1982); Peck 1986; Taryam 1987] and statistical studies on expatriate workers [Bonnie 1997; Birks 1988; Fasano & Goyal 2004; Al-Qudsi 1998] have been conducted. However, few studies have been conducted on the UAE society, particularly the social relations between the UAE nationals and expatriates and the manner in which they affect each other.   The questions that we should consider include the following: "who is a UAE national?" and "who is an expatriate?"   Most discussions are based on the understanding of the UAE residents by "national/expatriate" dichotomy, and it is clear that this dichotomic understanding simplifies our understanding of the UAE.

This paper aims to show the difficulties of defining nationals and consolidating national identity through Islam and Arabness ('urūba) as main elements of the UAE: how they have been transformed in the process of state formation and social transformation, and how the government attempts to retain the national identity through Islam and Arabness?   In the most general sense, "Arabness" indicates "the quality of being an Arab"; however, in this paper, I will consider the meaning in the group sense or "aṣabīya" because it can be stated that both of the terms have similar meaning and partly overlap in the context of the Arabian Peninsula.

In order to discuss these points, first, I attempt to describe the process of state formation and social transformation to identify the reasons that led to the emergence of demographic imbalance. Second, I elucidate some roles of Islam and Arabness in the UAE from the viewpoint of the Nationality Law.   Third, I discuss a debate about national identity using the policy of the Marriage Fund Program.

II. State Formation and Transformation of Demographic Structure

1. State Formation and Modernization in the UAE

On December 2, 1971, the UAE was established by seven Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujaira, and Ra's al-Khaima.   Abu Dhabi, the richest oil-producing emirate, has mainly contributed to the federal budget and allocated oil revenues to state development; besides, it has dominated key positions of the federal government such as president, foreign minister, and interior minister.   The first president of the UAE, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan who was elected from seven rulers, presided on the presidential seat for 33 years.

After the Middle East War IV in 1973, the development of the UAE accelerated due to the "oil boom."   Oil revenue had increased tenfold from 551 million dollars in 1972 to 5,536 million dollars in 1975, and then to 18.3 billion dollars in 1981 [al-Sadik 2001: 227].   According to the Federal Constitution articles 120–122, each emirate possessed the right to develop its own natural resources and economy.   However, since the northern Emirates do not have adequate natural resources to develop by themselves, they depend on the federal government.   Central objects of the developing field for the federal government included infrastructure, education, and

Table 1. Development of Infrastructures in the UAE

Infrastructure	1975	1980	1991
Ports	3	10	15
International Airports	3	4	5
Road system（km）	700	2,000	2,700
Satellite Earth Station	1	3	4
Telephone Lines	26,000	116,000	480,500
Post Office	29	–	68
Hospital	19	–	42（1992）
School	198	551（1985）	951（1995）
Housing	94,380	209,077	272,791

Source: [Kazim 2000: 339-341]

social services [ECSSR 2004: 503].   Table 1 presents the development of the main infrastructures in the UAE. during the period from 1975 to 1991.   At the time when the establishment of the UAE was declared, only three highways existed: Abu Dhabi to al-Ain; Sharjah to Ra's al-Khaima; and Dubai to Sharjah.   Citizens experienced extreme difficulty in traveling from one emirate to another [Taryam 1987: 272].   The federal government also focused on the education field to develop human resources.   In 1972, the government introduced public education system at the primary level, following which the UAE University was established in al-Ain in 1977 [Taryam 1987: 262].   The first development boom achieved a peak in 1977; the federal government expenditure in infrastructure was increased from AED 3.5 million (1972) to AED 2,900 million (1977) and then decreased to AED 1,590 million (1983) [Kazim 2000: 338].

As a result of these developments, the UAE was quickly modernized and its society was transformed, particularly the demographic structure.   However, before the UAE was established, the indigenous population was very small, under 200,000 people, and hence, it was not enough to supply both skilled and unskilled labor forces to various fields.   In order to substitute labor shortage, the federal government, consultant companies, and labor agencies introduced expatriate workers from Arab and Asian countries.   Educated Arabs worked in the public and education sector, and most Asian workers, mainly Indian and Pakistani, worked in the construction, retail, and service sectors.   Therefore, the population increased rapidly from 180,000 in 1968 to 5 million in 2006; in this context, expatriates account for more than 80% of the population (see Figure 1).

Another reason for the growth of the expatriate population includes the transformation of economic and industrial structures.   Although the development boom peaked in 1977, oil money still attracts expatriate workers to the UAE.   However, figure 1 indicates that the population of the UAE has been increasing until now, although the development of the infrastructure has slowed. This is because of diversification of the economic and industrial structures.   The non-oil sector, such as construction, manufacturing, service, and domestic help (maid/nanny), has expanded.   In fact, the percentage of the oil sector in GDP has declined from 67.7% (1975) to 22.4% (1998); on the other hand, the percentage of the manufacturing sector has increased from 0.9% to 12.4%, and that of commerce and services increased from 9.3% to 13.7%.   The percentage of the construction sector has continued to increase from 9.0% (1975) to 9.4% (1998) [Butt 2001: 253], which

Figure 1. The UAE Population (1968 - 2006)

Source: various studies.

indicates that this sector remains as the main economic base in the UAE.   These sectors comprise labor-intensive jobs, and the Dubai economy constitutes a noteworthy example.   Dubai is one of the oil-producing Emirates; however, production is significantly less compared to that of Abu Dhabi.   Therefore, Dubai has attempted to develop as an intermediate trade port and commercial center.   Indeed, at present, Dubai is famous for tourism and shopping places that required more skilled and unskilled expatriate workers.   In other words, if the UAE increases its attempts to emerge from the oil economy, then it would require more expatriate workers.

Research on the problems of population imbalance and expatriate labor in the GCC countries often treat them as a dichotomic perspective between national (muwātinūn) and expatriate ('Ajam/wāfidūn) or national vs. expatriate.   An important study on expatriate labor issues in the GCC countries by Andrzej Kapiszewski [Kapiszewski 2001] provides an example. He discussed about the relationships between nationals and expatriates in the GCC states societies, which had previously received less attention; however, the problem arises due to his perspective: simple dichotomy.   This dichotomy excluded the core of the problems.   In general, one nation-state is build by one nation; however, some unbridgeable political, social, and economic disparities exist between the UAE nationals/the other GCC nationals/other Arab expatriates even though they all Arabs.   This indicates that disparities exist not only between national/expatriate but also among Arabs.   A simple example: the GCC nationals cannot exercise political rights in the UAE, but they can enjoy some social and economic rights that are almost the same as those of the UAE. nationals. Thus, the definitions of the terms "national" and "expatriate" are changeable in the UAE or other GCC states.

Table 2. Population Structure by Nationalities in 2006 (Estimated)

Nationality	Population	%
the UAE	824,921	16.5%
GCC national	n.a.	−
Jordan	200,000	4.0%
Lebanon	60,000	1.2%
Egypt	100,000	2.0%
Syria	n.a.	−
Iran	400,000	8.0%
India	1,100,000	22.0%
Pakistan	750,000	15.0%
Bangladesh	500,000	10.0%
Sri Lanka	160,000	3.2%
Nepal	80,000	1.6%
Philippines	250,000	5.0%
Indonesia	35,000	0.7%
China	100,000	2.0%
UK	120,000	2.4%
Illegal Resident	310,000	6.2%
Total	4,989,921	100.0%

Source: [Gulf News; the UAE Population Census 2005; Kapiszewski 2001]

As the table 2 indicates, expatriates dominate by constituting more than 80% of the population of the UAE, and nationals form a minority group.   Generally, nation-state is based on the majority national; however, in the case of the UAE, they account for only 16.5% of the population.   Nevertheless, it is important to note that examining this table from a different perspective reveals that the UAE nationals constitute the second largest nationality in the total population, and hence, they are not a minority group.   Indians constitute the largest group. Pakistanis form the third largest group, followed by Bangladesh and Iran[3].   Iranians are not Arabs; however, they enjoy a special status in the UAE because their countries share historical relationships, and many Iranians have been naturalized; it has been estimated that more than 60,000 Iranian-origin Emiratis have been naturalized [Van Der Meulen 1997: 86].   From the ethnicity perspective, expatriates from the Arab countries make the UAE nationals, who are also Arabs, the majority group.   From the viewpoint of the religious population, Muslims dominate more than 90% (Shiah is estimated to account for 10% of all the Muslims).

In short, the UAE consists of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural states, even though the government emphasizes itself to be an Arab Islamic country.   This situation prepared the UAE government to counter the problem of demographic imbalance.

2.   Emergence of Demographic Imbalance

The influx of expatriate workers led to the problem of demographic imbalance in the UAE.   Three

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[3] Governmental statistics and other studies have not presented the details of the population structure by nationalities due to the lack of statistics and information.   Moreover, this information includes politically sensitive issues because it presents some situations, in which the expatriates or other nationalities "dominate" in the UAE. The data of table 2 is based on local news, governmental statistics and some studies.

kinds of problems exist: growing national unemployment rate, social relationship between the UAE nationals and expatriates, and national identity.   These problems are the main concerns and policy targets of the UAE government.

First, the national unemployment rates have emerged since the late 1980s.   Almost 90% of the labor population in the UAE is dominated by expatriate workers; in the private sector, the share of the labor forces reached 97% [Abdelkarim 2001: 24].   Most of the UAE national workers prefer to enter the public sector because of salary and social security; moreover, they do not want to work as a "blue-color" employee such as construction workers, factory workers, waiter/waitress, or maids.   Nowadays, the unemployment rate of the national work force has become high, which was estimated to be 13% in 2005 [Gulf News in November 17, 2005].   The UAE government has implemented the labor naturalization policy known as "Emiratization" to counter the problem of unemployment; however, the process of Emiratization is encountering difficulties.

Second, related to the abovementioned facts, the working culture and social life affects the social relationship between nationals and expatriates.   In general, their relations have been limited due to the separation of both the groups [Kapiszewski 2001: 178].   This separation and economic disparity between the groups leads to the formation of social classes between the UAE nationals and expatriates, and also among expatriates.   We can discover some reasons in the "sponsorship system (kafāla)"; the power relationship can be observed when expatriate workers require sponsorship and apply for working visa.   While nationals discriminate them by using terms like "We" and "They," expatriates consider nationals to be people who cannot do anything without their support.

Third, national identity, related to state formation, is the most serious problem in the UAE.   Many people, including government and intellectuals, have recognized this problem to be the most significant[4].   At present, not only the western media, internet, or MacDonald's, but also an expatriate worker is a part of the globalization process.   These workers bring their language and culture to the UAE and retain their life style as if they are living in their home country.   It is difficult to find a UAE national in downtown; however, they can be seen in shopping malls. When we saw a UAE national family in a shopping mall, we found them to be accompanied by an expatriate maid or nanny.   Some children do not know the Arabic language because they often converse with their maids in the maids' language: English, Tagalog, or Indonesian.   Moreover, marriages between nationals and expatriates have become another national question because it results in the disappearance of "the national endemism" or national identity.

The UAE nationals enjoy privileges compared to the other expatriates in the UAE; however, they are in the "melting pot," as a large number of expatriates affect the society.   The processes of modernization and globalization have transformed the society; both of them have elements that can integrate and disintegrate the state.   How does the UAE government attempt to

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[4] Officials often express this issue in many aspects of daily political activities; in a recent case, President Shaikh Khalifa stressed the importance of national identity in his speech on the 36th UAE national day [WAM, December 2, 2007].   As another example, Dr. Fatma al-Sayegh (Associate professor of the UAE University) pointed out that the national identity problem is one of the serious issues in the UAE.   It is associated with other problems such as demographic balance and unemployment of the UAE Nationals. [Personal interview with Dr. al-Sayegh in Dubai, February 16, 2007].

safeguard the UAE nationals and their national identity?   In the following chapter, I shall examine the key elements of the state: Islam and Arabness.

III.   Islam and Arabness in the UAE

1.   State Elements of the UAE

Islam and Arabness ('Urūba) play significant roles in the UAE; further, they are the elements of the state and society.   Islam is the state religion and main source of law according to the Federal Constitution Article 7, and the UAE is a member of the OIC; moreover, most of the residents—both nationals and expatriates—are Muslims.   On the other hand, the UAE nationals also have strong feelings towards the tribal and historical linage/genealogy: group feeling or 'aṣabīya.   It constitutes a part of Arabness that is the base of national identity.   The UAE is a part of the "great Arab Umma," which is mentioned in the Constitution as well.

If we examine the policies of domestic politics, foreign affairs, society, culture, and economy in the UAE, we find that they reveal the importance of Islam and Arabness in the context of the UAE, particularly the recent policies for culture.   Since nowadays, national identity is recognized as an important issue, not only for the UAE but also for the other GCC countries, their governments attempt to safeguard and promote both Islam and Arabness for establishing the foundation of their identity.   The GCC states build cultural facilities, such as museum and theme park, and protect cultural properties: it is known as "heritage boom" [Ouis 2002].   In the case of the emirate of Sharjah, there are more than 20 museums around the city center, which is known as the "Heritage area," such as Sharjah Heritage Museum, Sharjah Islam Museum, and Sharjah Art Museum.   These museums collect and display the objects that are originally not only from the UAE, but also widely from the Islam or Arab world; it is similar to "the invention of tradition" by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger or it can be termed as "the purchase of tradition."   Heritage and cultural facilities are two of the important tourism resources; however, they also represent the system/institution for retaining and protecting the national identity to prevent the disappearance of the UAE nationals.

The UAE nationals both include Muslims and Arabs, and thus, the UAE government attempts to strengthen the national identity through Islam and Arabness.   However, there also exist non-UAE nationals who belong to Arab-Muslim category.   In this context, we deal with a new question: what is the difference between the UAE nationals and Arab-Muslims?   They are differentiated from each other by the Nationality Law; let us now attempt to extend this observation into the UAE Nationality Law from the perspective of Islam and Arabness.

2.   Islam and Arabness in the UAE: Viewpoint of the Nationality Law

How does the UAE define and control its "nationals" or "Emiratis"?   In order to answer this question, we shall discuss the Nationality Law (qānūn jinsīya) as a basic definition of the UAE national and a source of national identity.

The Nationality Law in the Gulf countries date from late 1940s, but their strict implementation did not start before the 1960s and in some cases (such as Bahrain and UAE) the

1970s [Longva 2000: 184]. The Nationality Law in the Gulf States has two characteristics. The first is paternal *jus sanguinis*, under which the nationality can only be granted if his or her father is a national. The second is an article that defines "the first generation" of nationals; that is, those who had lived in a specific period before the independence of their countries. Additionally, there are some important articles that prescribe certain requirements for the people who wish to be naturalized: Islam, Arabness or skill of the Arabic language, resident term, and criminal record. The Nationality Law of the UAE exhibits the same characteristics and the UAE national identity is based on it. A survey by C. Davidson shows that the UAE nationals follow "the UAE/Emirati" identity more than "an emirate-specific" or "Arab" identity except for those who are from Dubai [Davidson 2005: 82–84], and it indicates the existence of national consciousness. We shall now examine the UAE Nationality Law more carefully.

The UAE Nationality Law was issued in 1972 and consisted of 48 articles for "Federal Law No (17) for 1972 Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments thereof"; thereafter, it was partly modified in 1975 for "Federal Law No (10) for 1975 Concerning Amendment of Certain Articles of the Nationality and Passports Law No (17) for 1972." Let us consider the UAE Nationality law from three perspectives: tribal and Islamic definition, naturalization and ethnicity, and the right to vote and stand for election.

(i) Tribal and Islamic Definition: Article 2

Art. 2) The following shall be deemed citizens by law:
   A. The Arab who settled in any member Emirate in and before the year 1925 and continued to have his ordinary residence in that Emirate up to the effective date of this law. Ancestors' residence shall be deemed complementary to residence of descendants.
   B. Anyone born in the UAE or abroad whose father is a national by law.
   C. Anyone born in the UAE to a mother who is a national by law and whose relation to his or her father has not been substantiated.
   D. Anyone born in the UAE to a mother who is a citizen by law and whose father is unknown or without nationality.
   E. Anyone born in the UAE whose parents are unknown. A foundling child shall be deemed to have been born in the UAE unless proved to be otherwise.

Article 2 provides the most crucial definition for the UAE nationals because it defines who is a national. Clause A defines the requirements for "the first generations" of the UAE nationals; they must be Arabs and been living in the UAE before 1925. If they are Arabs, then they are automatically regarded as Muslims. Clause B refers to paternal *jus sanguinis*; thus, if the first generations are defined as nationals, then the next generations are automatically granted nationality. The important point to note is that paternal *jus sanguinis* does not place importance on the mother's nationality; further, if a child who is born from a national father and an expatriate mother, he or she is regarded as a UAE national. This is related to the problem of marriage and national identity, which is discussed in the next chapter.

(ii) Naturalization and Ethnicity: Article 5, 6, 7, and 8

Art. 5) The nationality of the UAE may be granted to the people belonging to the following categories:

    A. An Arab of Omani, Qatari, or Bahraini origin if he is a legal resident and has been residing for more than three years prior to his application for citizenship, on the condition that he has legal means of living, is of a good conduct, and has not been convicted for a crime that impugns integrity.

    B. Members of the Arabian tribes who have immigrated from neighboring countries to the UAE and have been continuously residing in the UAE for more than three years immediately prior to submitting the application for citizenship.

Art. 6) Citizenship of the UAE may be granted to any completely competent Arab, who has been a legal resident in a member Emirate, living continuously for more than seven years before submitting his or her application for naturalization on the condition that he has a legal means of living, is of good conduct, and has not been convicted for a crime that impugns integrity.

Art. 7) The UAE citizenship may be granted to any completely competent person if this person has been legally and continuously residing in a member Emirate before or since 1940 and has maintained his original residence up to the effective date of law, has legal means of living, is of good conduct, and has not been convicted for a crime that impugns integrity and is conversant in the Arabic language.

Art. 8) Citizenship of the country may be granted to any person other than those mentioned in articles (5) and (6) if that person is:

    A. Of full liability.

    B. Has resided in a continuous and statutory manner in any of the member Emirates for a period not less than thirty years, of which twenty years at least after this law enters into force.

    C. Has a legal source of living.

    D. Is of good conduct and has not been convicted for a crime that impugns integrity.

    E. Knows Arabic language well.

Article 5 shows that those who are considered to share lineage and genealogy with the Emiratis, such as Omani, Qatari, or Bahraini, can be naturalized easily compared to the other Arabs or nations. One of the reasons why the people from neighboring counties are not required to follow stringent rules is because of the historical relationship they share with the UAE; further, it is because they are Bedouin in origin. Indeed, before independence in 1971, the Trucial states (formerly the UAE), Qatar and Bahrain attempted to unite as one state but failed. According to

another perspective, a naturalized person is required to be skilled in the Arabic language, which refers to the concept of "Arabness."

(iii)   The right to vote and stand for election: Article 13

> Art. 13) A person who has acquired nationality of the country by naturalization shall not have the right of vote, or being a candidate or to be appointed in any parliamentary or public body or any ministerial position. Persons of Omani, Qatari, and Bahraini origin are exempted from the provisions of this article seven years after their acquisition of nationality.

In general, those who were naturalized are categorized as "naturalized citizens"; however, their political rights and engaging in certain public works are partly restricted. Article 13 mentions about the restriction of the right to vote and stand for election; however, even Omani, Qatari, and Bahraini do not place much emphasis on it. The Nationality Law does not mention about the restriction for engaging in public works such as police and military services; thus, a considerable number of Omanis enter the UAE's defense forces.   However, only the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requires nationality of the UAE for both staff and his or her partner [Al Alkim 1989: 100].

Judging from the abovementioned facts, we may state that the definition of the UAE nationals according to the Nationality Law is changeable and flexible in certain cases. According to the Nationality Law, to be a UAE national, the following are required: paternal linage and genealogy, definite residential term, Arabness and Arabic, and Islam. Even Omani, Qatari, and Bahraini share these requirements; although they are not Emiratis, they still have an advantage.

The UAE Nationality Law has been influenced by the opinions of Shaikh Zayed, who was a chief of the tribe; his thought was based on the traditional and tribal life styles. Therefore, he had stressed the importance of tribal and genealogical values for the Nationality Law and national identity. In contrast, Shaikh Rashid bin Saeed Al-Maktum, who was the ruler of Dubai, emphasized on shared experience before residents became rich because Dubai has been open trade city and there exist a considerable number of historical relations between neighboring countries, particularly for Iran [Dresh 2005: 140–142]. The former idea significantly affected the UAE Nationality Law, although there exists flexibility in the operation of the law: there are many Emiratis, originally from Iran, Pakistan, and India, who live in Dubai.

The Nationality Law is a product of modernity, and the state determines who is a UAE national, and then, firmly establishes their framework by it. Further, it provides a source of national identity.   However, there exists an uncontrollable phenomenon for the state: the marriage between nationals and expatriates.

IV.   A Debate on Demographic Balance and National Identity

1. Retaining Islam and Arabness: The Case of the Marriage Fund Policy

The problem of demographic imbalance involves a private matter—marriage. Since the late 1980s, the number of marriages between nationals and expatriates have increased due to the increase in bride price and marriage cost. Thereafter, it has become a political issue because it results in the loss of "the endemism of Emirati" and disrupts the national identity. This marriage is considered as a problem because the children who are born from Emirati fathers and expatriate mothers, mainly Indian or Filipino, are considered as Emiratis according to the Nationality Law. However, do they share Emirati-ness or "Arabness" on the base of the national identity? In this chapter, I attempt to argue this debate using the Marriage Fund Policy.

Before minutely examining the marriage problem, a few remarks should be made with regard to Islam and marriage. In Islam, marriage is very important because it constitutes the foundation of the family system and maintains Umma. Qur'an and Sunna mention about the importance of marriage for Muslims and recommend it. Marriage is a contract between man and woman, whose details are defined by the Islamic law, for example, bride price or "mahr." The bridegroom must pay mahr to the bride when they enter into a contract. The contemporary Middle Eastern countries still follow the Islamic family law or status law. We shall discuss the problem of marriage in detail. The increasing bride price and marriage cost make young Emirati marriage more difficult because they do not have enough money to pay. Therefore, young Emiratis marry expatriate women because they do not have to pay a high mahr. Although no data exists that reveals the amount of mahr paid by them, we can know about the marriage cost from some surveys. Surveys reveal that marriage costs are dependent on the couples; however, the average cost ranges from AED 200,000 (= $730,000) to AED 500,000 (= $1,825,000) [Dresh 2005: 137–138]. Another data reveals that 89% of the male Emiratis who married expatriate women pointed out that they married for the cost [Marriage Fund n.d.: 36]. For example, as a result of this problem, in Abu Dhabi, among the total marriages solemnized in 1989, 47% were between nationals, 36% between national males and expatriate females, and 17% between national females and expatriate males [Kapiszewski 2001: 163].

This situation led to significant social problems and we can point out seven major problems. First, decrease in the number of "pure Emiratis," which threatens the raison d'etre of the UAE. Second, the problems of children's identity. Third, an increase in the divorce rates, which leads to unstableness in the UAE society. Fourth, an increase in the percentage of the unmarried female nationals, even though Islam recommends marriage. Fifth, the increasing tendency to postpone marriages among the young nationals, which leads to a low birthrate. Sixth, influence on the social awareness that weakens the UAE traditions, family values, and social foundation. Seventh, the problems of nationality, citizenship, and Arabness, which are related to the national identity. These abovementioned problems are threatening the foundation of the state: family and home [Marriage Fund n.a.: 64-65].

In order to solve those problems, the UAE government established the Marriage Fund (Mu'assasa Ṣundūq al-Zawāj) in 1992, initiated by Shaikh Zayed. He criticized the problems of expensive mahr and cost of marriage; he stated that "Extravagance in dowries and exaggeration in

wedding celebrations and all matters that exhaust the youth at the beginning of their life are unjustifiable things and are against the teachings of Islam and our deep-rooted traditions" [Marriage Fund n.d.: 26].

Let us focus on the tasks of the Marriage Fund.   The fund provides some services. First, its main service is to provide financial support to young Emiratis' marriages by granting AED 70,000 (= $255,000) to encourage marriage and maintain a stable family.   Second, the fund attempts to reduce expensive mahr and costs of wedding: they visit the tribes in different areas of the UAE to reduce costs and conduct mass wedding parties.   Third, the fund supports researches and studies, publishes and distributes the magazine "Mawadda," and holds lectures and seminars to enhance the awareness of family issues.   According to the fund policies, they are granted a total of AED 1.76 billion ($64 billion) by 2000; finally, the marriage rate between nationals has reached 79% in some Emirates.

Central to this issue is the problem of the Nationality Law that defines the framework of the Emirati.   It adopts paternal *jus sanguinis*, and therefore, the children born from expatriate mothers are regarded as Emiratis by article 2-B of the Nationality Law.   Some surveys show that these children suffer from identity crises and that the divorce rates of the national and expatriate couples are higher than that of the national couples.   It exerts a harmful influence on the attempts of the UAE. to stabilize the state and society.   It can be indicated that the stability of the national families is the same as the stability of the state in the logic of the UAE, and therefore, the UAE government may attempt to intervene in marriages.

2.   Who are Emiratis and Expatriates?

Demographic imbalance symbolizes the contemporary UAE society, which presents the dilemma between modernization and the fear of the "disappearance of the Emirati."   In other words, how does the state achieve a good balance between development and safeguarding nationals?   For the UAE government, protecting the UAE nationals, along with their traditions, culture, endemism, and "purity" as state foundation, is the main concern because the UAE is built on the logic of the nation-state; if nationals disappear, then it will result in the disappearance of the UAE as well.   In order to avoid this consequence, the state attempts to safeguard their nationals through the Marriage Fund and other policies.

However, a discrepancy exists between principals and policies.   The Marriage Fund Policy is based on the Islamic thought and employs Islamic logic in its activities.   Intrinsically, there is no difference between Muslims—they are living in the Umma, and marriage must be recommended regardless of the race, nation, and ethnicity.   The same logic is adopted for Arabness; although the state emphasizes that the UAE is a part of the Arab world and is a brother country, they eliminate certain Arabs from the framework of the UAE.   In other words, the process of state formation strengthens the status of the Emiratis as "nationals"; however, it also excludes expatriates even when they are Muslims or Arabs.

This is another dilemma in which the UAE cannot firmly establish national identity or strengthen the framework of the nation and state; however, they cannot ignore the demographic imbalance as well.   On one hand, emphasizing Islam and Arabness as the national identity

integrates the UAE nationals; however, on the other hand, they might prevent building the national identity because the concept of Islam and Arabness goes beyond the nation and state.   How can the UAE eliminate this dilemma?   We may state that it is very difficult for the UAE to introduce nationalistic policies that exclude expatriates because the UAE cannot exist without expatriate workers in its economy and daily social life, and it is clear that nationalistic policies for expatriates will lead to an unstable situation in the UAE.   For these reasons, the UAE must attain a practical balance between them in order to stabilize the state and society.

V.   Conclusion

In this paper, I discussed the relations between Islam, Arabness, and state formation by using the case of the Nationality Law and Marriage Fund programs in the UAE.   The process of modernization has attracted considerable number of expatriates to the UAE; this has resulted in demographic imbalance and national identity problems.   The UAE attempts to retain the UAE national identity to solve these problems through Islamic and Arabic policies.

It should be concluded, from the abovementioned facts, that Islam and Arabness are important elements of the UAE from the state level to the individual level, which are related to the national identity'; however, both Islam and Arabness are shared by the other Arabs, Muslims, or Arab-Muslims.   The demographic imbalance is one of the biggest problems in the UAE; thus, the government attempts to prevent the disappearance of nationals and firmly establishes the national identity.   The logic of the nation-states does not allow equal treatment to nationals and expatriates: existence of nationality and nationality law defines them and prescribes people who can enjoy welfare provided by the state.   This is a dilemma for the UAE, or for the other GCC countries, because these states have a possibility of excluding expatriates who are Arabs, Muslims, or Arab-Muslims, even if they follow this as a fundamental ideology for state integration.

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　　"Federal Law No (17) for 1972: Concerning Nationality, Passports and Amendments thereof"

　　"Federal Law No (10) for 1975 Concerning Amendment of Certain Articles of the Nationality and Passports Law No (17) for 1972"

Political Activities under Mubarak's Authoritarian Electoral Engineering in the 1980s

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I. Introduction

II. Shift to Multi-Party Authoritarian Rule

III. Parliamentary Elections and the New Electoral Regulations

IV. The Brotherhood and the New Constitutional Framework

V. Concluding Remarks

I. Introduction

Just as national independence was the key issue in the early 1950s, and socio-economic developments in the 1960s and 1970s, democratization became the most and difficult task for the Arab Middle East in the 1980s. From the early seventies up to late eighties, a "wave of democratization" crashed over many countries in Southern Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe. However, the shores of the Arab Middle Eastern counties seem to have been strong enough to resist the wave.[1] Important changes have occurred but they have not entailed progress towards genuine democratization. Rather, these countries have moved to a more consolidated form of authoritarianism. In attempting to explain the failure of democratic transformation in the Arab world, many scholars have called attention to the political cultural and religious orientations of the Middle East.

This cultural approach to democratic transformation has driven some scholars to doubt whether it can be applied in the Middle East. The late Elie Kedourie, looking at Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, concluded that there was an incompatibility between democracy and the Arab political tradition, which he claimed was characterized by autocracy and passive obedience, a situation that left no room for a promising transition towards democracy.[2] Moreover, during the Cold War, Islam, for an Orientalist like Bernard Lewis, seemed inhospitable to democracy. Lewis emphasized that the "traditions of Islam" are not inclined to benefit from democracy, and that if individual Muslims chose to abandon some of their traditions and beliefs, they would accept the Communist, rather than democratic alternative.[3]

However, Mark Tessler uses public opinion data collected in Palestine, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, to examine the influence of Islam on attitudes towards democracy, and concludes that religious beliefs had little influence on political attitudes, and that support for democracy is not lower among those individuals with the strongest Islamic attachments.[4] In other words, Tessler's findings challenge the thesis that religious and cultural orientations discourage the emergence of political attitudes conducive to democracy.

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[1] Vanhanen, Tatu. 1991. *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-88.* New York: Crane Russak; Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman; University of Oklahoma Press; Saikai, Amin & Schanbel, Albercht. 2003. *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges.* United Nations University Press; Albrecht, Holger & Schlumberger, Oliver. 2004. "Waiting for Godot: Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East". *International Political Science Review,* 25 (4).

[2] Kedourie, Elie. 1994. *Democracy and Arab Political Culture.* Great Britain: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.

[3] Lewis, Bernard. 1954. "Communism and Islam", *International Affairs,* 30 (1) January: 3.

[4] Tessler, Mark. 2002. "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: the Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes towards Democracy in Four Arab Countries." *Comparative Politics* 34: 351.

Najib Ghadbian seems to be more optimistic than Kedourie and Lewis, as he concludes that a wave of democratization blessed Arab countries in the 1980s, but that as Islamists achieved clear victories in all elections, rulers, with support from Western powers, responded by putting the brakes on democratization.[5] He continues that if authoritarian regimes show obstinate resistance to a gradual transition to democracy, populist Islamist forces become a very real alternative that can form a new radical authoritarian state.[6] This means that the collapse of authoritarian regimes does not seem promising. However, he sees the process of democratization in a larger framework of regional coordination between Arab populations, which will lead to democratic practices in Arab countries.

External pressure for democratization appears to be a workable solution to Jon Pevehouse, who explores the roles of international organizations in expanding democratization.[7] He argues that external pressures from international organizations can undermine authoritarian regimes by creating economic difficulties and hence exacerbating economic crises. Furthermore, he argues that diplomatic pressures and the resulting international isolation can help de-legitimize a regime domestically.[8] He also encourages policymakers to use international organizations as a tool for expanding democracy around the globe.[9] On the other hand, however, Burhan Ghalioun finds that using external pressure to advance democratization seems unrealistic due to many factors that have delayed the break with authoritarianism. For instance, the fear of a return to anti-Western populism, the desire to retain control over the world's most important petroleum reserves, and the increasing political and moral support of Israel and its supremacy have led Western powers and the United States in particular to renew their ties with Arab regimes that seem to display effectiveness.[10]

Therefore, any attempt to rely on the role of external powers to advance democratization would be impractical, as it is impossible to set a single criterion for assessing the lack of democratic advancement without paying attention to other crucial internal factors. Among the most important is the role of the state apparatus that denies the right of existence to any political or social force that is perceived as a potential challenge to its hegemonic power. On top of this, most Arab regimes in the Middle East have come to realize that there is no need to pay heed to the "Western Pressures for Democracy" due to the complicated situation in the region, America's sinking into the morass of war in Iraq and its failure to make of it a *manar* of "democracy" in the Middle East, while the Iranian nuclear proliferation and stalemate in the peace process remain a source of deep concern to the stability of the tempting oil-rich region.

Apart from the religious and cultural approaches, the study of democratization and civil society in Arab Middle Eastern countries has also drawn the attention of many scholars including Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Saʿid Bin Saʿid al-ʿAlawi, Michaelle L. Browers, Raymond A. Hinnebusch, and many others,[11] who put significant stress on the relationship between the functioning of civil society and democratization. Ibrahim stresses the importance

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[5] Ghadbian, Najib. 1997. *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World*. United States of America: Westview Press: 141.
[6] Ibid., 149.
[7] Pevehouse, Jon. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization*, 56 (3)
[8] Ibid., 522.
[9] Ibid., 543.
[10] Ghalioun, Burhan. 2004. "The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (4): 128.
[11] For more details see: Hinnebusch, Raymond. 1993. "State and civil Society in Syria." *Middle East Journal,* 47. Spring; Browers, Michaelle. 2006. *Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought.* Syracuse. NY: Syracuse University Press; Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1996. *Egypt, Islam and Democracy.* Cairo: the American University in Cairo Press; Al-ʿAlawi, Saʿid Bin Saʿid, ed. 1992. *Al-Mujtamaʿ al-Madani fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi wa Dawruh fi Tahqiq al-Dimuqratiyya.* Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya; and Al-ʿAlawi, Saʿid Bin Saʿid. 2006. *ʿAwaʾiq al-Tahawwul al-Dimuqrati fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi.* Damascus: Dar al-Fikr.

of this relationship.[12] He sees no prospect for democracy without the existence of a strong civil society. He attributes the latest developments and gradual sprouting of civil society since the early 1980s to internal and regional factors. The important factors are the increasing weakness and vulnerability of Arab regimes due to their inability to suppress the steady growth of new socio-economic formations and regional armed conflicts. The exacerbation of these problems and continued failure to deal with them exposed the impotence of Arab regimes.[13]

Al-ʿAlawi also emphasizes the importance of the existence of civil society as well as that of the opposition forces.[14] He sees their weakness as an obstacle to democratic transformation in the Arab world. He further ascribes the lack of democracy to the Arab intellectual who endlessly seems to be heading nowhere, trapped between a sense of belonging to the bureaucratic establishment of the authoritarian state and a revolutionary tendency to make changes in the society.

The weakness of opposition parties is very obvious in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where they win very few seats in parliament. Even in countries where they are relative successful, they lack any legislative influence. Apart from electoral fraud and state regime repression, Vickie Langohr argues that opposition parties are structurally incapable of challenging the authoritarian regimes, and explores other factors that systematically undermine opposition strength.[15] The first is what she calls "incomplete parliamentarianism" where significant deviation from general parliamentary procedures occurs, such as allowing unelected upper houses to censure governments, obstructing elected representatives. Second, the prevalence of independent candidacy among non-ruling party candidates weakens the opposition by preventing the development of party programs that offer a clear alternative to the ruling parties. The third is the opposition's financial fragility.[16]

Another important factor is the fact that the existence of legal opposition forces is in the hands of the ruler, and their role does not go beyond criticizing the ruling party's policies; they do not compete with it in order to take the reins of government. This weakness of opposition forces must have helped authoritarian regimes to stay in power and to further weaken opposition forces by exacerbating the splits between them. Egypt represents a good example of this, as the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections led to great divisions among both the *Ḥizb al-ʿAmal al-Ishtiraki* (Socialist Labor Party, hereafter abbreviated as Labor) and Wafd parties, due to the electoral laws engineered by the regime during the first years in power of President Ḥusni Mubarak (born in 1928 and President of Egypt since 1981).

However, attributing the persistence of authoritarian rule to the lack of a strong civil society in the Arab world implies that people have chosen durable authoritarianism and aspire to be ruled autocratically. Nicola Pratt believes that the problem lies not with the lack of a civil society per se but with the lack of a consensus among civil society actors that could challenge the hegemony underpinning authoritarian regimes.[17] According to Pratt, an oppositional attitude to an authoritarian regime alone cannot be equated with challenging authoritarianism. In order for authoritarianism to be dismantled, it is necessary for civil society to create a new consensus and wage a

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[12] Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. "Civil Society and Prospect of Democratization in the Arab World." In Norton, Augustus Richard, ed. 1995. *Civil Society in the Middle East*. The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden: 29.
[13] Ibid., 51.
[14] Al-ʿAlawi, Saʿid Bin Saʿid, ed. 1992. *Al-Mujtamaʿ al-Madani fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi wa Dawruh fi Tahqiq al-Dimuqratiyya*. Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya; Al-ʿAlawi, Saʿid Bin Saʿid. 2006. *ʿAwaʾiq al-Tahawwul al-Dimuqrati fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi*. Damascus: Dar al-Fikr
[15] Langohr, Vickie. January 2004. "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalization Arab Regimes." *Comparative Politics*.
[16] Ibid., 188-189.
[17] Pratt, Nicola. 2007. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

"war of positions" which challenges the overall complex of socioeconomic, ideological and institutional structures of authoritarianism.[18] She contends that the inability of civil society to reach this consensus is responsible for not only the persistence of authoritarian rule, but also for reproducing a consensus normalizing authoritarianism. In Egypt, for instance, in demonstrating their opposition to *infitah* policies, civil society actors called for the restoration of the regime's commitment to national modernization, including the populist socioeconomic benefits and anti-imperialist foreign polices that characterized post-independence politics.[19]

But it is unfair to place both civil society and authoritarian regimes on an equal footing, because the weakness of the former is a direct product of the state police system that exists in the Arab world. Using both the carrot and the stick, Arab police states see civil society actors merely as human rights activists, a situation that generates a confrontational attitude on the state's part. Civil society may require more experience, professionalism, and human and financial resources, but first and foremost it requires a degree of freedom which still seems to lack in the context of the Arab world. Nobuaki Nutahara, a Japanese researcher on the Arab world who has spent a considerable part of his life in Arab countries, addresses the issue of freedom when he talks about the spread of suppression in almost all countries of the Arab world, the rulers' contempt for their people and their rulership for life, as well as the absence of social justice.[20]

Despite this, we learn from the Egyptian experience that a limited margin of freedom led to a certain level of cooperation among civil society actors, legal opposition forces and "proscribed" actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the communists, with the aim to overturn authoritarian restrictions. The ability of these actors to seek outlets for action under authoritarian rule sheds light on a very important issue: political activism under durable authoritarian rule. If a lack of freedom, in its political and economic dimensions, explains the lack or weakness of civil society, authoritarianism becomes a very hot topic for in-depth exploration, due to its persistence in the Middle East.

The most recent study on authoritarianism in the Arab world is by Steven Heydemann, "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World."[21] Heydemann demonstrates that many authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have been successful in undermining pressures toward democracy by reorganizing new governance strategies to adjust to new global, regional and domestic circumstances. Although authoritarian regimes do not resort to the same scale of repression as in the past, during the last two decades, they have become proficient at undermining and containing pressures for political change by converging around policies designed to preserve authoritarian rule and manage demands for democratization. Heydemann calls this policy an "authoritarian upgrading" through which authoritarian Arab regimes expand the political space – electoral arenas in particular – where controlled forms of political contestation can occur, and reconfigure authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic and social conditions.[22]

This authoritarian upgrading has been shaped by the diffusion across the region, and modification in the process, of what might be called "authoritarian learning." Heydemann notes that the region further witnessed the globalization of new hybrid forms of authoritarian governance, competitive authoritarian and other hybrid regime

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[18] Ibid., 189.
[19] Ibid., 88.
[20] Notohara, Nobuaki. 2004. *Al-'Arab…Wijhat Nazhr Yabaniyya*. Germany: Manshurat al-Jamal.
[21] Heydemann, Steven. 2007. "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World." *Analysis Paper*, No. 13 October. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution.
[22] Ibid., 1.

types that exploit elements of openness and contestation to reinforce systems of authoritarian rule. The upgrading of authoritarianism opened a limited space for civil society, made it possible for political parties to operate more freely, broadened freedom of the press, and acknowledged the legitimacy of human rights. Nonetheless, they continue ruthlessly to police the boundaries of acceptable political practice. What he sees emerging in the Arab world is a hybrid form of authoritarianism which combines tried strategies of the past like coercion, surveillance, corruption and personalism, with innovations that reflect the determination of authoritarian elites to respond aggressively to the triple threat of globalization, marketization and democratization.[23] Heydemann's study exposes five key features that stand out as defining elements of authoritarian upgrading. These are: appropriating and containing civil society; managing political contestation; capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms; controlling new communications technologies; and diversifying international linkages.

In this paper, I do not attempt to address all aspects of authoritarian rules, but I touch upon a very important aspect: the authoritarian electoral engineering of the Egyptian regime under President Husni Mubarak during the first decade of his rule, in the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections. The paper demonstrates how Mubarak used constitutional electoral laws to consolidate his legitimacy and guarantee the stability of his regime. I argue that the electoral arrangements implemented during the first and second terms of his presidency aimed not to exclude the Brotherhood, but rather to use its political participation in the elections to lend credibility to his authoritarian electoral arrangements and diminish the emergence of an effective opposition in parliament. I also attempt to observe and analyze the political role of the Brotherhood's political participation in 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections in the framework of engineered "political pluralism" in Egypt. The paper further highlights how even under authoritarian rules, democratic learning had been taking place among opposition parties in order to overturn authoritarian rules.

Changes in electoral laws under so-called political pluralism (*al-ta'addudiyya al-siyasiyya*) during the Mubarak era has been very effective for consolidating the authoritarian regime and diminishing the emergence of any effective role for the formal opposition parties. Changes in electoral laws have succeeded in weakening the opposition and accommodating the proscribed Brotherhood. By allowing the Brotherhood to contest parliamentary elections, Mubarak managed to weaken the legal opposition [24] by destroying their credibility among the people, lend credibility to his rules, and consolidate the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) with no strong "legal" rival in parliament. Furthermore, opening an outlet for its members to operate in public allowed the Mubarak regime to check the Brotherhood's political weight in order to reframe the future political settings of his regime and secure the dominance of his party over politics with a very limited margin of freedom for the (ineffective) operation of other opposition forces.

II. Shift to Multi-Party Authoritarian Rule

1. Under 'Anwar al-Sadat

The political landscape in Egypt has undergone significant changes since the first multi-party parliamentary elections in 1976. That year's electoral competition under a quasi-multiparty system initiated by Sadat (1918-81, President from 1970 to 1981) was the first such experience for Egypt since the Free

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[23] Ibid., 3.
[24] Apart from the ruling National Democratic Party, there are four major opposition parties: the Wafd, Socialist Labor, Liberal and Tagammau'.

Officers[25] overthrew the monarchal regime in 1952. The shift from a single party to a quasi-multiparty system (*manabir*), with factions being allowed to form within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the sole party at the time, and the subsequent transformation of these factions into political parties, was not the result of a natural development of the relationship between various social forces. It developed, rather, out of a comprehensive plan to reformulate the internal relationships between social actors as well as Egypt's relations with the outside world. In other words, the shift to a multi-party system was bound to the economic open door policy and Egypt's policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.[26] The shift to political "pluralism" was not a regime change to democratization, but rather a process of institutionalizing the authoritarian elements of Sadat's regime.

  During Sadat's rule (1970-1981), the regime aimed in particular at accelerating private sector growth following the 1973 War. In 1974, it adopted Law no. 43 to strengthen the role of the private sector and to allocate more space to individual projects in the Egyptian economy.[27] Sadat must have planned to change the pattern of his country's relationship with the Socialist Bloc in order to establish a special relationship with Europe and the United States. This shift toward the West was further consolidated after the peace agreement with Israel which changed the face of the Middle East and opened the door to subsequent US aid and loans of more than $15 billion from 1974 to 1984.[28]

  The October War in 1973 and the signing of the peace accord with Israel allowed Sadat to concentrate on putting his house in order again. In June 1977, in order to fend off criticism of his policies, limit political participation and restrain the emergence of new political parties, the *Qanun al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya* (Law no. 40) was established to give the ruling ASU the authority to deny licenses to parties.[29] The law put decisions on the formation of political parties into the hands of the regime by establishing a special committee called *Lajnat Shu'un al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya* to which applications for the establishment of political parties were addressed. This committee consisted of four representatives from the regime, including the minister of interior, plus three retired senior judges appointed by the president of the committee, himself being one of the four representatives.[30]

  Then, in order to dispose of those who opposed his internal and external policies, Sadat dissolved the People's Assembly in 1979 and replaced its membership with people who supported his economic policies and the new orientation of the regime.[31] Further political restrictions imposed by Sadat on social and political forces gave rise to widespread opposition to his policies, prompting him to launch a crackdown that swept nearly 1,600 Egyptians into prisons. Hundreds more were detained under house arrest or stripped of official positions in professional associations.[32] It was after this upheaval in the domestic social and political scene that Sadat was assassinated by members of the military on October 6, 1981. Sadat's reckless authoritarian policies had ended up instigating public dissent and alienating both the people and the opposition from the regime.

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[25] The Free Officers were a new generation of army officers, with Muhammad Najib at their head, who led the revolution, forced King Faruq to abdicate, and put to an end the monarchal rule on July 23, 1952. For more details, see Al-Hindi, Hani & Al-Nasrawi, 'Abd al-'Ila, ed. 2001. *Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-'Arab 1951-1968: Nash'tuha wa Tatawuriha 'Abra Watha'iqiha*. Vol. 1. Al-Abhath al-'Arabiyya: 97-102.

[26] Naf'a, Hasan. 1988. "Al-Idara al-Siyasiyya li'zmat al-Tahawul min Nizam al-Hizb al-Wahid ila Nizam Ta'addud al-Ahzab fi Misr." *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, 112 June: 74-77.

[27] Hilal, 'Ali al-Din, ed. 1986. *Al-Tatawur al-Dimuqrati fi Misr*. Cairo: Nahdat al-Sharq: 61.

[28] Naf'a. "Al-Idara al-Siyasiyya li'zmat al-Tahawul": 77.

[29] Ibid., 80.

[30] Hilal, 'Ali al-Din. 2006. *Tatawur al-Nizam al-Siyasi fi Misr 1805-2005*. 2006. Cairo University: Markaz al-Buhus li al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya: 270.

[31] Hilal. *Al-Tatawur al-Dimuqrati fi Misr*: 73.

[32] Stork, Joe. 1981. "Massive Arrests Precede Sadat's Assassination." *MERIP Middle East Reports*, 100/101 October: 43.

2. Mubarak's Search for Stability

Before examining the political activism of the opposition, it is important to shed light on some of the important factors that provided an outlet for its engagement in politics. The most important change to the political landscape prior to the 1984 parliamentary elections was the ascendance of Ḥusni Mubarak to the presidency on October 14, 1981. Mubarak inherited not only a regime that had gone through a severe crisis ending up with the assassination of its leadership, but also a politically staggering regime faced with the accumulation of social and economic unrest. He was left with a regionally isolated state, due to the peace agreement with Israel, and faced a disordered domestic political situation.[33]

This state of turmoil prompted the new leadership under Mubarak to plunge into another crisis regarding the creation of a stable political legitimacy, albeit for different reasons. One can be attributed to a break in the continuity of the regime's leadership, as Mubarak did not belong to the Free Officers whose revolution/coup d'état had brought down the monarchy in 1952 and achieved national independence. Hence, he was unable to rely on the revolutionary credentials of President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasjr (1918-70, President from 1956 to 1970) to secure legitimacy. Another reason can be attributed to the fact that, although he had gained status as the commander of the air forces [34] in the 1973 October War, Mubarak did not participate, politically, in the "victory" against Israel as it was achieved by Sadat, so he was not able to rely on its legitimacy as Sadat had. However, the break of continuity also exonerated Mubarak from responsibility for the signing of the peace accord with Israel as he was further able to reap its benefits.

The lack of grounds for legitimacy and the instability of the regime shaped Mubarak's crisis, and he had to work hard to create a powerful and influential new political elite around him to guarantee the stability of his regime and secure a source of legitimacy. He had to disperse anti-regime sentiments in order to eliminate the elements that had led to the rise of violence. He did so by placing considerable emphasis and commitment to the rule of law, respect for equal rights and the independence of judiciary as the only safety valve for the stability of Egypt.[35] In his efforts to establish new grounds for legitimacy, Mubarak's regime aimed to bring about changes to the country's political system. He resorted to promises to carry the banner of democracy, embrace the rule of law and preserve freedom of speech for all Egyptians.[36] The aim of this promise to advance democratic rule was to achieve reconciliation with various social and political forces until his rule was steady and stabilized. That is why he started his rule by releasing the political prisoners who had been arrested by Sadat's regime in September 1981, including 'Umar al-Tilmisani, the third Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood.[37] This also explains why Mubarak's regime took a compromising attitude towards other political forces, allowing the return of the Wafd

[33] Al-Mishat, 'Abd al-Mun'im. 1982. "Misj wa Ab'ad al-Tahaddi-lil-'indimaj al-'Arabi: 'Ishkaliyya al-Hal." *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi* No. 43: 43.
[34] Robert Springborg. 1987. "The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today." *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 147.
[35] *Al-Ahram. July 20, 1983*, Ḥusni Mubarak's speech on 19 July, 1983. Also available at *Egypt State Information Service online,* http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Politics/PInstitution/President/Speeshes/000001/040101020000000000246.htm (accessed August 16, 2007).
[36] Ibid., Mubarak put an emphasis on democracy, the rule of law and freedom of press; see also Mubarak's speech at the joint meeting of the People's Assembly and Shura Council (Upper House), "Al-Hai'a al-'amma Lil-Isti'lamamat." *Egypt States Information Service*, October 3, 1982: http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Politics/PInstitution/President/Speeshes/000001/040101020000000000198.htm; and Mubarak's speech at the joint meeting of People's Assembly and Shura on the Anniversary Day of Corrective Revolution, thwarat al-Tashjh} October 14, 1983: http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Politics/PInstitution/President/Speeshes/000001/040101020000000000238.htm. (Accessed October 13, 2007).
[37] For more details about Mubarak's strategies towards the opposition during his early years in power, see 'Uda Jihad. "Istratijiyyat al-Ra'is Mubarak fi al-Ta'amul ma' al-Mu'arada 1981-1987." In Hilal, 'Ali al-Din, ed. 1988. *Al-Nizham al-Siyasi al-Misji al-Taghyir wa al-Istimrar.* Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya: 165-210.

party. Although democratization was one of the options that could be used to compensate for Mubarak's lack of legitimacy, it did not bring about a democratic regime change but was tightly restricted, if not even void, as this paper attempts to demonstrate.

Since then, new realities have necessitated new changes that have reframed the political environment in Egypt. Their direct impact has been on the course of parliamentary elections, which have become very important to the survival of the Egyptian regime since 1981. The unique nature of the authoritarian regime in Egypt is that it observes rulings of the judiciary to a certain extent, while carrying out constitutional amendments to preserve dominance over legislative functioning. Furthermore, the continuation of the state of emergency since Sadat's assassination gave Mubarak, who is also the supreme commander of the armed forces and head of the executive, the power to restrain the judiciary and act without the support of the legislature. In addition, of course, being the head of the majority party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), in the legislative body of the state enabled Mubarak to have the keys of both the legislative and executive branches.

Prominent Egyptian historian and judge Tariq al-Bishri notes that the "judiciary is facing a political establishment where the state, legislative authority and the ruling party are three aspects of the same face. They are three forms of one sole authority with one strategy, survival. In order to guarantee the survival of the regime, only one operation is needed every five years which goes on for just two months and that is elections."[38] Under Mubarak's rule, Egypt witnessed five parliamentary elections and the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled four parliaments to be unconstitutional, and two parliaments were dissolved before completing their constitutional terms (the 1984 and 1987 parliaments). This is how Mubarak, the longest-serving president in Egypt under the republican regime, consolidated his rule and extended the terms of his presidency. The latest move was in 2005, when he managed to gain a fifth consecutive term in presidential elections and extended his presidency until 2011.

Muslim Brotherhood and Changes in the Electoral Laws

The biggest beneficiary of the change in the electoral laws was the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, whose members have been able to make inroads into the People's Assembly (PA), the lower chamber of parliament, since 1984. Although the illegal status imposed on the Brotherhood had made it a force outside the formal political structure, it was able to influence politics by mobilizing its members and supporters. The Brotherhood's rising social and political power led it to victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections, when 88 candidates fielded by the Brotherhood won seats in the PA (winning about 20 per cent of the seats), to form the biggest opposition force to the ruling NDP, presided by Mubarak.

The increasing success of the proscribed Brotherhood in the PA was a result of its rising political role in society, which enabled it to play an important political role exceeding that of other legal opposition forces. Its rise on the political scene has and continues to be carried out under a twofold policy of containment. The first part of this policy was the refusal to grant the Brotherhood legal recognition, with the aim of diminishing its rising influence, and the other was refraining from totally preventing its members from participating in the political life of the country, with the aim to maintain social stability and weaken legal opposition forces in the country. The illegal status imposed on the Brotherhood since 1954, however, did not drive its members to react

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[38] Al-Bishri, Tariq. 2006. *Al-Qadha al-Misri bain al-Istiqlal wa al-Ihtiwaʾ*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Shuruq al-Duwaliyya: 66.

violently to the Mubarak regime. Instead, it chose to accept and work within a framework based on rules set by the regime, lending credibility to its orchestrated electoral changes.

III. Parliamentary Elections and New Regulations

1. New Electoral Adjustments

The first parliamentary elections under the new leadership of Mubarak were held in 1984 with the aim, as mentioned above, of securing the regime's stability and establishing new grounds of legitimacy. The elections witnessed for the first time the participation of the reborn liberal New Wafd Party (hereafter abbreviated to Wafd party) that had been abolished, along with other political parties, under Nasir's regime, had re-emerged under Sadat's in 1978, but which had been banned that same year. It finally resumed functioning in 1983 under Mubarak based on rulings from the Administrative Court.[39] The 1984 elections were also preceded by municipal and Majlis al-Shura [40] (Upper House or Consultative Assembly) elections. The general political environment anticipated change as Mubarak had been discussing democracy, reforms on all levels, and the need to reach a national consensus in the country and among all political parties.

Both the Shura and municipal elections had a major impact on the 1984 parliamentary elections. These elections for the Shura Assembly showed, for the first time, a level of cooperation among the opposition forces. On July 16, 1983, they held a conference to discuss the electoral laws and announced that they had unanimously decided to boycott the elections. They voiced their objection to *al-qaʾima al-mutlaqa* (the complete list) system, which gave all the available contested seats to the party whose list got the most votes, and demanded the right for all political parties and forces to freely form parties and newspapers.[41] Not to mention that, according to the constitution, a third of the Shura Assembly's seats were to be filled by the president for six-year terms, with the remaining seats being contested in the elections, so that the opposition would have to win a super-majority of the remaining elected seats to get representation.

Needless to say, under the complete list system, the ruling NDP would be the inevitable winner in the Shura elections, and opposition parties would be unable to gain any representation. Regardless of the efficacy of the opposition's attitude and the results of both elections, it was an invaluable experience that revealed that the opposition could work collectively against the elections. It showed the importance of solidarity between the opposition forces. However, the course of this "collective action" of the opposition changed during the PA

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[39] The secular-liberal Wafd party was one of the great political forces in Egypt. It emerged from a mass nationalist non-violent uprising in 1919 in the wake of British-ordered exile of its leader, Saʿd Zaghlul. The uprising led to quasi-independence from the British in 1922 by forcing the withdrawal of the British forces in Egypt. With the establishment of Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir's authoritarian regime that overthrew the monarchy, the Wafd was banned along with all other political parties. When ʾAnwar al-Sadat came to power in 1970, his 'de-Nasirization' and liberalization measures, set the stage for the resurrection of the Wafd in February 1978 under the leadership of Fuʾad Sirraj al-Din. In May 1978, with Sadat's crackdown on the opposition, restrictions on political liberties and expulsion of the Wafd members from parliament, the Wafd was unable to operate and it voted to disband itself. Two years later, the Wafd decided to resurrect itself and went to the Administrative Court which ruled in its favor in October 1983. For more details, see 1. ʾAmin, Muhammad Fahim. 1992. *Al-Wafd wa Dawruh al-Tarikhi fi al-Haraka al-Wataniyya wa al-ʿUmmaliyya wa al-ʾIjtimaʿiyya*. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-ʿArabi; 2. Reid, Donald M. 1979. "The Return of the Egyptian Wafd, 1978." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 12 (3); 3. Hinnebusch, Raymond A. 1984 "The Reemergence of the Wafd Party: Glimpses of the Liberal Opposition in Egypt." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 16 (1).

[40] The Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) was created by President Sadat in 1980. One third of its 88 seats were to be appointed by the president and the remaining seats filled by elections. According to the amended Constitution of 1980, the Majlis al-Shura is concerned with the study and proposal of what it deems necessary to preserve the principles of the Revolution of July, 1952 and the Revolution of May, 1971. Unlike the People's Assembly, the Shura does not enjoy an independent legislative role. For more details see Kienle, Ebrehard. 2001. *A Grand Delusion, Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd: 66; and Al-Tilmisani, Umar. 1984. *Aiyam maʿ al-Sadat*. Cairo: Dar al-Iʿtisam: 17.

[41] Al-Asʿad, Muhammad Abu. 1984. *Nazahat a-Intikhabat fi Misr fi Bidayat ʿAhd al-Jumhuriyya al-Rabiʿa 1981-1984*. Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli: 80.

elections in 1984.

Prior to the 1984 elections, the PA passed Law no. 114 [42] of 1983, replacing the old single-member constituencies with a party list based on a proportional representation system, and preventing candidates from running for elections as independents. In order to secure representation in the PA, a party had to have its own party list and win a minimum of eight per cent of the national votes cast. In addition, if a party failed to gain twenty per cent of the votes in a given constituency, its votes would be added to the majority party. Through this the regime hoped to guarantee its monopoly in the legislature, and planned to use constitutional constraints to diminish the influence of the opposition, which had to fight a two-battlefront political game to secure the difficult-to-attain eight per cent and twenty per cent conditions to secure representation the PA. In short, along with the developments that have been mentioned so far, Law no. 114 was significant due to its direct impact on the electoral process.

The law allowed the regime to kill two birds with one stone. First, it ruled out the possibility of party alliances, as members of different parties were not allowed to run on one party slate to overcome the eight per cent requirement for securing representation; and second, independents were not allowed to run for election. In other words, based on these restrictions Brotherhood members were deliberately excluded from the electoral process, as they had no choice but to run as independents. The Law further led to splits and to resignations inside opposition parties, since candidates with names high on the party slate had a greater chance of wining. [43] These problems could have been triggered by the personal preferences and interests of party leaders when choosing candidates for each party slate. Law no. 114 further prevented independents from participating in the elections whether they were from the Brotherhood or not.

Although all opposition forces including the Brotherhood condemned Law no. 114 as unconstitutional, [44] their demands were rejected and the 1984 elections were held based on the new amendments. The opposition forces were determined to boycott the elections, but the Wafd party's decision to contest them forced other opposition parties to participate in order to avoid isolation from political life.[45] The Brotherhood's attitude towards the electoral law was in conformity with the opposition and its members announced their support for the opposition's stance by participating in a conference held at the headquarters of the Labor Party in Cairo on July 16, 1983. In the end, the opposition decided to participate in the elections under these new restrictions while hoping that Mubarak would keep his promise to implement free and fair elections under judiciary supervision. [46]

2. Inception of the Brotherhood-Wafd Alliance

In spite of the restrictions on the electoral process, Mubarak's decision to allow the opposition to contest the 1984 elections enabled his regime to enhance its image as democratic and to elevate the credibility of the elections. Mubarak's policy in excluding independent candidates failed to prevent the Brotherhood from getting

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[42] Full details of Law no. 114 were released in *al-Ahram* (a daily newspaper) on August 8, 1983. First, the membership of the People's Assembly was raised from 380 to 448, with the number of constituencies being reduced from 176 to 48. In thirty-one of these constituencies one seat was reserved for women and ten additional members were to be appointed by the President bringing the assembly total to 458. Second, party slates under a proportional representation system replaced single-member constituencies and candidates were not allowed to stand for election as independents. Third, a party had to secure 8 per cent of the national vote to receive representation in the People's Assembly. Fourth, a party had to reach a certain percentage in a constituency or its votes would be added to those of the majority party. For further analysis of Law no. 114, see Fahmy, Ninette S. 2002. *The Politics of Egypt, State-Society Relationship*. NY: Routledge Curzon: 69.

[43] *Al-Ahram*, April 13, 1984; and *Al-Majalla*. No. 233. July 28-August 8, 1984: 14-15.

[44] Nafʿa, Ḥasan, " Mulaḥazat Ḥaula Intikhabat 1984." In *Al-Taṭawur al-Dimuqraṭi fi Misr*: 44.

[45] Hilal, "Taḥlil Intikhabat 1984." In *Al-Taṭawur al-Dimuqraṭi fi Misr*: 290.

[46] *Al-Ahram*, March 6 & April 26, 1984.

in, as it forged an alliance with the Wafd party. On top of Law no. 40 of 1977, which prohibited the formation of political parties based on racial, class or religious affiliations, Law no. 114 added further restrictions on the Brotherhood, as it prohibited candidates from running for election as independents and also stipulates that the right to nomination was conditioned by having party membership.

In order to circumvent Law no. 114, the proscribed and non-partisan Brotherhood embarked on a strategy of alliance with legal political groups to contest the elections. The emergence of an alliance between the Brotherhood and the Wafd party can be attributed to the failure of the legal opposition to find a way out to deal with law no. 114 and hence demonstrates its weakness. The opposition's decision might have also been attributed to a lack of confidence in reaching a unanimous decision to boycott parliamentary elections, due to the fact that their unanimous boycott of both the municipal and Shura council elections in 1983 had turned out to be ineffective. Further, the return of the Wafd party to the political scene prior to the elections and its determination to work hard to prove its political and social presence did away with any attempt to reach a unanimous decision for a boycott. Moreover, in spite of its popularity [47] among the people, the 30 years of absence from the political scene must have made it difficult for the Wafd party's leadership to prepare for elections in such a short period of time.

Although it was aware of the impossibility of competing with or loosening the dominance of the ruling NDP in the PA, the Brotherhood's decision, with other opposition forces, to contest the elections was seen by the regime as an implicit approval of Law no. 114. In addition, boycotting the elections would have politically marginalized the newcomer Wafd party, from politics and cost its leadership loss of credibility from its supporters due to the implicit confession of its inability to reach the minimum eight per cent requirement for entering the PA.

But why would a legal organization like the Wafd party, which enjoyed strong popular support, agree to ally itself with a proscribed force like the Brotherhood? In pre-revolution Egypt, the Wafd party and the Brotherhood were in strong ideological conflict.[48] The Wafd party's long absence must have cost it significantly in terms of popular support compared to the Brotherhood, which although illegal had been functioning as a social and political force since the early seventies. Moreover, even if the Wafd party had the confidence to fulfill the eight per cent condition, its leadership must have wanted to avoid the risk of failing to win seats in the PA and to guarantee that the party would make a strong comeback on the political stage by securing representation above the eight per cent requirement in order to form the biggest opposition force next to the ruling NDP. One must also remember that the Wafd party had to field a large number of candidates for two reasons. First, Law no. 114 stipulated that each party had to have a reserve candidate list, with a number equivalent to the candidates on the primary list, from use as replacements in case of death or resignation, in each constituency a given party chooses to contest.[49] Second, the Wafd party's leader, Sarraj al Din, abruptly announced publicly that his party would win approximately 30 or 35 per cent of the national vote, a condition that would be impossible to achieve without fielding candidates in all 48 constituencies. However, when the Wafd party began its election campaign,

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[47] Two incidents symbolized Wafd's strong appearance on the political scene after its first come back in 1987: a gathering of 40-50,000 young people to listen to a speech by its leader, Sirraj Al-Din, in Alexandria despite bad weather; and the fact that in the two and a half months following its return, 959,000 persons had joined the Wafd. For more details see Ansari, Hamied. 1986. *Egypt, the Stalled Society*. State University of New York Press: 202.

[48] For an historical study of the relationship between the Wafd party and the Brotherhood, see Mardini, Zuhair. 1984. *Al-Laduda: al-Wafd wa al-'Ikhwan*. Beirut: Dar 'iqra'.

[49] *Al-Ahram*, April 5, 1984.

it realized that 30 years of absence had led to a fall in its mass popularity.[50] In order to field candidates in nearly all constituencies [51] and make a strong comeback on the political stage, Sarraj al-Din must have brought his party into alliance with a mass force like the Brotherhood.

Mubarak did not attempt to prevent the alliance, since it had been orchestrated within the constitutional framework he himself had designed. Moreover, the alliance was not one between two legal political parties, since the Brotherhood was not a political party or even a body that had been legally recognized by the regime. Therefore, it was able to field candidates under the Wafd party name and on its electoral slate. Even if Brotherhood members ran as Wafd members, it was impossible to call their party affiliation into question, as they did not belong to any party in the first place. Therefore, it can be said that the regime's decision to overlook the alliance proves that Mubarak attempted to open the door to a bigger role for the Brotherhood in politics as long as its members abided by his rules and kept as low a political profile as possible.

Furthermore, the Brotherhood's decision to run in the elections proves in practice that its stance towards the multi-party system has changed and thus brings to light a significant shift in the Brotherhood's political thought and practice since its establishment in 1928. If we go back to the writings of its founder, Ḥasan al-Banna [52] (1906-49), on political pluralism, we have to conclude that the group's participation in the 1984 elections are almost a complete contradiction of its fundamental principles which characterized and distinguished the Brotherhood from other political parties. Al-Banna defined the Brotherhood as "a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural educational union, an economic company and a social idea." [53] Further, he questioned the need for political parties to establish a parliamentary system. In fact, he strongly advocated a totalitarian one-party system. He believed that a multi-party political system would simply weaken the solidarity of the people (*umma*) and create severe social divides in the society.[54]

Before its experience in Egypt's politics, the Brotherhood had expressed a negative attitude toward political pluralism based on *ḥizbiyya* (partisanship) or *aḥzab siyasiyya* (political parties). Some of the Brotherhood's principles toward political pluralism were as follows: there is no necessity for the existence of political parties to have a sound parliamentary system; freedom of speech and criticism does not necessary correlate with political pluralism; Islam does not approve of the existence of various parties as it leads to division; and therefore there is an urgent need to abolish pluralistic systems and dissolve all political parties.[55] However, when analyzing the Brotherhood's rhetoric under the leadership of al-Banna', it is necessary to examine the political and social conditions of that era, when the monarchy in Egypt was under the British colonial control and the great national aspiration of achieving independence was the primary goal of many Egyptians. Thus, it is possible to say that, for al-Banna, the idea of working under a one-party system must have been a promising solution for achieving solidarity against colonial rule.

Regardless of its ideological background and its founder's rejection of the pluralist party system, the

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[50] *Al-Ahram*, April 13, 1984.
[51] *Al-Ahram* April 26, 1984. The Wafd's efforts to field candidates in all 48 constituencies were successful and it managed to field candidates in just 44 constituencies.
[52] Since the assassination of al-Banna in 1949, during the period of monarchy, the Brotherhood has been led by five Supreme Guides (al-Murshid al-'Am): Ḥasan al-Huḍaibi (1951-1973), 'Umar al-Tilmisani (1974-1986), Muḥammad Ḥamid Abu al-Naṣr (1986-1996), Musṭafa Mashhur (1996-2002), Muḥammad al-Ma'mun al-Huḍaibi (2002-2004), and the current Muḥammad Mahdi Akif (since 2004).
[53] Al-Banna, Hasan. 2002. *Majmu'at Rasa'il*. Cairo: Dar al-Da'wah: 170.
[54] Ibid., 197.
[55] Raslan, 'Uthman 'Abd al-Mu'iz. 1990. *Al-Tarbiya al-Siyasiyya 'inda al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*. Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi' wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya: 356-357.

Brotherhood's long experience was accompanied by an evolution of its ideological and political stances under Mubarak's political adjustments, in order to overcome the restrictions and in particular Law no. 114, and to avoid being excluded from the electoral process. In fact, the inability of the Brotherhood to form its own party and to make an alliance with the Wafd party turned out to be quite important; the alliance helped its leadership sustain the Brotherhood's attitude towards political parties and hence gain credibility among its supporters due to its unchanging ideological principles set forth by al-Banna several decades earlier. The Brotherhood's third Supreme Guide, 'Umar al-Tilmisani (1904-1986), stated the alliance was based on existing political realities and did not go beyond cooperation in order to make inroads into the PA.[56]

The experience with the Wafd party and parliamentary elections drove the Brotherhood to demand, beginning in the mid 1980s, the right to form its own political party and a newspaper through which it would be able to speak out, like other legal parties, on political and social issues.[57] The demand for the formation of its own party, a demand that remains unfulfilled even today, represents a significant development for the Brotherhood. This new development must have begun when the Brotherhood realized that working under the name of another political party restricted its activities in pursuing its declared goals and having its own electoral program, and did not help its leadership to gain legal recognition from the state.

3. Mubarak's Attitude towards the Alliance

It is important to examine how the Mubarak regime reacted towards the Brotherhood-Wafd alliance, since Law no.114 was intended to weaken the opposition and close the door to independent candidates in elections. As Egypt remained in a state of emergency since the assassination of Sadat in 1981, it would have been easy for it, if Mubarak wanted, to intervene and stop the establishment of the alliance on the pretext of countering militant Islamists, for instance. This is especially true considering that during the electoral campaign, state security forces cracked down heavily on many radical Islamist groups and put many of their members on trial. [58]

The regime's tolerance towards the Brotherhood-Wafd alliance must have stemmed from a well-planned strategy for diminishing the influence of legal opposition and containing the Brotherhood. During the first years of his rule, it was important for Mubarak to convey a message to the society that he was fighting only those militant Islamists who posed a threat to the security of the country.[59] Mubarak intended to give the Brotherhood the message that it could help him, by condemning acts of terror, to lessen the appeal of violent acts committed by militant Islamists. The regime's interior minister himself emphasized that radical militant Islamist groups did not emerge from the cloak of the Brotherhood and that the violence that Egypt had been witnessing was imported from outside the country.[60] Moreover, the regime must have realized that the Brotherhood was determined to achieve representation in the PA while respecting the rules set by the regime, an act of support where the regime had to make use of by allowing its members to work under the Wafd party. After all, it was difficult for the regime to challenge the legality of the alliance since Law no. 114 did not include any article forbidding it. In addition, it might be that Mubarak did not want to interfere in the alliance, as it might give the

[56] *Al-Majalla*, May 10-16, 1984. "Al-Tilmisani: Sanutalib fi al-Barlaman bi-'Audat al-Shar'iyya ila al-Ikhwan."
[57] Ibrahim, Hasanin Taufiq. 1998. *Al-Nizam al-Siyasi wa al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Misr 1981-1996*. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a: 71.
[58] *Al-Ahram*, April 28, 1984.
[59] Ibrahim, *Al-Nizam al-Siyasi wa al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Misr 1981-1996*: 20.
[60] *Al-Ahram*, January 22, 1983.

impression that he was seizing the chance to attack the newly reborn Wafd party.

Although the regime did not try to break up the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance, it was very anxious about the electoral results. Despite all of the advantage the regime gained from Law no. 114, it still resorted to considerable interference and fraud. The state of emergency, along with Mubarak's refusal to subject the election to direct supervision by the judiciary, made it easy to carry on intimidation and restrictions on the electoral process.[61] But a question arises: would the regime have imposed such restrictions if the Brotherhood had not decided to contest the elections under the umbrella of the Wafd party? The regime's resort to intimidation must have stemmed mainly from its political concern that Law no. 114 would not be sufficient to stop the rise of the opposition. Orchestrating constitutional measures through legal channels did not seem to guarantee the regime its ability to secure absolute dominance over the electoral process, and hence it concluded that it needed to further construct a specific coercive framework within which the alliance would have to work and constrain its campaign activities.

4. The Wafd-Brotherhood Alliance and Electoral Votes

The results of 1984 parliamentary elections demonstrated that Mubarak was able to tame the opposition and force it to play by the rules set by his government. Of the five political parties, only two -- the NDP and the Wafd party -- were able to secure representation in the PA. The Wafd-Brotherhood alliance got 58 of the 448 contested seats and the NDP took the remaining 390. The Socialist Labor, Liberal and Tajammu' parties all fell short of the minimum eight per cent.[62] The Labor party came very close to reaching the minimum (with 7.73 percent) but ultimately failed together with the Liberal and Tajammu' parties. They gained approximately 11.8 percent of the electoral votes, which should have entitled them to about 50 seats, but they failed to win even a single seat.[63] With the help of Law no. 114, which prevented the opposition from working collectively, the ruling NDP was able to reap the votes of these parties. Moreover, although the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance gained 15.113 per cent of the total number of votes cast, which qualified them get 67 seats, they were allocated only 58. Whereas the NDP got 72.987 per cent from the votes cast, which should have entitled it to 326 seats, it was able to get 390. The extra 64 seats gained by the NDP were due to the help of the proportional representational system, under which both seats allocated to women and the votes of failed parties were allocated to the NDP.[64] Law no. 114 helped the party that was able to get the greatest number of votes, allowing it to gain absolute dominance over the legislative body.

The loss experienced by these parties and the relative success of the alliance demonstrated that that the eight per cent condition was too high. Of the 58 seats won by the alliance, the Brotherhood was allocated eight. The allocation of just eight seats to the Brotherhood seems like a statement that the Wafd party would have been able to secure the eight per cent requirement without the help of the Brotherhood. However, a close look at the number of candidates fielded shows that the Brotherhood fielded only 17 compared with 448 by the Wafd party.[65] The Brotherhood's ability to get eight seats by fielding only seventeen candidates (meaning that just

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[61] Post, Erika. 1984. "Egypt's Elections." *Middle East Report,* No. 147: 18; See also *Al-Majalla* (226) May 9-15, 1984: 8-9.
[62] *Al-Ahram*, May 30, 1984.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibrahim, Hasanin Tawfiq & 'Awad, Huda Raghib. 1996. *Al-Daur al-Siyasi li-Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Zil al-Ta'addudiyya al-Siyasiyya al-Muqaiyada fi Misr*. Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrusa: 179-180.
[65] Ibid., 188.

under half of its candidates were successful) demonstrates that the slates in which Brotherhood members participated were effective in wining votes since voters were not able to give their votes to individual candidates but to the whole electoral slate. Even if it could have secured representation without the help of the Brotherhood, the alliance enabled the Wafd party to increase its number of seats in the PA. But in the end, the Wafd party's decision to seek another social and political force like the Brotherhood indicates that it felt uncertainty and weakness toward securing electoral success.

Regardless of the poor performance of the opposition in the elections and despite the unchanging dominance of the ruling NPD over the PA, the 1984 elections enabled both the Brotherhood, for the first time in its history, and the Wafd party, for the first time since its exclusion from the political realm three decades earlier, to make inroads in the legislative body of Egypt, with relatively large representation. In spite of the restrictions imposed by the regime on the electoral process, the Brotherhood was able to overcome Law no. 114 and secure legal representation in the PA, in spite of both its outlawed status and the regime's attitude towards its members, as well as to prove its popular legitimacy. In other words, the ability to gain representation in the PA enhanced the political and social legitimacy of the formally illegal Brotherhood.

The amendments made by Mubarak in 1983 to introduce proportional representation were later challenged before the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) as a breach of the principle of equal opportunity, on the basis that the law deprived independent candidates who did not belong to any political parties from nomination for membership. Faced with the threat of a ruling from the SCC declaring the amendment unconstitutional, Mubarak passed a decree promulgating Law no. 181 of 1986, amending Law no. 114 upon which the 1984 elections had been held. Mubarak hastily initiated the new law in December 1986, before the Supreme Constitutional Court could overturn Law no. 114 as unconstitutional. The new law combined elections through a party slate with independent candidacy. In addition, the seats reserved for women were abolished and only one person in each of the 48 constituencies was allowed to run as an independent. The other candidates had to be on party slate. [66] However, the new amendments did not abolish the eight per cent requirement that parties had to achieve in order to get enter the PA.

IV. The Brotherhood and the New Constitutional Framework

1. Mubarak's Shift in Strategy

Observing and analyzing the constitutional and political framework of the 1984 elections for the PA will enable us to gain a better understanding of the situation during the 1987 elections. As mentioned previously, out of concern that the 1984 Assembly would be invalidated by a ruling from the SCC that Law no. 114, on which basis it had been elected, was unconstitutional, Mubarak enacted electoral reforms reconstructing independent representation in the PA in December 1986. We have also seen that with the help of the Brotherhood, the Wafd party was able to gain status as the leading and only opposition force in the PA next to the ruling NDP, whereas other opposition parties, and Labor in particular, were only a step away from the PA.

Later developments during the 1987 election campaign changed the balance of the opposition representation in the PA, following changes in the Brotherhood's tactical alliance and the Wafd party's attitude towards other opposition parties. When the constitutionality of Law no. 114 was challenged, the regime swiftly

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[66] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 3055, December 29, 1983: 6-7.

proposed amendments to eliminate the unconstitutional items, and Law no. 181 of 1986 was passed before the SCC reached its decision. Mubarak then decided to call for a national referendum on the dissolution of the PA and new elections. [67] The elections were held according to both Law no. 181 and the unchanged terms of Law no. 114, including the eight per cent condition and the ban on party alliances. The new amendments created a combination of party proportional representation and candidate-centered seats. It allocated 48 seats, one from each of the 48 constituencies, to individual candidates, but also gave other partisans the right to contest them. In each constituency, individual candidates had to gain 20 percent of the votes and if they failed, reelections were to be held. [68]

Law no. 181 stipulated that the party winning most of the votes would no longer receive the votes of the parties failing to achieve the eight per cent condition. Despite these changes, it is difficult to say that Mubarak's decision to introduce the new amendments satisfied the opposition's request, because the main demand of the opposition was the cancellation of the requirement for a party to win eight per cent of the national vote to get representation in the PA. Therefore, rather than making the PA truly representative of all political forces, Mubarak aimed to secure his nomination to a new presidential term (1987) through, at least, a constitutionally unchallenged PA.

Mubarak's tactic calling for the dissolution of PA and for new elections was aimed to consolidate his hold on power. In addition to avoiding showing signs of defeat to the opposition based on the SCC's decision regarding the constitutionality of Law no. 114, Mubarak had to take steps to deal with the Central Security Force (CSF, al-ʾamn al-Markazi) riots of February 26-27, 1986. [69] The riots had spread to all security centers in Cairo and in other cities, leading to destruction and arson in many private and public places. It even developed into clashes with military troops, who were able to get the riots under control. [70] The rioting was a matter of high concern to Mubarak, because it was launched by elements who were supposed to be his right arm in maintaining public order and quelling unrest.

The riots were the first major challenge faced by Mubarak since his rise to power. His resort to use military force against the rioters revealed his mounting fear and may have been a demonstration to the opposition that the regime's existence depended on the military. The real reason behind the rioting is still unknown, but the government and Mubarak himself claimed that they had been caused by rumors that the CSF term of service would be extended from three to four years. [71] However, the events also underlined the extraordinary economic and social disparities, which created a collision between the country's haves and have-nots. [72]

2. The Brotherhood and the 1987 Elections
Split between the Brotherhood and Wafd Party

As previously mentioned, the first elected People's Assembly in Mubarak's Egypt failed to complete its constitutional term (five years), and was dissolved by Mubarak in 1987 following amendments to some of the unconstitutional items in Law no. 114 of 1983. Mubarak's decision to dissolve the PA and call for new elections

[67] *Al-Ahram*, February 8, 1987.
[68] ʿAbd al-Lah, Muhammad. ed., 1990. *Al-intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr, Dars Intikhabat 1987.* Cairo: Sina-li-al-Nashr: 66.
[69] *Al-Ahram*, February 27, 1986.
[70] *Al-Ahram*, Februar 28, 1986; See also Lesch, Ann M. 1986. "Mutiny in Cairo." *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 139 March-April: 43.
[71] *Al-Ahram*, February 27, 1986. "Husni Mubarak's speech"
[72] McDermott, Anthony. 1986. "Mubarak's Egypt: the Challenge of the Militant Tendency." *The World Today.* October, 42 (10): 171.

must have put the Brotherhood and other opposition forces under pressure, as there were only two months between Mubarak's decision on 4 April 1987 to call for a national referendum for the dissolution of the PA on February 12 [73] and the holding of elections on 6 April. In addition, the formal beginning of the electoral campaign was16 March, meaning that there were no more than three weeks for campaigning.

Prior to the 1987 elections, the Brotherhood-Wafd alliance went through a series of fallouts, and the two sides seemed unable to patch things up. [74] Issues related to the bills and projects introduced by both sides in parliament led to a gradual setback for the alliance. The parliamentarian sheikh Salah Abu Isma'il, who played an important role in forming the alliance between the Brotherhood and the Wafd, party stated that the main dispute between the two was on the issue of implementing the Shari'a (Islamic law), which the Wafd party did not support. [75] However, it can also be said that the Brotherhood's share in the alliance (8 out of 58 seats) was quite small, a situation that did not help its parliamentarians to have much saying in the alliance.

In order to gain a more effective political role, the Brotherhood had shifted tactics and engineered a major political realignment in the political scene by forming *al-Tahaluf al-'islami* (the Islamic Alliance, hereafter abbreviated IA) with the opposition Labor and *Hizb al-Ahrar* (hereafter abbreviated Liberal) parties. But how did the Brotherhood reach the decision to join with the Liberal and Labor parties to form the IA?

Prior to the Alliance, the idea of contesting the elections under a single electoral slate seemed to be accepted by most opposition parties, including the Brotherhood and the Wafd party. Due to its considerable mass following, most of the opposition forces agreed to contest the elections under the Wafd party slate. [76] However, the inception of this united alliance failed due to the Wafd party's last-minute decision to withdraw. It is said that this decision was prompted by rivalry between the old guards and newcomers inside the party as well as the inability of a united electoral slate to leave room for both of them. [77] One of the undeclared reasons behind the Wafd party's decision to run in the elections alone may have been its confidence that it could overcome the minimum eight per cent requirement to gain representation in the PA without the help of other forces. [78] This confidence must have stemmed from its ability to secure considerable representation in the 1984 elections.

Prior to the 1987 elections, the Wafd party's leader, Sarraj al-Din, stressed his party's popularity, stating that it would be able to gain twice as many seats in the 1984 elections and to lead the opposition again in the 1987 PA. [79] To seek legal legitimacy, avoid divisions within the party, and distinguish itself from other opposition parties, the Wafd party's leadership justified its decision to withdraw by claiming that party alliances were illegal since the electoral law does not allow members from different political parties to run on a single electoral slate. [80] However, a more logical reason behind the party's decision to withdraw may have been its fear of Mubarak's reaction to a strong united opposition which would most likely be targeted at it due its inherent rivalry with the regime. In addition, both the Labor and Liberal parties had been formed by the Sadat regime under the cloak of the Arab Socialist Union.

The Wafd party's unexpected decision to withdraw from the alliance put the rest of the opposition in an

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[73] *Al-Ahram*, February 5, 1987.
[74] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 3009, February 10, 1986: 12-13.
[75] Ibid., 13.
[76] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 3063. February 23, 1987: 8.
[77] Ibid.
[78] *Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadi*, No. 951., April 6, 1987.
[79] *Al-Majalla*, No., 374. April 8-14, 1987: 18.
[80] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, February 26, 1987: 10.

awkward situation, and paved the way for the Brotherhood to play a more effective role in building an alliance with weak opposition parties according to its own terms. Ibrahim Shukri, the president of the Labor party, stressed that the Wafd party's decision to withdraw encouraged the formation of the IA with the Brotherhood and Liberal party. [81] Moreover, the leaders of both the Labor and Liberal parties emphasized that their electoral programs are consistent with the Brotherhood's goals for implementing Shari'a. [82] Accepting the description of the Alliance as Islamic suggests that the Brotherhood was the most influential force and also indicates a tendency to exclude the leftist opposition, the Tajammu' party in particular, from the Alliance. The Brotherhood's experience with the Wafd seems to have encouraged it to ally itself with less domineering parties.

The Emergence of the Brotherhood's Political Leadership

Prior to the announcement of the final electoral slates, some disputes surfaced among the parties in the IA due to Brotherhood's dominance over the slates, which was estimated to be around 90 per cent. [83] The weakness and lack of popularity of the Labor and Liberal parties compared to seemed to have helped the Brotherhood to force its will on them, and this was obvious in the IA's first time adopted slogan in Egypt, *al-Islam Huwa al-Hal* (Islam in the Solution). The strong position the Brotherhood enjoyed, in comparison with the other parties, was behind its leaders' emphasis that the IA was no more than a channel they could use in order to enter the PA and that they were not to be dissolved in either parties. [84]

In its quest to gain dominance within the alliance, the Brotherhood exercised pressure on both the Labor and Liberal parties, threatening to break from the IA and forge an alliance with the Wafd if its conditions were not met. [85] This may explain why the Brotherhood did not directly criticize the Wafd even after its shift of alliance with other political forces. In reality, the Brotherhood needed the IA more than any other political party because it was the only bridge for it to the PA. Moreover, the Brotherhood must have wanted to exclude other political forces from the alliance, including the Wafd party, in order to guarantee its own members a larger share of votes and representation in the PA. Not only that, but if the Wafd party took part, its members would naturally play a leading role in the alliance due to its very recent experience in leading the opposition in the 1984 parliament, in sharp contrast with other opposition parties that had failed to get even a single seat in the 1984 elections.

Therefore, the inability of the opposition to form a united front and run on the Wafd party list created a considerable advantage for the Brotherhood. Not to mention that the Islamic Alliance allocated about 40 per cent of the votes to its members. [86] This must have given the Brotherhood a large role in determining the electoral slates. This became obvious when the Brotherhood set strict conditions on the Labor party, demanding the expulsion of all Marxist and Nassirist affiliated candidates. [87] The Brotherhood's aim in creating the IA was to bypass the regime's restrictions on its participation in the electoral system, and to overturn the law preventing non-partisans from entering elections. Despite its lack of status as a legal political party, the Brotherhood was able not only to engage actively in politics, but even to prove its presence as a powerful political force due to its

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[81] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No., 3068. December 30, 1987: 16.
[82] Ibid., 16-17.
[83] *Al-Ahram*, March 3, 1987.
[84] *Al-Ahram*, March 15, 1987.
[85] 'Abd al-Lah, ed. *Al-intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi-Misr.*
[86] Ibid., 76.
[87] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No., 3065. December 9, 1987: 8.

ability to control legal political parties like the Labor and Liberal parties. This situation might not have occurred if the regime had actually interfered to stop the Brotherhood's electoral participation.

How, then, was the Brotherhood able to become an essential political actor in the IA, and what were the main motivations behind its decision to run in parliamentary elections? It is important to note that the Brotherhood had become confident in contesting elections due to its rising social power and increasing mass following. In 1984, Islamists affiliated with the Brotherhood contested the elections of the *al-Niqabat al-Mihaniyya* (Professional Syndicates), as an organized bloc, and achieved decisive victories. [88] For instance, in the Doctors' Syndicate, whose council consists of 24 members in addition to the President (Naqib), 20 Islamists were elected. In the Engineers' Syndicate and Pharmacists' Syndicate's councils, 45 out of 61 and 17 out 25 members were won by the Islamists. The rising dominance of the Islamists extended also to other syndicates such as the Bar, Trade, Press, Lawyers and Teachers. [89] Given also the Brotherhood's control of the governing boards of many students unions and faculty clubs, these institutions became important source of electoral victories at the national level. [90] This explains how the Brotherhood, although banned by Mubarak, was able to transform itself into an institutionalized and organized force surpassing other legal opposition parties, a situation that must have created incentives for coordination among Brotherhood members. Wickham notes that by permitting a genuine process of contestation in the professional syndicates, the Mubarak regime may have wagered that it would be able to accommodate the opposition's demands for representation without jeopardizing its own hold on power, at least in the short term. [91]

The expansion of the Brotherhood's political involvement by contesting parliamentary elections also helped it to distance itself from other militant Islamic groups while stating its willingness to work within the political framework set by Mubarak. The Brotherhood's increasing involvement in politics and its rising social power must have sent a political message to Mubarak that this strong social and political heavyweight, unlike other opposition parties, had to be considered seriously when initiating political changes in Egypt. The Brotherhood's ability to attract an alliance with two opposition parties and to have them agree to its demands, when they accepted the alliance based on its political conditions, demonstrated its position as a strong and central opposition force in Egypt. [92] The shift in the electoral map and the formation of the Islamic Alliance enabled the Brotherhood to shift the balance of the opposition when the Wafd was dominant in 1984, and to become the pillar of the Alliance in the 1987 elections.

3. The Islamic Alliance's Tactics in the 1987 Elections

Before moving to the election results, it is important to look at the IA's electoral program and examine the main issues it addressed. Although its electoral program addressed a number of Islamic issues such as the implementation of Shari'a (Islamic law) and the significance of implanting virtue and eradicating corruption, the first issue in terms of importance and order of priority was t political reform, stated as "reforming the political system based on *'al-Dimuqratiyya al-Sahiha'* (correct democracy)." [93] Moreover, on the issue of implementing

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[88] Amani Qandil. 1992. "Al-Mumarasa al-Siyasiyya wa Taqwim al-Mumarasa al-Hizbiyya Lada 'Aiyiya ,im A'da' al-Jama'at al-Mihaniyya." 29 (1). Cairo: *Al-Majalla al-Ijtima'iyya al-Qawmiyya*.

[89] Ibid., 6-7.

[90] Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky, 2002. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press: 17 &184.

[91] Ibid., 178.

[92] Abd Allah. *Al-'intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr*: 305-317.

[93] For more details of the IA's electoral program, see Abd Allah. *Al-'intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr*: 305-317.

Shariʿa, the program did not demand an immediate implementation, but rather a gradual one.

In terms of political reform, the program focused on four essential elements. First, it demanded a review of the constitution with the aim to transform the political system from a controlled totalitarian one to a democratic system based on political pluralism. Second, it demanded the eradication of undemocratic rules, such as the suspension of the state of emergency law and the freedom to form political parties. Third, it asked for the guarantee of the transparency of elections. Finally, it called for the independence of the judiciary. The emphasis on democracy suggests that the Brotherhood was not only considering the demands of the other parties in the IA, but also desired to gain legal recognition from the state. This may explain why the Brotherhood's main issue, of implementing the Shariʿa, was placed second. The IA must have believed that the severe economic problems confronting Egypt from in the 1980s could only be solved by first reforming the political system, since economic issues were listed second to last in the electoral program, followed only by "national security and international relations."

The IA depended on an extensive media network for its electoral campaign, incorporating both of the Labor and Liberal paper newspapers and other Islamic magazines such as *al-'I'tiṣām*. Moreover, with its large social network of around 2,500 religious institutions with more than two million employees, [94] the Brotherhood provided the IA with a broad source of support in its electoral campaigns. The campaign also worked hard to dispel fears among Christian Copts toward the Supreme Guide, Muḥammad Ḥamid Abu al-Naṣr (born March 25, 1913 and Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood from 1986 to 1996), and affirmed its support for equal rights between Muslims and their "brother" Christian Copts. [95] Ma'mun al-Huḍaibi, the official spokesman of the Brotherhood's bloc in parliament, stated that the Brotherhood supported the Christian Copts' right to form their own religious party as a means to protect their rights in Egypt. [96] To couple these words with deeds, the IA placed several Copts on its candidacy lists. One Copt, Jamaʾ Asʾad ʿAbd al-Malak, who was placed at the top of a party list, was elected in the 1987 and entered the PA with the IA. [97] Furthermore, the Brotherhood intended to field some of its own well-known members on the IA's candidacy lists. These members included Muḥammad Ma'mun al-Huḍaibi, the son of the late second Supreme Guide, Ḥasan al-Huḍaibi, and Saif al-Islam Ḥasan al-Bannaʾ the son the Brotherhood's founder, Ḥasan al-Bannaʾ [98]

In its electoral campaign, the IA also played upon some very sensitive issues that the Mubarak regime had confronted, namely the economic crisis and failure of the ruling NDP to take any effective measures to resolve it. The challenge faced by Mubarak was the outstanding external debt, which had skyrocketed from $27.6 billion in 1982/83 to $37.6 billion in 1986/1987. This was the period of the Five Year Plan launched by Mubarak when he assumed the presidency. [99] The main cause of the rising external debt was the expansionary policy, exemplified by high budget deficits and a relaxed monetary stance. The government's consolidated budget deficit, excluding debts and amortization, reached 23 per cent of the GDP in 1986. [100]

Another major blow to Mubarak was the dramatic fall in oil prices, leading to a sharp reduction in Egypt's

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[94] Ibid., 86-87.

[95] *Al-Hawadith*, April 10, 1987.

[96] *Al-Majalla*, No. 376, April 22-28, 1987: 11.

[97] Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1988. "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s," *Third World Quarterly*, 10 (2) April: 633; see also the Official Website of the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc: http://www.nowabikhwan.com.

[98] Ibrahim, Ḥasan Tawfiq. *Al-Dawr al-Siyasi li-Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*: 317.

[99] Mursi, Fuʾad. "Al-Taḥawulat al-ʿiqtiṣadiyya wa al-ʿijtimaʿiyya fi Miṣr mundhu al-Sabʿinat," in *Al-'intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Miṣr*: 30-33.

[100] Ikram, Khalid. 2006. *The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000: Performance, Policies and Issues*. New York: Routledge: 58.

oil revenues. Oil exports were very low in the first part of 1986, and oil revenues fell by around $1 billion in 1986/6 to $2 billion. [101] Prime Minister 'Ali Lutfi himself declared that his government was facing mounting debts and losses of about $6.7 billion in 1986. [102] In addition, Egyptian workers' remittances from abroad fell sharply, accompanied by a severe decline in tourism. [103] The open door economic reform (Infitah) initiated by President 'Anwar al-Sadat in 1973, which ended the domination of the economy by the public sector and invited foreign and domestic investments in the private sector was, to a certain extent, behind the economic crisis in the late 1980s. Inflation had a direct negative impact of the infitah policy due to increasing rates of expenditures over a very low level of production, a situation that increased Egypt's foreign imports. [104]

4. Election Results

Although the 1987 parliamentary elections were participated in by most political and social forces, they ended as expected with a victory by Mubarak's NDP, which gained a comfortable majority in the PA. The NDP won 309 seats on its party slate (with about 70 per cent of the vote), the IA won 56 seats (with about 17 per cent of the vote), the Wafd party won 35 seats (with about 11 per cent of the vote). Other parties such as Tajammu' and Umma were unable to secure the minimum eight per cent of the national vote to win representation. [105] Following the new election law, the remaining 48 seats were set aside for independent candidates or individual party nominees. Of these 48 seats, NDP candidates took 44, and the IA took the remaining four. The combined results gave the NDP a total of 352 seats in the PA. [106]

The important feature of the 1987 parliamentary elections was that the opposition came to hold the largest number of seats in the PA since the beginning of the parliamentary system in 1923. Whereas the Wafd party was the sole rival of the NDP in 1984, the Brotherhood's large share of the seats won by the IA (38 out of 60) is clear evidence of its dominance over the IA (Labor won 16 seats and the Liberals 6) and its rising parliamentary presence (five times as many seats than three years earlier), which placed it second to the NDP. [107] The Brotherhood became the strongest and largest opposition force.

The rising presence of the opposition in the PA in fact served Mubarak's efforts to secure a legitimate second-term for his presidency, as the elected MPs were scheduled to nominate him in November of the same year. Considering this, if the Brotherhood had not brought the Labor and Liberal parties into the PA, Mubarak would not have been able to secure a relatively representative constitutional parliament and avoid questions on the constitutionality of his right to continue to rule. It is true that the opposition gained a relative large representation compared with 1984, but it is difficult to say that the 1987 PA truly reflected the overall balance of the opposition. That can be seen by the fact that immediately after the announcement of the election results by Interior Minister Zaki Badr, many opposition leaders, notably Ibrahim Shukri of the Labor Party and Wafd spokesman Yasin Sarraj al-Din, denounced the election results as fraud. [108] In addition to monopolizing the media and hampering the ability of other parties to communicate with the public, and resorting to *tazwir* (fraud),

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[101] Harris, Lillian Craig, ed. 1988. *Egypt: Internal Challenges and Regional Stability*. New York: Routledge, the Royal Institute of International Affairs: 38.
[102] *Al-Ahram al-'iqtisadi* "Khasa'ir wa Iltizamat al-Hukuma 'am 1986." No. 927, October 20, 1986: 12.
[103] Ibid,. 12.
[104] *Al-Ahram al-'iqtisadi* No. 913. Mustafa, Hala, "Misr wa al-'i'timad 'ala al-dat." Cairo: July 14, 1986: 30.
[105] *Al-Ahram*, April 11, 1987.
[106] Post. 1987. "Egypt's Elections": 17.
[107] Ibid., 17.
[108] *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, No. 902. April 20, 1987: 38-39.

Amn al-Dawla (State Security) cancelled many meetings of the opposition on security grounds. Further, the police carried out a countrywide wave of arrests a few days before the elections to intimidate the Brotherhood and other opposition forces. [109] The opposition also called into question the constitutionality of the two amendments in Law no. 114 and 181, under which the 1987 elections were held. [110] Not to mention that the PA was already waiting for the Supreme Constitutional Court's final decision on some debated articles of the electoral law brought by the opposition. [111] Moreover, a decision had already been announced by the Interior Ministry to regulate the election, but it was not implemented. [112]

Although both of the Labor and Liberal parties made use of the Brotherhood to get relatively satisfactory representation in the PA – compared with the 1984 elections, where they could not even secure one seat – the IA in fact had negative impacts on both parties. It widened divisions within them, with some leading members leaving after voicing their objections to the IA and against the Brotherhood's power in deciding what candidates to field, even from inside the Labor party. [113] The divisions within the parties were not only due to ideological differences but also to the Brotherhood's excessive control of the party lists, with more than 90 per cent being headed by Brotherhood candidates. [114] The Brotherhood's bold rhetoric during the electoral campaign, emphasizing that its alliance with the Labor and Liberal parties was temporary and would come to an end right after the elections, demonstrated the heavy weight it carried in the alliance. This was especially true considering that both the Labor and Liberal party leaders stated that their alliance with the Brotherhood was strategic and would continue even after the elections. [115]

The Brotherhood's lack of a political party and inability of both the Labor and Liberal to overturn electoral restrictions or engage in rivalry with their strong political opponent, the ruling NDP, likely led to the formation of the IA. In spite of the many illegal aspects of the IA, Mubarak did not interfere, as his concern for gaining a relatively constitutional second presidential term outweighed his fears regarding the illegality of the IA. Bakr al-Qabbani and Mufid Shihab, then professors at the Cairo University Faculty of Law, emphasized that the IA violated the Constitution. [116] They noted that Labor's action in granting false membership to Liberal and Brotherhood candidates in order to establish this "illusionary alliance" was unconstitutional, being based on deception. Qabbani argued that the Alliance violated Articles 5 and 12 of the Constitution which provide for multi-party pluralism in the framework of moral principles and forbids acts of political deception. [117] Moreover, the amended Law no. 181 stipulated that each party had to have its own party slate, which other parties' candidates could not join or be listed upon.

Mubarak did not attempt to stop the IA since his party was assured of the two-thirds majority required for him to gain a second term. Further, he was able to force the opposition to contest the elections under an electoral law that contained many unconstitutional terms. Opening the way for the Brotherhood's participation lent credibility to Mubarak's electoral amendments, the electoral process, and avoided a boycott participation by

[109] Hendriks, Bertus. 1987. "A Report from the Election Campaign: Egypt's New Political Map." *MERIP Middle East Report.* No. 147: 23-25.

[110] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 3057, May 27, 1987. Al-Tuhami, Mahmud. "Mu'aiyidin wa Mu'aridun li Qanun al-'intikhabat.": 8-9.

[111] Ibid., 9.

[112] Naf'a, Hasan. 1988. "Al-'idara al-Siyasiyya li 'azmat al-Tahawul min Nizam al-Hizb al-Wahid 'ila Nizam Ta'addud al-Ahzab fi Misr", *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, No. 112, June: 36.

[113] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 3065, March 9, 1987: 10-11.

[114] *Al-Ahram*, March 2, 1987.

[115] *Ruz al-Yusuf,* No.3068, March 30, 1987: 17; See also *Al-Ahram*, March 15, 1987.

[116] 1. *Al-Ahram al-Iqtishadi*, no. 951. April 6, 1987: 7; 2. *Ruz al-Yusuf*, no. 3064, March 2, 1987: 16-17.

[117] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, no. 3064, March 2, 1987: 17.

other opposition parties who were left with no choice but to seek comfort in a popular movement like the Brotherhood in order to avoid being marginalized from politics. The eight per cent requirement of nationwide votes to enter parliament blocked the representation of small parties such as Tajammu' and Umma. In addition, granting just one seat to independent candidates in each of the 48 constituencies limited the number of unaffiliated people who wanted to contest the elections.

Thanks to the relatively large opposition presence and the NDP's comfortable and absolute majority in the People's Assembly, Mubarak was able not only to secure his second term but also to extend authoritarian rules such as the state of emergency and to concentrate more power into his own hands. Further, he managed to win his second term with the support of the Islamic Alliance [118] and to have a somewhat representative parliament with at least four opposition forces, including the Brotherhood. The structure of the new PA reflected a new reality, as the Wafd party's representation had decreased considerably (to 35 seats from 50 in 1984) and neither Tajammu' nor any of the Nassirist or Marxist forces were able to enter parliament.

Further, Labor seems to have lost much of its defining nature as a result of its integration into the Islamic trend represented in the Brotherhood, and the same thing can be said of the Liberals. In other words, even though the PA won credibility thanks to the Islamic representation, it still lacked legitimacy due to the exclusion of the Nassirists and Marxists, a necessary condition for achieving a balance among the representative forces of society. As we have seen, the eight per cent condition imposed by Mubarak for representation in parliament led to the exclusion of three parties in 1984 and two in 1987. The inability to meet this condition as well as the restrictions on non-partisan political forces were behind the Labor and Liberal parties' alliance with the Brotherhood, meaning that they had to fight both the ruling NDP's difficult-to-meet conditions for entering parliament and the Brotherhood's mass popularity and its dominance over the Alliance. The electoral amendments engineered by Mubarak succeeded in eliminating any effective legal political representation in the PA.

The 1987 PA itself was found to be unconstitutional by the SCC on May 19, 1990, and it, like its predecessor, was unable to complete its five-year constitutional term. [119] The constitutionality of Law no. 181 was brought up before the SCC, which agreed to examine its constitutionality on March 31, 1987, in the midst of the election campaign. [120] However, Mubarak did not attempt to halt the elections, as his main concern was to gain a second presidential term and eliminate strong legal representation in the PA.

VI. Concluding Remarks

Mubarak's management of the electoral laws and constitutional amendments are symbolic of the nature of authoritarianism in Egypt. His tactic of engaging the opposition in parliamentary elections in the 1980s was aimed at institutionalizing a more consolidated style of authoritarian rule that would be difficult to challenge. During Mubarak's first years in power, he had no choice but to end Sadat's offensive against the opposition in order to close the door on political radicalism, represented at that time by radical Islamists who were using violence in an attempt to bring about regime change. Along with these arrangements, Mubarak counted on another effective tool, the extension of the state of emergency that began with Sadat's assassination, and which has been justified by the need to face extremist groups but in reality curtailed the movements of the opposition

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[118] Leschl, Ann M. 1989. "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches his Second Term As President." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 11 November 4 Fall.
[119] *Al-I'tisam*, June 1990, No. 3 : 4.
[120] Ibid., No. May 2, 1990: 16.

and put extra power into Mubarak's hands. Hasanain Ibrahim, a professor at the Faculty of Economic and Political Science at Cairo University, explains how the state of emergency allowed Mubarak's regime to set rules and exercise exceptional measures to expand executive power, leading to a clear breach in the separation of powers, with the executive performing the functions of the judiciary. [121] The extension of the state of emergency clearly contradicts Mubarak's slogan to strengthen democracy and good governance in his first decade in power. Rather, it constitutes a framework of violence formally exercised by the state apparatus.

It is true that the opposition was allowed to contest elections and succeeded, to some extent, in overturning legal constitutional restrictions set by the regime, but the fact that the ruling NDP kept an ample majority in the PA allowed Mubarak to carry through his resolutions. The legitimacy of the PA was enhanced by the fact that the number of seats gained by the opposition increased and that more opposition political parties were able to make inroads in parliament. Genuine political participation would have given a more effective role to the opposition in the PA, but the regime's persisting dominance over other political forces demonstrates that Mubarak was not ready for real political participation by people who might have limited his power. Hasan Naf'a explains another important issue that has enabled Mubarak to hold extensive power: being both leader of the ruling NDP and President of the state. [122] Naf'a highlights some strategic considerations for holding both positions, such as the need for a political force for Mubarak to rely on to easily execute his policies and to avoid divisions within the party by exercising direct control over its members. [123] This guarantees the NDP continuity as long as Mubarak is the head of the state. Moreover, holding both positions has definitely enabled Mubarak to incapacitate opposition movements.

The initial measures that Mubarak adopted in the 1980s to consolidate his authoritarian rule succeeded in tightening control over political participation, with effects that persist even today. Wickham notes, "the focus on change in formal rules, law and procedures and the shift from one party rule to pluralism in Egypt are not effective so long as the political party contestation is tightly controlled from above and the emergency laws remain in effect." [124] Even if the elections demonstrated the Brotherhood's potential as the strongest political force, the continuing imposition of illegal status on its members allowed Mubarak to open political space for them to some extent, without much concern about the outcome. In addition, allowing the Brotherhood, with its mass following, to participate in politics helped diminish the influence of other legal opposition parties and assured Mubarak that potential opponents would work within his system rather than against it. The Brotherhood's goal was to secure mass support while trying to gain the hard-to-attain formal legal recognition from the state by challenging the regime on its own ground, be it in parliament or other civil institutions. Fahmi al-Huwaidi notes that the Brotherhood entered the election campaign while being proscribed by law. He emphasizes the necessity for the Brotherhood to acquire legal status; otherwise it has to operate secretly, a situation that has the potential to lead to radicalism. [125]

Mubarak's orchestrated parliamentary competition served to exhaust the opposition and lent credibility to his authoritarian rule. As we have seen, his hasty amendments to electoral laws were aimed to achieve the

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[121] Hasanain Taufiq Ibrahim. November 1988. "Zahirat al-'unf al-Siyasi fi Misr: Dirasa Kammiyya, Tahliliyya, Muqarana, 1952-1987." *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, No. 117: 33.

[122] Naf'a. "Al-Idara al-Siyasiyya li'zmat al-Tahawul."

[123] Ibid,. 88.

[124] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, 1994. "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World," *Political Science and Politics*. 27(3) September: 508.

[125] *Al-Ahram*, April 14, 1987.

short-term objectives of securing stable and legitimate rule, as both the 1984 and 1987 amendments were ruled unconstitutional. The first decade of Mubarak's rule in Egypt reveals that it is unlikely that he will dismantle authoritarianism from above, since any further change by the ruler will further aim to lay down a framework that can guarantee the continuation of authoritarian rule through the NDP's absolute dominance over politics and decision-making.

Although not within the scope of this paper, subsequent developments demonstrate that Mubarak's ability to consolidate his rule in the late 1980s, along with the increasing political role of the Brotherhood, led to a radical change in his attitude towards it. As Brotherhood members gained familiarity with and became able to challenge Mubarak's legal restrictions, they turned out to be the biggest threat and challenge to his regime. The new approach adopted by the regime involved stressing the illegality of the Brotherhood while accusing it of threatening national security by maintaining covert relations with foreign powers and seeking to overthrow the government.[126] Eberhard Kienle's study on the political de-liberalization and repressive measures of the Mubarak regime in the 1990s demonstrates later developments towards the rising political role of the Brotherhood.[127] Unlike during his first decade in power, Mubarak aimed in the 1990 and 1995 parliamentary elections to exclude the Brotherhood from electoral participation and to guarantee the perpetuation of the regime against all possible risks arising from an assembly that had become increasingly unreliable and volatile.[128] Finally, Mubarak's persistent denial of legal status to the Brotherhood suggests that his regime is unable to recognize and cope with the existence of a strong opposition force in the country, whether secular or religious, if it becomes viewed as a power seeker whose goal is to dominate the political system.

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[126] *Al-Hayat,* December 18, 1992. "Misr: 'I'tiqal 11 min al-Ikhwan bi Tuhma al-'Ittisal bi Jabahat 'Ajnabiyya."
[127] Kienle, Eberhard. 1998. "More than a Response to Islamism: the Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s." *Middle East Journal*, 52 (2).
[128] Ibid., 234.

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Session 4 (Feb. 2　15:15-16:45)

・TOBINA Hiromi (Kyoto University)

"To Maintain Jerusalemite 'Rights': Palestinian Lives under the Threat of House Demolition"

・KURODA Kenji (Kyoto University)

"The Institution of *Marjiʿ al-Taqlīd* after the Islamic Revolution in Iran"

・HIRANO Junichi (Kyoto University)

"Beyond the Sunni-Shiite Dichotomy: Rethinking al-Afghānī and His Pan-Islamism"

To Maintain Jerusalemite "Rights":
Palestinian Lives under the Threat of House Demolitions

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Introduction

In this paper, I will explain one aspect of the struggle of Palestinian Jerusalemites to maintain their "rights" to live in Jerusalem by describing the conflict between Israeli demolitions of Palestinian houses and Palestinian attempts to maintain their houses in East Jerusalem.

Firstly, we need to keep in mind Israel's political priorities in Jerusalem ever since it occupied the expanded East Jerusalem in 1967. Israel's priorities are: Judaization of Jerusalem—in other words, "strengthening Jewish presence in Jerusalem", as put forth by Amir Cheshin, a former mayor's adviser on Arab sector—establishment of Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem, and its acceptance by the international community. In 1967 Israel occupied the expanded East Jerusalem, which was accompanied by annexation of approximately 69,000 Palestinians. This *significant minority* became a demographic problem for Israel. Israel wanted to keep Jerusalem's demographic balance at 70% Jews and 30% Palestinians; however, presently the Palestinian population is about 33% of the total population of Jerusalem. Demographic control in Jerusalem has always been a serious political issue in Israel, as Israel defines itself as *a Jewish state* and declares the unified Jerusalem as its *eternal capital city*.

After 1967 Israel offered *residency rights* to Palestinians in East Jerusalem to certify their legal status in Israel. The residency rights literally mean the rights to live in Jerusalem. It is definitely different from citizenship in the sense that the residency rights can be revoked. Further, Palestinians have to prove that their *center of life* is inside the boundary of the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem. Israeli demolitions of Palestinian houses and Palestinian activities to keep their houses in East Jerusalem are strongly connected to the residency rights, either directly or indirectly.

"Illegal Constructions" and House Demolitions in East Jerusalem

In this section, I will describe Israeli demolitions of Palestinian houses and the difficulties faced by Palestinian Jerusalemites in building their houses in Jerusalem. An Israeli domestic law, the Planning and Building Law 1965, obliges that anybody who is going to construct a new building or renovate/improve an existing one should obtain a permit from the local municipality. Further, one is only allowed to construct a house on the land which the municipality has allocated as a residential area in its town building scheme. This law is applicable to all people in Israel, both citizens and residents. However, this law makes it difficult for Palestinians to construct houses in Jerusalem. The two major reasons for this are as follows.

One reason is that the Palestinian residential area is very limited in the town building scheme. Looking at Figure 1, we notice that the green-colored zone occupies a significant percentage of land in East Jerusalem. These areas are called "green areas", which have been confiscated by Israel for *public purposes*. The *public* means Jewish public, and many of the green areas have been turned into Jewish settlements which serve the Jewish public. The Palestinian residential area occupies only 17% of East Jerusalem, or 7.25% of the whole of Jerusalem. Compared to the fact that Palestinian population amounts to approximately 33% of the total population in Jerusalem, the extreme smallness of the Palestinian residential area is but evident.

The other reason is that it is very difficult for Palestinians to obtain a construction permit from the municipality. Moreover, people have to prove their ownership of the land and bear the expenses in order to acquire a permit. As the land ownership system which the Israeli law adheres to is different from the customary Palestinian way of succeeding estates and the Jordanian land registration system, it is rarely possible to prove one's land ownership and register it with the Israeli Land Administration. Besides, people have to meet the expenses for various fees (see Figure 2), which is a great burden especially for Palestinians whose average income is said to be much lower than that of Jewish Israelis. Also, in addition to the above expenses, money is also required for the actual construction.

This leads to Palestinian "illegal constructions." Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem considers Palestinian "illegal constructions" a significant political problem. According to Palestinians, houses have been constructed "illegally" because the natural increase of population has necessitated an increase in the number of houses, and the movement of Palestinian Jerusalemites from "outside" to "inside" of the

"Separation Wall" after 2003 further pushes the demands upwards; yet the Municipality of Jerusalem rarely issues construction permits for Palestinians. They regard the municipal refusal to issue permits as an occupation policy to control the demography of and land in Jerusalem. On the other hand, Israel and the Jerusalem municipality consider Palestinian "illegal constructions" political activities against demographic control—Israel's primary political priority.

The Municipality of Jerusalem and the Ministry of Interior have the authority to issue demolition orders toward "illegal constructions." Orders issued by these two bodies are called "the administrative demolition orders", and can be issued toward buildings which are still under construction or inhabitable: these orders have limited validity for 30 days. A law court can issue "judicial demolition orders" toward buildings which are habitable, and also toward inhabitable structures whose administrative demolition orders have become invalid after the 30 day period. Figure 3 includes both administrative and judicial demolition orders.

People who build "illegal construction" are imposed a fine or are imprisoned. Even after the penalties, people cannot have the demolition order canceled and are still under the threat of getting their houses demolished until they obtain a construction permit from the Municipality. Moreover, people are obliged to pay Arnona tax, a so-called property tax for "illegal constructions."

Palestinian Jerusalemites have no way of avoiding this scenario if they want to continue living in Jerusalem. They cannot live in Jerusalem without having a house. This leads them to construct houses *illegally* as they are rarely able to obtain a construction permit, and these "illegal constructions" are open to the threat of demolitions. If demolitions are actually executed, Palestinians lose their houses and cannot live in Jerusalem. Here, Palestinians cannot build "illegal houses" secretly, because Arnona tax is imposed even on "illegal buildings", and paying Arnona tax is one of the most important factors to prove that a person's *center of life* is in Jerusalem—the very condition to keep one's residency rights.

According to Meir Margalit, a director of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), Jewish Israelis commit much more illegal constructions than Palestinians do. However, the Municipality and the Ministry of Interior demolish lesser number of Jewish Israeli homes. The Municipality's and the Ministry's way of dealing with Palestinians' illegal constructions cannot be not regarded as political. Jews with Israeli citizenship do not lose their citizenship and can keep living in Jerusalem, even if their illegal houses get demolished or they do not pay Arnona tax. However, Palestinians' residency rights can be revoked if any of the above conditions are not satisfied.

Thus, the issue of "illegal construction" is connected to *the politics of demography* directly or indirectly, and, as evident, *the politics of demography* is profoundly linked to Palestinians' "rights" to live in Jerusalem. I shall now describe Palestinian activities to continue living in Jerusalem.

There are three Palestinian NGOs (non-governmental organizations) engaged in house constructions in East Jerusalem: Welfare Association (WA, Mu'assasah al-Ta'āwun), Jerusalem Society for Welfare and Development (JSWD, Jam'īyah al-Quds lil-Rifāh wa al-Taṭwīr), and Palestinian Housing Council (PHC, al-Majlis al-Filasṭīn lil-'Iskān). Each NGO has its own projects, but in 1995 these three organizations launched a new project cooperatively in order to renovate and improve old houses in the Old City of Jerusalem. This project was backed by Islamic countries. The Al-'Aqsā Unit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), deals with Jerusalem affairs. This unit has decided to support the project and approached the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) for financial aid. The three NGOs got financial aid from IDB and put the project into practice.

Figure 4 shows the mechanism of the project to renovate and improve old Palestinian houses in the Old City of Jerusalem. First, Palestinian residents submit an application form to JSWD, and JSWD allocates the applications to WA, PHC, and JSWD itself. Then, each organization asks Palestinian contractors for renovations and improvements, using their own network. Before starting construction works, the three NGOs investigate the clients' houses. They check if the client has got a construction permit from the Municipality since a permit is required for renovation and improvement. They also check if the owner of the house or the Waqf Administration allows a renovation if the client is a tenant. Then, the organizations measure the size of the house precisely. In many cases, the clients cannot get a permit from the Municipality, so the renovation works have been practiced "illegally". The client and the contractor make a contract after the NGOs get a permit from the owner of the house and measure the precise size of the house. The three NGOs never become a party of the construction contract but just play a role as an intermediary body and a financial donor.

In this project, WA has renovated about 450 houses and JSWD 205 houses, so far. The number of houses PHC has renovated is not available. Although almost all works were done without municipal permits, the project was successful except for one case. Often on the construction sites harsh quarrels happened between contractors and officers of the Municipality or the Ministry of Interior whose task is to

find "illegal constructions," and there were also cases where those officers warned the contractors to stop working. However, the renovated houses were not actually demolished. According to the guesses made by the Palestinian NGOs the reasons for this are: the Old City of Jerusalem is a very crucial and sensitive area and this prevented Israel from demolishing the structures; the project was supported by OIC; the project only involved renovation of the existing houses and not building of new houses; and the NGOs showed that the project was not a political challenge against Israel's policy of demographic control by paying the close attention to keep the sizes of the houses unchanged.

The only case of demolition happened in the Moroccan Quarter (ḥārah al-Maghārbah). The Moroccan Quarter was located in the southeast part of the Old City and in front of the Wailing Wall/ Al-Burāq Wall. Israel destroyed almost all of the quarter right after the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, but a small part of the quarter remained in the present Jewish Quarter. The demolition of the renovated part of a house in the Moroccan Quarter was executed on the ground that the renovation had been done without a permit from the Municipality. The resident of the house was also fined. The Palestinian NGOs perceive this case as a *symbolic demolition* by which the Israeli authorities showed that their cognition of these Palestinian renovation activities is political in spite of the Palestinian insistence that their activities were not a political challenge against Israel, and that the renovation in the Moroccan Quarter that is located on the site nearest to the Wailing Wall/ Al-Burāq Wall was beyond Israeli tolerance limit.

The Palestinian NGOs which are engaged in construction in East Jerusalem emphasize that they are doing humanitarian and social activities. They do know that Israeli authorities regard their activities as political, but they insist the opposite. It is but obvious that these NGOs believe that they can continue their activities by insisting that their activities are not political but humanitarian and social. Contrary to Palestinian NGOs, Israeli NGOs declare that they are engaged in political activities. For example, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), which literally conducts anti-demolition activities to defend Palestinian houses in Jerusalem and the West Bank, openly states that its activities are undoubtedly political.

Conclusion

Not only Israel but many other countries have town planning and construction permit, and the former almost always has a certain political goal. In Jerusalem, even if the government of Israel excuses that it is not discriminative against Palestinians because everything is done according to laws which are enacted through a democratic procedure and laws are applicable to all people in the country (including both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians), we cannot help concluding that Israeli laws and systems concerning house constructions are clearly connected to the occupation policy in the city, namely, the control of demography and land, when we consider the following things: Israel defines itself as a "Jewish state;" democracy means "Jewish democracy;" its first political priority in Jerusalem is to maintain the demographics at 70% Jews and 30% Palestinians; the residency right complicates and de-stabilizes the legal status of Palestinian Jerusalemites and can be used to control demography; and that construction of houses and "illegal constructions" are profoundly linked to the residency rights.

While illegal constructions committed by Jewish Israelis are considered to be just illegal deeds, those committed by Palestinians are regarded as "political." Activities of the Palestinian construction NGOs are aimed to enable Palestinians to continue living in Jerusalem. Therefore, their activities are obstacles to the Israeli policy of demographic control. In this situation, the Palestinian NGOs continue to work by emphasizing that their activities are not political but humanitarian and social, by conducting activities obeying Israeli law, and by elaborating strategies to avoid Israeli intervention when acting illegally.

Here, we should pay attention to the definition of the word "political." For Israel, any activity which can be related to the demographic policy is a "political activity." Therefore, any Palestinian activity which helps them to continue living in Jerusalem is regarded as "political." When ICAHD says it is conducting "political activities," it means that it (ICAHD) is doing activities against the discriminative policies toward Palestinians implemented by Israel's government and the Municipality of Jerusalem. The Palestinian definition of the word "political" might be different from the Israeli definitions.

We should also keep in mind that the activities of the Palestinian NGOs are actually humanitarian and social ones. Offering houses to Palestinians who do not have a place to live in, and giving financial aid to Palestinians who are living in a wretched condition and yet cannot improve their living circumstances due to financial constraints and/or their inability to obtain a permit from the Municipality, are certainly humanitarian and social activities. The fact that humanitarian and social activities are turned into political ones reflects the functioning of the Israeli occupation policy in East Jerusalem.

Figure 1. East Jerusalem Neighborhoods and "Green Areas"

[Margalit 2006:9]

Figure 2. Table of Fees and Levies for Obtaining Building Permit for a 200 ㎡ House on a Half Dunam Lot

Opening of File	**About NIS 2,000**
Road Development Fee-Building	**NIS 14,800**
Development Fee-Lot	**NIS 18,500**
Sewage Fee-Lot	**NIS 15,525**
Water Mains Connection Fee	**NIS 5,025**
Water Mains Development Fee	**NIS 17,606**
Plan for Registration Purposes	**About NIS 15,000**
Betterment Levy	**About NIS 12,800**
Total	**About NIS 109,492**

＊ 1 dunam=1,000 ㎡
＊ 1 NIS=About 30 Yen (US$ 1=3.6 NIS)

[Margalit 2006:50]

Figure 3. Israeli Demolitions of Palestinian Houses

Year	New Palestinian Houses	Construction Permits Issued to Palestinians	Palestinian "Illegal Constructions"	Demolition Orders toward Palestinians	Demolitions of Palestinian Houses
2000	1008	129	879	513	18
2001	1433	110	1323	761	41
2002	1172	97	1075	996	43
2003	1435	59	1376	858	99
2004	1233	49	1184	832	152
2005	—	—	—	799	94

[Margalit 2006]

Figure 4. The Mechanism of the Palestinian NGO Project

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The Institution of *Marji' al-Taqlīd* after the Islamic Revolution in Iran

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Ⅰ． **Introduction**
Ⅱ． **What is the Marji'?**
Ⅲ． **Institutions of Marji' in Revolutionary Iran as a Political Issue**
Ⅳ． **The Practice of Legal Interpretation in the Institutions of Marji'**
Ⅴ． **Conclusion**
Ⅵ． **Reference**
Ⅶ． **Appendix**

Ⅰ． Introduction

The year 1979 is a meaningful year for rethinking the relationship between religion and modernity. It was in this year that the Islamic Revolution occurred in Iran, the country that the West had thought to be the most westernized in the Middle East. The Islamic Revolution raised questions about the legitimacy of a social system dominated by western values. At the same time, it showed the effectiveness of the Islamic legal system in the modern world. That is to say, *Āya Allāh* Khomeynī issued his Islamic legal opinions, which the people followed, and this ultimately led to the defeat of the Pahlavi monarchy.

In my presentation, I attempt to reveal the relationship between Islam and modernity by analyzing the institutions of *Marji'* (*Marji' al-Taqlīd*) in post-revolutionary Iran. The position of the *Marji',* and Khomeynī was one of them, is the highest authority in Islamic jurisprudence in the Twelver Shī'a and the highest position in the Twelver Shī'ite legal academia. It is needless to say that Islamic law has played an important role in Iranian society. Moreover, as a result of the Islamic Revolution, a new political system called "*Velāyat-e Faqīh (Gurdianship of the Islamic Jurist)*" was established. In this political system, Islamic jurists have played an important political role. As a consequence, the study of the political aspect of jurists has advanced, while the study of the relationship between Islamic law and society which appeared in wake of the Islamic Revolution hasn't advanced.

Anthropological studies have clearly shown that there is close relationship between law and society. For example, Clifford Geertz revealed how basic cultural assumptions were hidden in legal material, although he didn't analyze the laws themselves.［Geertz 1983: 167 sq.］ In addition to this, he stated that law was "local knowledge" in a very deep sense. Another anthropologist, Lawrence Rosen, who made a study of the Moroccan town of Sefrū, pointed out that Islamic law and society were permeated by the same cultural assumptions［Rosen 1989］. Of course, his study is problematic because he confused past and present models of Islamic law, but his point is very interesting. Namely, Islamic law and society are inseparable. However, it is necessary to indicate that the relationship between the two has changed.

For instance, modernity has continued to advance among the Twelver Shī'as and they have experienced these changes in their daily lives. According to Shouichiro Takezawa, the notion of modernity is defined as 'world scale changes in what human beings are and do which western

society has realized through a series of cultural and socio-economic changes brought about by the expansion of capitalism'［Takezawa (ed.) 2006: 1］. Modernization theorists like Max Weber and Émile Durkheim expected that the development of modernization and urbanization which were elements of modernity would gradually lead people's lives and consciousnesses to be more rationalized and calculated. As a result, they predicted that seemingly irrational human practices such as religion, witchcraft and so on, would decline［Durkheim 1915: Weber 1963］. However, such expectations were clearly mistaken and on the contrary some religions have increased their roles in their respective societies in unison with expanding modernity, the Islamic Revolution that occurred in what was apparently the most westernized country in the Middle-East, being a clear example.

Taking into consideration the simultaneous expansion of religion and modernity, I propose to analyze the institutions of jurisprudence in post-revolutionary Iran by employing three processes. Firstly, I attempt to draw an outline of the role of *Marjiʻ* in the Twelver Shīʻa. Secondly, I try to show how the role of *Marjiʻ* in post-revolutionary Iran has been dealt with in previous studies. Thirdly, I attempt to illustrate the role of *Marjiʻ* in post-revolutionary Iran through my field-work. After describing these three processes, I will analyze the relationship between religion and modernity in post-revolutionary Iran.

Ⅱ．**What is the Marjiʻ?**

The *Marjiʻ* is recognized as the highest jurisprudence authority in the Twelver Shīʻa, but the form in which it is found in today's centralized authority only began to appear in the mid-19th century. Since the 18th century, the Uṣūlī scholars started formalizing a hierarchy of jurisprudence for the purpose of organizing their school and establishing a centralized authority for settling disputes between the *Akhbārī* scholars, the *Shaykhī* scholars, and the *Baha'ī*s［Cole 1983: 33-46; Mousavvi 1996: 279; Walbridge 2001: 4］. Gradually a clearly distinguished hierarchy of jurisprudence, and a comprehensive Islamic authority were established in the mid-19th century. Namely Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī assumed the position of *Marjiʻ*, the supreme authority on Islamic law after the death of Ḥasan al-Najafī. Following al-Anṣārī, an outstanding jurist would be recognized to the position of supreme authority as *Marjiʻ* having been selected by a panel consisting of Uṣūlī scholars and laymen.

It is true that there were also jurists who had held the title of *Marjiʻ* before al-Anṣārī, but it was merely a title and they did not have comprehensive authority［Calmard 1991: 551］. At the same time, many Twelver Shīʻite laymen and scholars assert that *Marāji*ʻ(pl. of *Marjiʻ*) have continued to exist since the *ghayba* (the last *Imām*'s occultation). However they also distinguish between the time before al-Anṣārī and the time after him by the fact of there being a centralized authority or not ［Tājīk1377; Honarī 1379］. This shows that a centralized authority for jurisprudence was just starting to appear around the mid-19th century.

While it is clear when the birth of the modern version of the *Marjiʻ* started, the actual qualifications for becoming one are ambiguous. Generally speaking, the conviction of laymen is a common condition, but what are the criteria? In previous studies, it has been stated that six basic qualifications were required, namely *bulūgh* (maturity), *ʻaql* (intelligence), *īmān* (faith), *ʻadāla* (justice), *ṭagārat-e mawlid* (being of legitimate birth), and *dhukūra* (being of the male sex) ［Calmard 1991: 554］. In addition to these basic qualifications, previous studies point out various ancillary conditions.

However, it is clear that the *Marjiʻ* is undoubtedly the Islamic legal authority and no other criteria are more important than an excellent knowledge of Islamic law. This idea is based on the

theory of Tāleghānī and the common practice of Marʿashī Najafī who was also a *Marjiʿ*. According to Tāleghānī, there are two conditions, the first being a congenital condition and the second an acquired condition. Here the emphasis is on the latter and that is one who is *afqah* (the most learned in Islamic law) and *aqdas* (the most sacred)［Ṭāleghānī 1376: 134］. Apparently, it would be strange to juxtapose the two, but it isn't so strange to juxtapose the two by examining the people's practice in the case of Marʿāshī Najafī.

Many people visit the shrine where he is buried to pay their respects. When I asked them why they did so, they pointed out the excellence of his knowledge of Qurʿān and Hadīth. All interpretations of Islamic law are based on that knowledge. Namely the sanctity of the *Marājiʿ* is according to the Islamic knowledge bestowed on them by Allāh. Thus, there have been *Marājiʿ* in contemporary Iranian society who, in addition to their knowledge of Islamic law, have sometimes taking on the phenomenon of holiness. Sometimes they have even played an important role in a social movement. For example, they played important roles in the Tobacco Boycott Movement which started in 1891, and in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution which started in 1906. Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī in the former case, and Ākhund Khurāsānī in the latter case, were deeply involved in these movements. However the *Marjiʿ* has not always exerted influence over society. Ḥāʿerī Yazdī, the young Khomeynī's master and teacher, and Burūjerdī who played a central role in law and academic circles were not politically active. This brings us to the question of why and what changed political inactivity into political activism in the case of Khomeynī. I suggest that this may have been brought about by economical and structural changes in the institution of *Marjiʿ* itself.

After the death of Borūjerdī 1961, many prominent jurists became new *Marājiʿ* and this lead to the dispersion of power. This situation enabled Moḥammad Reẕā-shā, the second Pahlavi monarch, to enforce land reforms in 1962. This agrarian reform had a deep significance for the *ʿulamāʿ*, because their economic foundation mainly depended on income from the renting of land. The land reform deprived them of their economic foundation and forced them to require alternative means of support. In this situation, they made use of the *khums*[1] which they had primarily collected from bazaar merchants. In addition to utilizing the *khums*, they sought to increase it by starting to collect *khums* from all laymen instead for only the merchants ［Fischer 1980: 85; Halm 1991: 122-3］.

This economical change brought about two changes in the law academia. Firstly it led to the jurist holding the position of *Marjiʿ* having much more power among the Twelver Shīʿite law academia, because it was only the *marjiʿ* who had the right to collect the *khums*. Secondly, by collecting the *khums* from ordinal people, it became necessary for *ʿulamāʿ* to participate in society and politics[2]. Thus Khomeynī issued his legal opinion which ordered the overthrowing of the monarchy and the people acted upon it.

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[1] The tax of one-fifth of one's income. In Sunni Jurisprudence, it was banned by Umar al Khatab, the second khalīfa ʿ but among the Shīʿa, it continued to be enforced. The object of the tax was booty originally, but in Shīʿa context, it includes wealth obtained from the sea, deposits, minerals and so on. Recipients include the Prophet's family "Ahl al-Bayt", orphans, the poor, and travelers. In the time of the Imāms, they received it and distributed to *Imām* (*sahm al-imām*) and Sayyid (*sahm al-sāda*). By the time of the absence of the Imam, it became important problem that jurists collected it in spite of there being no Imām. In the 13th century, Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī judged it was permissible but that it could not be received by other scholars, but by the 17th century, it was possible for just *mujtahid* to collect it ［Gleave 2004: 533-4］.

[2] It is clear that the *ʿulamāʿ* had already participated in the Iranian constitutional revolution, but at that time, there were some different opinions about the constitution within the jurisprudence academia. So they were divided and confused ［Arjomand 1988］.

That is to say, the *Marāji'* not only firmed up their prestige in Twelver Shī'ite law academia, but also began to issue their legal opinions closely related to social matters in the early 1960s. Well, has this revolutionary Iran in which Islamic jurists have played such an important political role brought about any changes to the authority of the *Marāji'*, and if so, what are they?

Ⅲ. Institutions of Marji' in Revolutionary Iran as a Political Issue

Lead by Khomeynī, the anti-monarchy movement has spread since 1978. As a result, Islamic Revolution succeeded in Iran. After the revolution, internal and external matters led a group which supported Khomeynī's "*Velāyat-e Faqīh*" theory to seize political power and establish a new political system in which jurists played important role. In this section, I will attempt to grasp the development of institutions of *Marji'* under this new political system.

Many researchers have attempted to reveal the existence of *Marji'* in a political issues. Certainly, it is important to reveal it, because the supreme leader was required by Article 109 of the new constitution to have the qualification of *Marji'*. So after the death of Khomeynī, it became an important concern in the political arena. In those days, no one who was on the side of the establishment was qualified and all the eligible *Marāji'* had some demerit such as being anti-establishment, or indifferent to political matters. Then the *Shūrā-ye Khobregān* (Assembly of experts) appointed *Ḥujjat al-Islām wa Muslimīn* Khamene'ī as supreme leader and eliminated the necessity for the qualification of *Marji'* by amending Article 109. Moreover, the new establishment recommended Khomeynī's laymen to give their obedience to 'Alī Arākī as the new *Marji'* ［Milani 1992］.

In those days, there was another solution which was to in some way push Khāmene'ī up to the position of the *Marji'* and some people kept attempting to do this. For instance, the chairman of the assembly of experts, Meshkīnī, and the attorney general Moḥammad Yazdī were involved in this group. During this time, some respected *Marāji'* to whom many laymen had showed obedience passed away. Mar'ashī Najafī died in 1991, Khū'ī in 1992, and Reẓā Golpāygānī in 1993, and so Khāmene'ī was pushed up, but he himself publicly rejected the promotion. Moreover the lay supporters of Khū'ī did not accept the promotion of Khāmene'ī to *Marji'* and many of them gave their obedience to 'Alī Sīstānī who was the most prominent student of Khū'ī.

In spite of all this Khāmene'ī did step into the shoes of the *Marji'* after the death of 'Alī Arākī, mainly due to the support of *JMHEQ* (*Jāme'-e Modarresīn-e Ḥowze-ye 'Elīye-ye Qom*) which had introduced six jurists with him as a new *Marji'* ［Ṣāliḥ (ed.) 1385: vol.VIII, 213-4］ [3]. The underhand way that Khāmene'ī succeeded 'Alī Arākī with the support of domestic and foreign political supporters is often spoken of negatively (［cf. Walbridge 2001b: 234］). At the same time, it is often said that his position as *Marji'* was much weaker than Khomeynī's and that he couldn't monopolize it as a political tool in the way that Khomeynī had. During this time, many seasoned jurists such as Ṣāfī, Ardabīlī, Jannātī were recognized as a new *Marji'*. It can be said that the increasing number of *Marāji'* was a way of covering the relative weakness of Khāmene'ī's authority, but at the same time, it reveals the possibility of creating multiple channels of access to power and a variety of legal opinions.

Related to the increasing number of *Marāji'*, Stephan Rosiny calculated the total number of *Marāji'* by using their description in the jurists' website［Rosiny 2003］. He didn't reveal the details

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[3] The seven jurists were Khāmene'ī, Mīrzā Javād Tabrīz (d. 2006), Moḥammad Fāẓel Lankarānī (d. 2007), Moḥammad Taqī Behjat (b. 1911), Ḥoseyn Vāḥid Khorāsānī (b. 1921), Mūsā Shobeyrī Zanjānī (b. 1928) and Nāṣer Makārem Shīrāzī (b. 1926).

of the institutions of *Marji'*, because the purpose of his research was to examine how religious authority had been affected by the introduction of the internet. However our purpose here is to examine how the *Marāji'*, increased by political influence after the death of Khomeynī, developed in society and what they actually did.

Regarding these issues, I'd like to propose an approach to the study of the role of the institutions of *Marāji'* in the society by using two processes. Firstly, I try to reveal its membership and their activities. Secondly, I try to reconstruct the role of the institutions of *Marāji'* in the society by employing anthropological hypotheses.

Ⅳ. The Practice of Legal Interpretation in the Institutions of Marji'

In this section, I attempt to grasp the activities of the institutions of *Marāji'* through concrete instances and to understand their role in the society. Concrete instances are based on my field-work mainly at the offices of Ṣāfī, Lankarānī and Ardabīlī.

It is common with almost all the offices of the *Marāji'* that there is a sign at the corner of the alley, but there was no sign of anything. Their existence seemed almost to be invisible. However, all the people of the town know where they are and which offices belongs to which person is apparent to everyone. Ṣāfī's office is like this. His office is located on a blind alley, not on an open street. The building is made of brick and faced with cement just like an ordinary Iranian building, and it seems quite old. From his office, it is relatively easy to grasp the outline of the activities of the institution, because he only has one office in Qom.

During my fieldwork, one of their activities soon became clear through their daily routine. His office received many questions from visitors who came in person, or by telephone, letter, and e-mail. In all cases, the staff of jurists answered the question following Ṣāfī's guidelines, but in a case where the jurists couldn't answer, they would ask Ṣāfī in his court and Ṣāfī would answer the question. This was the usual method in the offices of other *Marāji'*. In an interview with Ardabīlī, I asked him why he didn't answer all questions himself. He answered, "There are too many to answer and so I answer only the more difficult questions, but I do check all the answers." So how are the answers conveyed to the questioners? After a scribe has written out a fair copy, Ṣāfī checks it and if necessary corrects it, and then he puts his seal[4] on it. In the case of a letter it is mailed directly, while in case of an e-mail, it is different from each office and there are three methods. One way is that a member of staff scans the hand-written paper and attaches the resulting file to an e-mail. Another is that the staff member writes the answer in digital form and attaches the resulting file to an e-mail. The last method is that the staff member writes the answer directly in the e-mail.

The staffs who perform these tasks are not all jurists. For example, one of the staff in Ṣāfī's office who made a fair copy was a graduate from the faculty of law in Tehran University. I asked him how he was able to do it. He said, "A scribe only needs the ability of good handwriting." Another of Ṣāfī's office staff who was engaged in technological work had graduated from the department of technology. I asked him why he worked there. He told me, "One of my friends who had a connection with this office recommended me to work here." I asked him whether he was also a follower of Ṣāfī. He replied, "I am not one of his followers. Actually, I am a follower of Behjat." These examples illustrate two points. Firstly, the institutions of *Marji'* are composed not only of

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[4] If Ṣāfī corrects it, a scribe makes a fair copy again. After that, Ṣāfī checks it again and puts his seal on it.

Islamic jurists but also of people educated in non-Islamic sciences. Secondly, the priority when employing institutional staff is not that they are followers of the particular *Marji'*, but is related to their skills and talents. In such a situation, jurists are permitted to interpret Islamic law according to the guidelines given by the *Marji'*.

So what are the questions which the *Marji'* receives about? By now we may have a very religious image of these institutions, but they are in fact rather worldly. Certainly, religious questions like about faith, rituals are involved, but requests for advice about everyday matters are more frequent than religious ones[5]. For example, they could be about marriage, divorce, planning the family's budget or using a new product such as computer software. Do these examples indicate that the Twelver Shī'ites do not have a modern world view? It goes without saying that this is an erroneous assumption. For instance, Sperber mentioned the phenomenon in which people have traditional thinking in conjunction with modern thinking［Sperber 1975］.

So, why do they consult a jurist about using a computer? Regarding this question, African witchcraft studies give us a hint. Victor Turner revealed that personal events were changed according to how people understood their society and the relationship between a person and the society through a highly institutionalized framework［Turner 1984: 48-9］. This shows that "reflexiveness", the core of Anthony Giddens' theory, isn't limited to the modern societies which have been released from the tradition［Giddens 1990］. In *Marji'*, it is possible to regard the highly institutionalized framework as the Islamic law. Moreover Peter Geschiere researched the re-activation of witchcraft in African societies and indicated that local people who practiced witchcraft coordinated the meaning of witchcraft with its purpose to understand a series of social conditions［Geschiere 1997］. His points are indeed interesting, but it is impossible to apply their theories to the institutions of *Marji'* directly. Firstly, their theories deal with modernity, but modernity is related to capitalism. Geshiere demonstrates the way to understand economic conditions in Africa under the spread of capitalism. Namely, the spread of capitalism was related to the spread of re-magicalization. However, modernity is not limited to capitalism, but is also concerned with changes in human affairs through modern thinking, modern products, and so on. Secondly, the case of witchcraft is about the re-activation of traditional thinking system to counter expanding modernity, while institutions of *marji'* are more of a combination of a traditional thinking system and a modern thinking system. However, I am not indicating that religion is "acquired". People experience religion in their daily lives and re-produce what it is according to their paradigms and social conditions.

Ⅴ．Conclusion

Expanding modernity and developing institutions of *Marāji'* are apparently contradicting phenomena. It has already been mentioned that modernization theorists like Weber and Durkheim predicted that religions would decline with the progress of modernization based on their theories. However the reality has not confirmed their expectations; rather, religions have been re-activated in society. I have suggested that one of the reasons for this has been the role religion has played in interpreting modernity in the modernized society. Certainly, the process is different in each religion and society. Therefore, in my presentation I have revealed the contemporary Iranian version of the institutions of *Marji'* and some of their features only.

Firstly, I have attempted to grasp the historical development of the institution of *Marji'*. It was established in the mid-18th century and it gradually strengthened its ties with society through

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[5] The E-mail newsletter of Jannātī "*Weekly judgement (Hafte-ye Esteftā')*" supports this.

economical issues in the early 1960s. After the Islamic Revolution had occurred in Iran on February 11th, 1979, a new political system, known as the *"Velāyat-e Faqīh"* system, in which Islamic jurists played an important role was introduced. In this political system, the supreme leader was required to have the qualification of *Marji'*. So, following the supreme leader Khomeynī's death, the succession of the low ranked jurist Khāmene'ī's to *Marji'iyya* was a political issue. Khāmene'ī was recommended as a *Marji'* by *JMHEQ* after Arākī's death. His succession to the position of *Marji'* over more higher qualified jurists was politically expedient and lead to the *Marāji'* becoming multi-polarizated.

Next, I have tried to uncover the reality of the institutions of *Marji'*. Firstly, those institutions were composed of not only jurists, but also educated staff who had not specialized in Islamic Law. Their main role was to respond to questions from their respective followers. The object of the questions they received tended to be materialistic rather than religious and I have tried to explain this by applying Turner's and Geschiere's anthropological theories. As a result, I suggest that the role of the institution of *Marji'* is as a tool to interpret modernity. At the same time, considering that historical development, I propose that the institution of *Marji'* is a locus for the interaction of "local knowledge" between jurists and laymen.

My conclusion is that this is a part of the role of these institutions, and it is necessary to grasp this synthetically. Also, if I try to reveal the relationship between the Twelver Shī'a and society, I have to grasp not only the practice of the institutions of *Marji'* but also people's practice on a larger scale. However it is clearly a part of the role of the Twelver Shī'a in Iranian society that the institutions of *Marji'* are a means to interpret modernity.

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VII. Appendix

Ākhund Khurāsānī; Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Khurāsānī.

He was born in Iranian Mashhad 1839 and studied primary Islamic science there. He moved to study in Iraq accompanying with group of visiting Iraqi shrine. In Iraq, he studied under Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī and prominent scholars. It has been to say to become one of *marājiʿ* after Muḥammad Ḥasan Shīrāzī. He passed away on the way to participate in Iranian constitutional revolution on Dismember 13th in 1911〔Amānī 1385: 444〕．

Āya Allāh **ʿAlī Arākī.**

He was born in Iranian Arāk on Dismember 23th in 1894, and his father is Mīrzā Farāhānī. He learned under Ḥāʿerī Yazdī and Khwānsārī and prominent scholars in Arāk. Together with Ḥāʿerī Yazdī moving to Qom, he kept studying Islamic science in Qom. After Islamic revolution, he was appointed Friday praying leader. After the rest of Khomeynī in 1989, the establishment recommended him as a *marjiʿ*. On October 15th in 1994, he passed away〔Khūʾī 1382: 951-4〕．

Sayyid **ʿAlī al-Sīstānī.**

He was born in Iranian Mashhad in 1930. His family name derives from his ancestor who was appointed as a Shaykh al-Islām in Sīstān by Safavid government. After his studying Islamic science in Qom, he kept studying it under Khūʿī in Najaf. After Khūʾī passing away, he was recognized a *marjiʿ*.〔ʿAlavīje 1386: 488-92〕．

Seyyed ʿAbd al-Karīm Mūsavī **Ardabīlī.**

He is a son of Seyyed ʿAbd al-Raḥīm and he was born in Iranian Ardabīl on January 27th in 1926. After studying primary Islamic science there, he studied under Reẓā Golpāygānī and other prominent scholars in Qom scince 1943/4. After learning it in Qom, he went to Iraqi Najaf like contemporary young jurists finishing their study. After Islamic revolution, he became attorney general on February in 1980 and became chief justice on June in 1981 until 1989. At the same time of chief justice, ha was a member of first assembly of experts.（http://www.ardebili.com/Per/ about/default.asp）．

Seyyed Ḥoseyn Ṭabāṭabāʾī **Borūjerdī.**

On April in 1875, He was born as a son of Seyyed ʿAlī ibn Seyyed Aḥmad Ṭabāṭabāʾī. It has been said to become only *marjiʿ* after death of Seyyed Āqā Ḥoseyn ibn Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī in 1947. At the same time, his outstanding made Qom center of twelver learning. Exceoting for anti-Bahaʾi campaign and anti-land reform, he was political tranquillo. He passed away on March 31th in 1961 and buried in Masjed-e Aʿẓam〔ʿAbīrī 1382: 662-72; Hairi 2004: 157-8〕．

Āya Allāh Ḥājj Sheykh ʿAbd al-Karīm **Ḥāʾerī Yazdī.**

He was born in Mehrjerd a region of Yazd in 1850/1. After studying at Yazd, he went to Iraqi Sāmarrā under Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī to study Islamic science. In 1900/1, he moved from Iraqi Najaf to Iranian Arāk and established basis of Arāk's *ḥawza*〔Shīrkhānī 1386: 31〕. In 1906, he left Arāk to Iraqi Najaf and Karbarā to study one, but people of Arāk called him come back and he followed that in 1913/4. It has been said to become marjiʿ in 1920. After keeping teaching Islamic science in Arāk, Bāfeqī called him to settle in Qum and he follwed this proposion. After moving to Qom, he revived importance of Qom in shiʿite academia. He passed away on January 29th on 1937〔ʿAbbās-Zāde 553-61〕．

Shaykh Muḥammad **Ḥasan** ibn Bāqir **al-Najafī.**

He was born in Najaf in 1787. He studied under Uṣūlī scholar Ja'far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā' and Shayhī scholar Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā'ī. After his study, he trained young scholars in Najaf. At the same time, he wrote books like *Jawāhir al-Kalām (Words of Jewelry).* He passed away in 1849/50 ［Momen 1985: 318］.

Moḥammad Ebrāhīm **Jannātī.**

He was born in Iranian Shāhrūd in 1932. He started his study at 6 years old. At 18 years old, he migrated to mashhad to study higher level. After sometimes, he travelled to Qom to study under Borūjerdī and Khomeynī and travelled to Najaf under Āya Allāh Shāhrūdī. In 1979, he return to Qom and since then he has taught *fiqh* and *uṣūl al-Fiqh* (http://www.jannaati.com/far/index. php?page=1).

Abū al-Qāsim ibn 'Alī Akbar al-Mūsawī **al-Khū'ī** al-Najafī.

He was born in Iranian Khū'i in 1899. In 1912 he went to Najaf to study Islamic science and studied it under contemporary prominent scholars including in some marji'like Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Nā'inī al-Najafi (d. 1936), Ḍiyā' al-Dīn ibn Muḥammad al-'Irāqī al-Najafī (d. 1942). It has been to say he became one of *marāji'* after the death of Borūjerdī. He became the most powerful marji'after the death of Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm who had been the most powerful *marji'* after the death of Borūjerdī ［Momen 1985: 315］. He passed away in 1992.

Moḥammad Fāẕel **Lankarānī.**

He was born in the jurist family of Iranian Lankarān in 1931. He learned Islamic science under Borūjerdī and Khomeynī and other prominent scholar. He didn't participate in anti-monarchy movement directly, but he supported it indirectly. ［Ṣāleḥ (ed.) 1385: vol.VIII, 305-9］. He passed away on 16 June in 2007.

Seyyed Shahāb al-Dīn **Mar'ashī Najafī.**

He was born in Najaf in 1897/8 and his father is Seyyed Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd Mar'ashī. He studied Islamic science under Aḥmad Kāshif al-Ghiṭā, and studied in Iraqi Karbarā and Iranian Tehrān. In Qom, he studied under Ḥā'erī Yazdī and taught young jurists. It has been said to become one of *marāji'* after death of Borūjerdī. He was political tranquillo and passed away on August 29th in 1990 ［Amānī 1382: 938］.

Sayyid **Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī** al-Ḥusaynī.

He was born in Iranian Shīrāz in 1815and studied Islamic science in Iranian Iṣfahān, Iraqi Najaf. It has been to say to become only *marji'* as his master Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī. In 1875, he moved to Iraqī Sāmarrā and open *ḥawza* (institutions of Islamic science school). He passed away in 1895.

Shaykh **Murtaḍā** ibn Muḥammad Amīn **al-Anṣārī** al-Tustarī.

He was born in Iranian city Dezfūr around 1799. He studied in Iranian city Kāshān and Iraqi city Karbalā and Najaf. After his study, he lived in Najaf and taught Islamic law. At the same time, he wrote important books which cultivated the field of uṣūl al-fiqh. For example, there was *Kitāb al-Maqāsib (Useful Books).* He passed away in 1864 ［Momen 1985: 311］.

Reẓā Golpāygānī.

He was born in Iranian Golpāygān on March 20th in 1899 and he was a son of Seyyed Moḥammad Bāqer Emām. After he studied Islamic science in Golpāygān, he kept studying it under Ḥā'erī Yazdī in Arāk. Together with his master moving to Qom, he also moved there. It has been to say he became one of *marāji'* after the death of Borūjerdī and under monarchy reign, he engaged in running *ḥawzā*. He passed away on Dismember 9th in 1993〔n. d. 1382: 945〕.

Loṭf Allāh Ṣāfī Golpāygānī.

He is a son of Mollā Moḥammad Javād and was born in Iranian Golpāygān on February 20th in 1919. After learning primary Islamic science, He studied it in Qom and Najaf. In Qom, he studied under Borūjerdī, Khwānsārī, Āya Allāh Ḥujjat, Ṣadr al-dīn Ṣadr and other prominent scholars. He got married to a daughter of Reẓā Golpāygānī. Hence he is son in law of Reẓā Golpāygānī〔Aḥmadī 1386: 392-405〕.

"Beyond the Sunni-Shiite Dichotomy: Rethinking al-Afghānī and His Pan-Islamism"

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0. Introduction

I. Pan-Islamism: As an Imagined Term in the West

II. Al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamism (Jāmi'a Islāmīya): Toward Transcending the Sunnī/Shī'a Dichotomy

III. Pan-Islamism: A New Phase in the Late 20th Century

IV. Conclusion

0. Introduction

It is well-known that there has been confrontation and somewhat nervous relations between Sunnīs and Shī'as in Islamic history. The differences between both religious schools derive from their respective viewpoints toward the early Islamic period, in their ways of thinking about jurisprudent and theological affairs. However, by the early the 20th century, the Islamic world had been absorbed into the worldwide political and economical system as a whole, and these differences made no critical sense. The integration of the world economy, together with the advance of secularization and westernization caused Islamic historical and religious differences to be put away, and Islamic intellectuals also did not think much of their internal disunity, being more concerned with taking care of the crisis caused by the confrontation with Western imperialism.

So far Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/39-97; al-Afghānī hereafter) has been evaluated as one of the greatest pioneers of Islamic revivalism and regarded as an important advocator of Pan-Islamism. His uniqueness derives not only from the knowledge he acquired through traditional Sunnī/Shī'a scholarship, but also from his maintaining unity and solidarity beyond narrow religious factionalism in dealing with the common crisis which faced the Islamic world. No other advocator of Islamic revivalism who stood beyond the fence between Sunnī and Shī'a can be seen in the 19th century except for him, and it is said that al-Afghānī has left an ecumenical heritage of his thought even within the context of today's contemporary Islamic revivalism.

This paper has three purposes. Firstly it points out that historically the term "Pan-Islamism" was first imagined and coined in Western countries with the negative connotation of fear of the Islamic world. Secondly, it brings into light the fact that al-Afghānī himself applied the same term

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in Arabic in a positive way for acquiring liberation and independence from the West, and there were two aspects to his Pan-Islamism, both political and religious. Thirdly, it confirms that the heritage of al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamic religious thought still remains within the so called second Islamic revival within the Islamic world in the latter half of the 20th century. As a typical example, we will focus on the re-approachment movement led by the organization called "Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya (the Organization for the re-approachment of Islamic schools of thought)" in Cairo in the 1960s.

I. Pan-Islamism: As an Imagined Term in the West

It is said that the term "Pan-Islamism" was coined in the 19th century in Western Europe. Originally the term captured the Europeans fearful perception of the Islamic world and had invasive sound[2]. Indeed there were some struggles for resistance against the West in the Islamic world. In 1882, the Egyptian general 'Arābī encouraged his fellow countrymen to free themselves from British colonial rule under the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians". In Egypt's neighbor, Sudan, Muḥammad Aḥmad declared himself to be the Mahdī and began a resistance movement against Britain in 1882, during which the British general Charles Gordon died fighting for a lost cause. In Iran the Tobacco Boycott Movement, which occurred in 1891, achieved the withdrawal of British economical suppression. Thus, western countries in general, and Britain in particular, began to hold a fearful perception of the Islamic world as a whole. One of the prominent German orientalists, Carl Becker defines Pan-Islamism as "the realization of the Islamic concept of Islamic world integration, by uniting under the sole leader of the community (Imām)" and maintains that the slogan Pan-Islamism originated after the Berlin conference in 1884 [Becker 1924: 231-51].

Other orientalists say that the expression was created in 1870s being compared with Pan-Slavism which was in full flourish in Eastern Europe [Lee 1942: 281], and a prominent Iranologist, Edward Browne, reports that he could not find any words equivalent to Pan-Islamism in the Arabic, Turkish and Persian languages, and said that when he asked his Muslim friend about it his friend replied that the term "Pan-Islamism" had been coined with a dark connotation by his correspondent 〔＝a Western〕 in Vienna [Browne 1902: 306-07]. On the other hand, the orientalist David Margoliouth says that Pan-Islamism was "a ghost", according to some Arabic resources [Margoliouth 1912: 3-4, 16-17]. Lee says that it was one aspect of the reaction of Muslims to the

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[2] Lockman says that Pan-Islamism is the shadow of a widespread European anxiety about Muslim solidarity, the term (literally meaning "encompassing all Muslims", on the model of "Pan-German" or "Pan-American") which European colonial officials and experts on Islam used to denote the persistent feelings of solidarity among Muslims across national boundaries which, they feared, might be mobilized against colonial rule. At the very zenith of European global hegemony, Europeans conjured up vague but threatening notions of secretive cabals of cruel and fanatical Muslims plotting to overthrow colonial rule everywhere across the Muslim world [Lockman 2004: 91].

impact of the Christian West [Lee 1942: 281]. As both of the secondary material sources in western European languages offer confusing and contradictory views, we can but surmise that the term "Pan-Islamism" was produced by the West in the modern imperial era[3].

Neither the intellectual and religious bent nor the actual steps to exploit it should be separated from their proper context which was the Oriental-Occidental cultural and political conflict. For example from the 1850s to the 1880s, there was severe rivalry between the Western Powers. Britain and Russia struggled with each other to acquire Central Asia and India. In response, Central Asian and Indian Muslims began calling for the aid of the Ottoman Caliphate and insisting on Islamic unity [Lee 1942: 283].

Thus Pan-Islamism did come about through the Muslim's natural and traditional sense of unity, but was only a way of thinking formed through their common experience under the threat of western imperialism and colonialism as a whole. That is to say, Pan-Islamism was a shadow cast over global integration under western imperialism and ultimately a negative aspect of imperialism itself [Kurita 2002: 4].

In this sense the term "Pan-Islamism", which al-Afghānī used frequently in his many articles and books to resist European, especially British imperialism, needed the very existence of the West to begin with. Indeed, as seen below, his famous Pan-Islamic journal "*al-'Urwa al-Wuthqā*" ('*UW* hereafter) was published from Paris and delivered throughout the world using modern technology[4]. In addition a contemporary Iranian Islamic writer Hādī Khosrō Shāhī describes his journey to Paris as pilgrimage (Hijra) [Shāhī 2000: 23]. Hijra is one of the key concepts in Islamic history, which marks the beginning of the Islamic Umma in the Arab Peninsula in the 7th century. From here we can judge how important the existence of the West was for the Islamic world to start the modern revival of it's Umma.

In that case, should we consider that al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamic thought was entirely produced by westerners and that he was totally prearranged or predetermined by them? Never. He used this term purely for liberating Muslims from Western colonialism so it can be said that his words never contained any connotation of a threat. On the one hand, westerners used the words in a fearful and negative way. On the other hand, he used it very positively as a concept for resisting Western colonialism. We will find this peculiar subjectivity of his own within the term in the next chapter.

II. Al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamism (Jāmi'a Islāmīya): Toward Transcending the Sunnī/Shī'a

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[3] The Indian Muslim scholar Seyyed Amīr 'Alī also defines the word as "the imaginary product aiming to break the freedom of Muslims [Ali 1938: 19-20].

[4] There is a indication that Pan-Islamic propaganda was made possible, perhaps actually engendered, by the mechanical progress in communications, the introduction of the printing press, and the increase of commercial transactions brought to the Islamic world from the West [Becker 1924; 239-42; Hurgronje 1915: 23-25; Ritter 1924: 329-50; Wirth 1915: 432-33].

Dichotomy

When al-Afghānī's political thought became widely known, Muslim intellectuals loved to use the term on the grounds that it was the very expression of true Islamic belief which enhanced the Muslim's sense of solidarity[5]. Now it is customary to regard him as a pioneer of Pan-Islamism both in the West and in Islamic countries[6].

It is well known that Islam strengthens the spirit of Muslim's solidarity, but in reality, it is not quite so simple. At that time Islamic countries maintained rather hostile relationships, and deep disagreement among religious schools was erupting [Kosugi 2006: 215]. When the Islamic Empire was the superior world power, this did not cause any problems. However, when the relationship between Europe and the Islamic world was reversed in the 19th century, and Western imperialistic countries began to invade Islamic territories, the issue became crucial.

Britain defeated France at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and expanded its territory in the Bengal area. Then through the three Maratha Wars in India from 1775 to 1818, and the Sikh Wars from 1845 to 1849, Britain conquered the Punjab area. Finally, Britain abolished the rank of the Mughal Emperor in 1857. Thus the British government colonized India thoroughly and began to govern her directly in the name of Queen Victoria.

Qājār Iran was defeated by Russia in two wars (1805-13, 1827-28), made the Turkmanchai treaty, lost Armenia and admitted extraterritoriality for Russians in its own territory. This was the beginning of Iran's unequivocal treaties with the major world powers. Russia, since its

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[5] His intellectual heritage was inherited by Islamic intellectuals as a whole. For instance, when we see Kawākibī and Riḍā, who are both Sunnī Muslim thinkers who lived from the later 19th century to the early 20th century, the Makka Conference advocated by Kawākibī had Shī'a Jurisprudents, and Riḍā praised the Shī'a 'ulamā' in his Islamic state theory. In fact, Shī'a 'ulamā' from 'Irāq took part in the Islamic International Conference held in Jerusalem in 1931, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference does not regard the Sunnī/Shī'a differences as such crucial a problem [Kosugi 2006: 706]. More over the Muslim Brotherhood was much more closely following the tradition of Pan-Islam as drawn up by al-Afghānī in the 19th century, with whom Ḥasan al-Bannā was frequently compared [Mitchell 1969: 321]. Nevertheless, as the contracts between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamā'at al-Taqrīb illustrate, the Ikhwān showed a fundamental willingness to engage in a dialogue of this type with the Shī'a [Brunner 2004: 124]. Regarding al-Bannā's Pan-Islamic thought, See [Mitchell 1969: 216].

[6] For example there are some studies on al-Afghānī in the West [Kamrava 2006: 12; Sardar 2006: 562]. On the other hand, a great many al-Afghānī studies appear in the contemporary Islamic world. In the Arab world for example [Ḥasan 1982: 13-17; al-Mur'ashlā 1983: 41-82, 105-51;'Abd al-Ghanī 1998: 45-49; al-Asadī 1999: 39; Shalash 1987: 35; 'Imāra 1968: 49-62, 1984: 27-29; Yūsuf 1999: 63-88; 165-189; Ḥanafī 1998: 11; Ṭahārī 1999: 28-39, 65-69], in Iran for example [Asadābādī 1971: 154; Ṭabāṭabā'ī 1972: 46-52, 92-110; Khorūsh 1979: 358-63; Modarresī 1982: 3-4; Jam'ī az Nevīsandegān-e Majalle-ye Ḥouze 1997: 101-54; Farhādiyān 1997: 99; Shāhī 2000: 14; Movaṣṣeqī 2003: 59; Karamī 2004: 227-60; Kermānī 2006: 64; Moqaddem 2007], and in Afghnistan for example [Bashār 1977: v; Ṭabībī 1977: 15-19, 94; Ghanī 1977: 31-43; Nevīn 1977: 4-10; Rashtī 1977: 6; Samandar 1977: ii; Ṣidqī 1977: 1-3; 'Abd al-Quyūm 2000: 9-10]. All of these studies confirm that he is a precursor of Pan-Islamism in the 19th century Islamic world.

subordination of the Gazan Khān kingdom in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible, the Emperor of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, continued to conquer the Khān states in Central Asia one after another, took steps toward Caucasus, and finished colonizing Dagestan by 1877.

On the other hand, the beginning of the colonization of North Africa goes back to the march of Napoleon on Egypt in 1798. After the withdrawal of Bonaparte, the Muḥammad ʿAlī dynasty was put under the influence of France and Britain, and the latter colonized Egypt in 1882 without missing the opportunity of the ʿArābī revolution. The former occupied Algeria in 1830 and colonized Tunisia and Morocco one by one. Italy began her occupation of Libya in 1911. The colonization of North Africa was followed by the division of Africa by the West and African Muslim countries were also subordinated [Nakata 2001: 41-42].

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Muslim countries that had kept their independence, albeit formally, were only three; Ottoman-Turkey, Qājār-Persia, and Durrānī-Afghan. For the Islamic world, the 19th century was the century of disassembling [Kosugi 2006: 188], and they experienced it as integration into the modern world system [Wallerstein 1974] politically, economically, and militarily, even though it was neither single-lined nor inevitable.

Al-Afghānī detected the essence of these serious crises and started the so called first Islamic revival movement in the 19th century [Kosugi 2006: 188-89]. After he had traveled through various Muslim countries including Afghanistan, Persia, India, and Egypt and observed each state to be powerless and incompetent, he clarified his concept of Islamic unity through the articles he and his Egyptian disciple, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, published during their 1884 Paris sojourn in their short-lived Pan-Islamic journal ʿUW[7]. His was the Islamic voice which shouted out against Western imperialism and succeeded in raising alarm across the Islamic world with these words;

> "Islamic sovereignty used to extend to Maghrib (Andalsia) in the West, Tonkin at the
> border of China in the East, Fazan in the North, and Sarandib at the equator in the South, and
> there were so many Muslims who lived within its borders. They had one Khalīfa, and when

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[7] Both stayed in Europe at this time involuntarily and ironically enough due to European colonialism in the Middle East. Al-Afghānī had been expelled from Egypt by the Khedive Tawfīq and reached Paris via India. ʿAbduh joined him there after being expelled from Cairo in the wake of the ʿArābī Revolt and the British occupation in 1882.

Now the term "al-ʿurwa al-wuthqā" derives from the Qurʾānic sentence; "There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in the Shaitan and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold on the most trustworthy hand-hold that never breaks, and Allah is Hearing, Knowing" (al-Bakara: 256).

Shāhī counts on the significance of the journal as follows. Firstly, as the expression of the resistance against European colonialism in general and that of the British in particular. Secondly, as the expression of the voice of Islamic solidarity and the abolishment of narrow religious factionalism. Thirdly, the discussion of the Muslim's decline and bringing the cause to light [Shāhī 2000: 519].

he raised his voice, Chinese Emperors surrendered and European kings were became very frightened. They have never invaded the Islamic Umma until recently. Once, Muslims rejected being put under a non-Muslim ruler, and when some Muslims were under the control of foreigners, every other Muslim mourned wholeheartedly throughout the entire Islamic brotherhood [al-Afghānī 2002a: 157]."

According to al-Afghānī, Arabs, Turks, Persians, Indians, Egyptians, and Maghribis had originally held onto the religious rein so tightly and kept so deep a relationship of kinship that when one of their companions was troubled by misfortune or their country was being loosened and divided, they would all feel great sorrow [al-Afghānī 2002a: 139]. However, the reality he faced in his time was quite the reverse. He complains loudly;

"When the Indian Revolt occurred 〔in 1857〕, Afghans and Baluchis Muslims failed to help Indian Muslims, and when the Afghan-British War broke out〔in 1878-81〕, they also did not participate in the political struggle against British encroachment. The key point in opposing the British occupation of Egypt lies in unity among the Indians, Afghans and Persians, and that is the very expression of Muslim brotherhood and a clue to the revival of the Islamic Umma in the future [al-Afghānī 2002a: 123]."

Thus Western colonial aggression awakened Muslim unity from its slumber, and al-Afghānī gave expression to that solidarity running through the Islamic world with "al-Jāmi'a al-Islāmīya (Pan-Islamism)" and aimed to construct a unified common front uniting Islamic independent states against imperialism[8]. In this sense, he has been regarded as a pioneer of Pan-Islamism and his Pan-Islamism was a political means for mobilising anti-imperialism[9].

However, we must also pay attention to his advocacy beyond the Sunnī/Shī'a dichotomy [Enayat 1982: 41-42; Landau 1990: 15]. In his scheme for Pan-Islamism, al-Afghānī advocated the

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[8] During his short stay in London, he contributed the articles "British Policy in East Countries（al-Siyāsa al-Injilizīya fī Mamārik al-Sharqīya）" and "The Reason for War in Egypt（Asbāb al-Ḥarb bi-Miṣr）" to a newspaper compiled by Lūis Sābunjī *The Bee（al-Naḥla）*". The former is a strong criticism of British foreign policy in India and Egypt, the latter pointed out that the true reason for the British invasion was their concern over the project of the Ottoman Sulṭān 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II to gather all the Muslims under the Islamic Khalīfa, that is, Pan-Islamism, and their dispatch of an army was to break up this rising sign of Islamic unity（'aṣabīya）for fear of it's deep influence in Eastern countries, especially in India [Keddie 1972a: 184]. Al-Afghānī himself when referring to the concrete project of the political alliance between the Ottoman empire, Persia and Afghanistan, used the Arabic term "al-Jāmi'a al-Islāmīya". See the article "Awakening from Sleep"[al-Afghānī 2002a: 405-06].

[9] Kosugi evaluates his peculiarity as translating a religious brotherhood into a political alliance between Islamic states in the 19th century [Kosugi 2006: 198].

unity of the Islamic religious schools; Sunnī and Shī'a. For instance, he suggested in an article entitled "Call for the Persians to Reach an Agreement with the Afghans" that;

"Both nations are like two branches of one tree and they have one root. That is an ancient Persian origin. When Islam came, both became so powerful through the deep unification which true religion brought. Actually, there are few differences between these nations, and those differences do not require to branches to be split or clothes to be cut. I am very sorry that these slight differences have become so serious although both parties have wise ways of thinking [al-Afghānī 2002a: 193][10]."

According to him, Afghans and Persians had become over particular about such tiny and frivolous differences. Originally both nations had been the one and had become so mighty by virtue of the true Islamic faith they shared. Though Islam has two religious schools in general, Sunnī and Shī'a, and Afghans belong to the former, while the Persians belonged to the latter. Sunnīs and Shī'as originally followed one Islam, and disparity and disunity between them only emerged with the passing of time. "Now we must go back to the pure Islamic principle and revive its true meaning", he advocated.

So what then was the motivation for him to advocate the necessity of transcending the narrow dichotomy between the Sunnīs and Shīas? We can observe the background to the Pan-Islamic character of his thinking in the following points.

First of all it can be confirmed through his description of the Afghan nation in his notable book "*History of Afghan (Tatimma al-Bayān fī Ta'rīkh al-Afghān)*"[11]. In this book he mentioned the unreasonably narrow religious factionalism which existed among the Afghans in his time. For example, he pointed out that;

"The Afghan 'ulamā' avoid eating food slaughtered by Shī'as. On the other hand, they do not hesitate to eat meals slaughtered by Jews or Christians, because they believe that Shī'ias have already disavowed their faith, and do not take any food slaughtered by those who have lost their own creed. This is their point of difference with ahl al-Kitāb (the people of the

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[10] He goes on to say, "Oh, Persians, remember that you have contributed your knowledge to Islam and turn your eyes to your inheritance in Islam. As you made a great effort in spreading Islam all over the world, you should become a pillar of the religion, Islam. You are the best people to restore Islam's past glory and to build a firm foundation for bringing about Islamic unity in the Umma. This deed is not impossible on account of your great nationality and firm will" [al-Afghānī 2002a: 195].

[11] According to Rashtī, who is a prominent al-Afghānī researcher in contemporary Afghanistan, al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamism was guaranteed by his experience of engagement in Afghan policy in the 1860s. The fruit of his experience is expressed in the book [Rashtī 1977: 5].

Sacred Book) [al-Afghānī 2002d: 179]."

Furthermore, he pointed out the meaningless and ugly struggles between Sunnīs and Shī'as as follows;

"There was a political struggle in Qandahar which derived from Islamic sectarian factionalism. It went as follows. One of the greatest (Sunnī) 'ulamā' declared the Shī'as to be unbelievers. Then the Afghan people revolted against them and so much blood flowed. Houses were broken and shops were invaded. The same situation happened in Kabul. The 'ulamā's declaration that the Shi'as were unbelievers led to an appalling war between Sunnīs and Shī'as which continued for a few months [al-Afghānī 2002d: 177-78]."

Thus the experience of al-Afghānī during his stay in Afghan in his youth contributed greatly to his later concept of Pan-Islamism, because he was fed up with the miserable conditions that resulted from the repeated factional struggles which occurred between the two religious schools, even though they were both Muslim[12]. So he aimed to offer a solution to break through the useless conflicts by means of advocating tolerance and the unity of Musims[13].

According to al-Makhẕūmī, al-Afghānī specified the reason for the disunity and disparity in the Islamic world was first of all the selfishness of its rulers. They wanted to keep their own subjects in ignorance, while making wars to expand their territories at any opportunity. Then the leaders of the Sunnīs and Shī'as exaggerated trifling differences, even though they both held to the

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[12] On the other hand, he praised an aspect of co-existence among Sunnīs and Shī'as in "*History of Afghān* ". Al-Afghānī pointed out that "Afgans have a strong attachment toward their religion, law school,and race (jins). They never discriminate rights among foreigners, and they have little concern about whether Shī'as or non-Muslims follow the Islamic principles or not, so they do not forbid them to take a high rank in Afghan government. Actually, you can see al-Qizil Bāsh transporting landlords in Afghan. Then al-Afghānī says that all Afghans, though they are poor, are proud of their Afghan-ness and convinced that they are from the noblest nation in this world. He also insists that there are no more pure in faith and complete in Islam than the Afghans and the 'Arabs [al-Afghānī 2002d: 175]. In this respect it is very interesting to point out that he insist that the Afghans and Persians are the same nation in origin (aṣl Īrānī) and the Afghan language derives from the old Persian language (ma'khūdh min lisān Zendōstā)[al-Afghānī 2002d: 114]. For him there are no peculiar distinctions between Afghan and Persia from national and linguistic viewpoints.

[13] Kosugi points out that during his stay in many countries, he became able to transcend the narrow religious factionalism by which the thought of most of people at that time had been arrested. On that basis he was accustomed to both Sunnī and Shī'a scholarship traditions. Judging from the traditional Islamic knowledge system, his was a very rare case [Kosugi 2006: 216]. For the background of his education, see ['Abduh 1972: 17; Riḍā 1931: 28; al-Makhẕūmī 1931: 111; 'Imāra 1984: 45; Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 17; Shāhī 2000; 17; Moqaddem 2007: 402-03], especially ['Abduh 1972: 12; al-Makhẕūmī 1931: 76; Riḍā 1931: 28; Amīn 1955: 24, 66-67; 'Imāra 1984: 53; Ḥalabī 2005: 7].

Qur'ān and the teachings of Muḥammad as their essential faith. Today the deep crack has disunited and weakened the Muslims. Abū Bakr and 'Alī would not have approved of such a struggle and such disparity under their own names [al-Makhzūmī 1931: 111-112]. This do not mean that al-Afghānī aimed to abolish both of the religious schools of thought (*madhhab*), but he insisted on the necessity of recalling the principle of Islam as Abū Bakr and 'Alī had proposed; Islam is one. Indeed, he had many disciples and companions regardless of whether they were Sunnī or Shī'a[14].

But there is no more clear evidence to prove his independence from solid religious sectionalism than his testimony. When al-Afghānī was asked about his own belief ('aqīda) by some Sunnī 'ulamā' in Turkey, he replied "I am a Muslim". When they asked him about his religious sect (madhhab), he answered "I do not know of any madhhab leaders who are greater than me". When the question was repeated, he said, "My madhhab corresponds to them in part, but is mostly different" [al-Makhzūmī 1931: 112-13; al-Mur'ashlā 1983: 39][15].

Thus he had already transcended the narrow Sunnī/Shī'a dichotomy even in the 19th century Islamic world. It may be considered that this religious transcendence was an important step towards his Pan-Islamic vision.

As seen above, the Islamic world was contending with advancing Western imperialism and colonialism as a whole at that time. The West felt threatened by the Islamic world although they had invaded it, and had coined the term "Pan-Islamism" with its fearful connotation. On the other side of the coin, al-Afghānī employed the Arabic term "al-Jāmi'a al-Islāmīya", which corresponded directly with Pan-Islamism. There is a possibility that after he observed that the term "Pan-Islamism" had been circulating in Europe, he began using the same term in Arabic[16]. If so, his Pan-Islamism was a concept borrowed from the West.

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[14] As to his disciples and companions regardless of they are being Sunnī or Shī'a, See table 1.

[15] 'Abduh and Makhzūmī or other later researchers rank him as a complete Muslim or a pure monotheist (Ḥanīfī)[al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; 'Abduh 1972: 27; Riḍā 1931: 41; 'Imāra 1984: 61, 1997: 53; Yūsuf 1999: 57-62; Ḥanafī 1998: 31] and as a man belonging to the Ash'arī or Mātrīdī schools of theology (kalām), not to any schools in faith ('aqīda), to the four law schools in 'ibāda, and to each of the schools to which each land ruler belonged in mu'āmalāt [al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; 'Abduh 1972: 27; Riḍā 1931: 47; 'Imāra 1984: 68; Ḥanafī 1998: 31]. We can see the reason why he has been evaluated highly by his disciples and companions past and present.

[16] According to Keddie, al-Afghānī was the first in his time to use the Qur'ānic term "al-'urwa al-wuthqā" express Muslim solidarity and advertise Pan-Islamism with his sincere praise for the Ottoman Khalīfa in the latter half of the 1870s [Keddie 1972a: 184]. It was in 1884 that Afghānī and 'Abduh published the Pan-Islamic journal "*UW*" from Paris. In the very same year the Berlin Conference, which is the symbol of colonial partition by the West of Asian and African countries, was held in Germany. There is a high possibility that "*UW*" as the expression of his Pan-Islamism was a reflection of Western imperialism itself. On the other hand, it is often pointed out that al-Afghānī took Czarist Russia as a model to follow for realizing Pan-Islamism because of it's absolute unity and unbending self-assertion [Yamauchi 2004: 238]. It is also mentioned that the unification of the German Empire in 1871, incidentally, served as the model for an agreement that could lead to unity [Brunner 2004: 35].

However, we must first and foremost pay attention to the fact that he used the word "al-Jāmi'a al-Islāmīya" to unite Muslims and to liberate the Islamic countries from Western encroachment. Indeed, the West and al-Afghānī used the same term but the meanings implied by either side were quite different. He reversed and modified the value of the term for his own purpose. In this sense, Pan-Islamism was the concept of a man who had internalized the West deeply and then strongly resisted its ifluence for the purpose of Islamic salvation. In the end he left a deep fear in the West, especially in his main opponent, Britain[17].

Regarding the term "Pan-Islamism", both sides appear to have influenced each other and produced one another.

III. Pan-Islamism: A New Phase in late 20th Century

In the latter half of the 20th century, especially after the 1970s, the Islamic world experienced the second Islamic revival. Some political events were considered evidence of the rising tide of this revival. In 1967 Egypt was completely defeated by Israel in the Third Middle East War and Arab nationalism faded away in the Arab world. In Iran, the Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979, halting the advance of the secular modernization policy which had been progressing up to that time. In the same year the Soviet Union began to invade Afghanistan and the Mujāhidīn gathered from all over the world to defend Islamic lands. The Islamic world responded to these political situations and took action toward religious revival as a whole [Kosugi 2006: 474-83].

Al-Afghānī's dream of establishing a political line of resistance to Western imperialism by combining the independent Islamic states, that is, Ottoman-Turkey, Qājār-Persia, and Durrānī-Afghan in the 19th century came true in a sense through the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1971[18]. This was an expression of the political aspect of his Pan-Islamism. So then how is the religious aspect of his Pan-Islamism expressed in the contemporary Islamic world?

Being linked by these outer-political conditions, the Islamic world produced a movement to

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[17] Hans Cohn says that the first time the term "Pan-Islamism" was used in Britain was in 1882 [Kohn 1920: 44], at the time when Britain subdued the 'Arābī revolution and occupied Egypt as mentioned above. In the very same year al-Afghānī visited Britain and had a discussion with British high officials about the 'Arābī revolution and the Mahdī movement in Sudan [Keddie 1972a: 229; Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 38; 'Imāra 1984: 67-68; Blunt 1983: 409-10]. So Pan-Islamism was a concept which reflected the correlation and interrelation between al-Afghānī or the Islamic world and the West.

[18] For details of the OIC political structure, the background of the Islamic concept on it's international laws and relationships, See [Moinuddin 1987]. On the other hand there is an opinion that the OIS is the very testimony for internalization of the Western colonial paradigm in the political domain, that is, the nation-state system. According to Nakata this system is irrelevant to the traditional Islamic world view. So while the OIC bases itself on that system, and stipulates itself to be an Islamic union, it will never be Islamic [Nakata 2001: 44, 52-55].

promote mutual understanding between Islamic schools of thought known as "Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya" during the 1960s. This movement was regarded among them as a kind of inner-religious reformism (iṣlāḥ) [*DTMI* 1966: 19].

The organization called "Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya (the Organization for re-approachment of Islamic schools of thought)" was established by Iranians and headed by Moḥammad Taqī Qommī at Cairo in January 1947 [Brunner 2004: 129-132]. This organization worked really hard through the 1940s-1960s and published an official journal called "*Risāla al-Islām*" (*RI* hereafter) which was distributed all over the Islamic world and then stopped it's activities in the 1970s[19]. After the Iranian Islamic Revolution, a similar organization called "Markaz al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya" was established in Tehran in the 1990s for the purpose of furthering the heritage of the previous organization [Brunner 2004: 382].

There are some points which show that this re-approachment movement was a remnant of al-Afghānī's religious Pan-Islamism. Firstly, it can be seen that al-Afghānī's trans-religious thinking was adopted by his most prominent disciple, Muḥmmad 'Abduh. In 1884, with Mirzā Moḥammad Bāqer Bawānātī, who was Shī'a, and other supporters, 'Abduh set up a secret society in Beirut that sought to bring about a tolerance among religions. This society is remarkable because the very term "re-approachment (taqrīb)" emerged explicitly for the very first time from its activities [Brunner 2004: 38-39].

Secondly, right from the beginning, Muḥammad Muḥammad Madanī articulated his hope that the *RI* might become a kind of *'UW* of our times [*RI* 1949/1: 110]. 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Mughnīya says that there is no doubt that the re-approachment movement owes its inspiration to al-Afghānī and Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh. Both prominent Islamic revivalists in the first Islamic revival era were the precursors in this matter for publishing the Pan-Islamic political journal *'UW* [*DTMI* 1966: 7]. Regarding this point, Brunner points out that since *'UW*, the *RI* was the first periodical established with the express goal of realizing a Pan-Islamic unity among the Muslims and the former became the model the latter sought to emulate [Brunner 2004: 143-44, 208-09].

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[19] In January 1949, exactly two years after the foundation of the organization, the first issue of its journal *RI* was released; within a brief period it was to become by far the JT's most important mainstay in making the taqrīb concept known [Brunner 2004: 143-44]. See al-Madanī's editorial to *RI* 1/1949/106-10, on 109f. During the 23 years of its existence, 17th volumes of the *RI* were published. The first eleven and a half of these (including vol. 12/2 of April 1960) appeared on a precise quarterly schedule, each issue having 112 pages. With an annual output of 448 pages, however, the *RI* lagged far behind other Islamic journals like the *Majalla al-Aẓhar* and *'Irfān* and was retracted without a reason being given [Brunner 2004: 144-45]. See *RI* 1/ 1949/ 4 and 2 1950/ 7. Editorial responsibility for the *RI* was in the hands of two Aẓhar scholars. The inspector (mufattish) and the later dean of the Department of Sharī'a, Muḥammad Muḥammad al-Madanī became editor in chief (ra'īs al-taḥrīr), and 'Abd al-'Azīz Muḥammad 'Īsā, who taught in the same department, took over the post of editorial staff director (mudīr al-majalla). For details of the men who supported the journal or supported the re-approachment movement, See table 2.

Thus from point of view on it's name and publication, the organization was a remnant of al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamism. Then what was the concrete purpose of this organization and which kind of results it achieved?

Mughnīya points out the five purposes of the organization. Firstly, it aimed to make Muslims one (tawḥīd al-muslimīn) and to gather them under the Islamic and Qur'ānic flag, because "we can accomplish liberation from the miserable situation we are in today only through unity (al-ittiḥād), effort (jihād) and self-sacrifice (al-taḍhiyāt)". Secondly, it aimed to understand the true meaning of Islam and what Islamic religious schools represent, to confirm the basic Islamic ideas such as the Profession of Faith (Shahāda), the Last Day (al-yawm al-Ākhir), Worship or Prayer (Ṣalāt), Fasting (Ṣawm), Pilgrimage (Ḥajj), and the Book of God (al-Qur'ān), and to banish the ignorance that was circulating around the Islamic world. Thirdly, it aimed to call for re-approachment (da'wa al-taqrīb) of the Islamic religious schools, to avoid struggles and to establish a deep relationship between them[20]. Forthly, it aimed to negate the religious school's fanaticism (ta'aṣṣub), because fanaticism makes the reason and the mind so blind that people cannot discern anything. The Qur'ān and the Sunna teach that Muslims must avoid fanaticism, be tolerant of other religious beliefs, and reconfirm the brother and sisterhood of all human beings. Fifthly, it aimed to prevent any Muslim from declaring another Muslim an unbeliever (takfīr) on the grounds that they did not belong to their own religious school. [*DTMI* 1966: 6][21].

He also points out that their intention is not to demand that the Sunnīs renounce their sect, or Shī'as abandon their schools, but to call for unity with one another under a common cause (yattaḥid al-jamī' ḥawla al-uṣūl al-muttafiq 'alayhā) and for tolerating others unless they denied the principle of Islam, the conditions of faith, or the requirements of religion [*DTMI* 1966: 12][22].

By virtue of the ardent activities of this organization, Maḥmūd Shaltūt, the head of al-Aẓhar at that time, gave a fatwā in 1959 permitting Muslims to select their own schools as long as they lead

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[20] He also adds that calling for re-approachment is calling for unity (da'wa al-tawḥīd wa al-waḥda) and for subordination and peace (da'wa al-islām wa al-salām) [*DTMI* 1966: 14].

[21] The re-approachment group adopts mottos (al-qānūn al-asāsī) as such; Firstly, to collect the voices of Islamic religious school leaders. Secondly, to spread Islamic principles with various languages and to explain the necessity to adopt those principles in society. Thirdly, to end the struggle and apathy between two the Muslim nations (sha'b) and sects (ṭawā'if) and unite them (tawfīq) [*RI* 1991: 8].

[22] According to Brunner this kind of remark goes back to those of Abū al-Ḥasan Mīrzā, Shaykh al-Ra'īs, who had been through theological training. In a treatise entitled Etteḥād-e Eslām, published in Bombay in 1894, he discussed in detail the relationship between Sunnīs and Shī'as. He did this, however, not so much on a doctrinal-theological level but on a diplomatic-political one. His main motivation was to bring about some type of equilibrium between the governments of the Ottoman Empire and Qājār Persia. He also supported the recognition of both the mundane and the spiritual sovereignty of the Ottoman sulṭān, a fact that necessarily rendered his initiative unacceptable to the Shī'a 'ulamā'. Remarkably enough though, he assured the reader that he neither wanted to convert Sunnīs into Shī'as nor vice versa [Brunner 2004: 36-37].

to a faithful path on firm ground and rational reasoning, and legitimizing the Shī'a who followed the doctrine of the Ja'farī school [*DTMI* 1966: 15]. Thus the Sunnī authorities admitted the Shi'as formally for the first time in Islamic history. Brunner says that "before Shaltūt, no Sunnī legal scholar of rank, let alone a Shaykh al-Aẓhar, had gone as far to recognize Shīism as a completely equal denomination"[Brunner 2004: 290]. Actually the religious leaders of al-Aẓhar respected this fatwā, which prompted various religious leaders to cooperate together in starting Islamic law studies regardless of Sunnī/Shī'a schools depending on rational demonstrations and persuasive proofs free from any dogmatism. Together they embarked on wholistic Islamic studies [*DTMI* 1966: 16][23].

We must keep it in mind that the fatwā given by Shaltūt was a jurisprudential view and that there remain so many real and concrete gaps between Sunnīs and Shī'as, but we can also see in it a very important first step toward mutual understanding among Muslims as a part of the second Islamic revival, because "the idea of 'taqrīb' is the very point of transformation in the history of Islamic reformism past and present" [*DTMI* 1966: 19][24].

We should also remember that this re-approachment movement was a product of the time it belonged to. Indeed, the taqrīb theory has an aspect in its response to Western colonialism which has been preserved in the contemporary Islamic world. There is a sentence in the book; "We need to accord to resist against the vicious attacks and the coarse Crusaders of the present Zionism and American imperialism"[*DTMI* 1966: 5][25]. Like the Pan-Islamism advocated by al-Afghānī within the tide of the first Islamic revival in the latter half of the 19th century, the re-approachment theory within the context of the second Islamic revival in the latter half of the 20th century reflected the Western imperialism, that is, America-Israeli colonialism, and the very means of resisting it.

IV. Conclusion

There was a slogan "Jāmi'a Islāmīya" in the context of the first Islamic revival in the latter

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[23] Āyatollāh Montaẓerī recalls in his memoirs that Shaltūt's fatwā was the result of Borūjerdī's activity [Brunner 2004: 290]. It is said that Borūjerdī received a deep impression from al-Afghānī in his Pan-Islamic thought [Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 123]. It is therefore possible to think that there is some relationship between Shaltūt and al-Afghānī through Borūjerdī.

[24] Fazr Rahmān points out that it was in the 1960s and the 1970s that a wholesale modernization of the Aẓhar was embarked upon. In 1961 a law was enacted to institute as part of the Aẓhar University a school of medicine, a school of agriculture, and a school of engineering, and in 1962 a women's college was also set up within the Aẓhar complex [Rahman 1982: 68, 101-02]. It would even be possible to say that the fatwā enacted from Shaltūt can be regarded as a kind of modernization reform movement in the Aẓhar.

[25] It also points out that contemporary Islam is confronting American imperialism and Israeli Zionism and "they know that Islam is the most suitable religion for freeing human beings, the belief for promoting justice and progress through the Prophet Muḥammad, and the faith for fighting with enemies to acquire its independence and rights" [*DTMI* 1966: 5].

half of the 19ᵗʰ century. And now there is a slogan "Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya" in the context of the second Islamic revival. These slogans have been categorized as representing the very same Pan-Islamism.

The term "Pan-Islamism" was created in the West in the latter half of the 19ᵗʰ century with a dreadful connotation. Al-Afghānī accepted this term and changed the meaning from a negative one to positive one and then used it to call the Muslims to liberate themselves from Western colonialism, especially that of Britain. In this meaning the term "Pan-Islamism" is a term coined by the West and used against the West.

Within the context of Pan-Islamism al-Afghānī advocated a unified common political front between independent Islamic countries against imperialism, and he also insisted on the transcendence of the religious dichotomy between Sunnīs and Shī'as. This paper has focused on the latter.

The calling for mutual re-approachment between the two main Islamic schools of thought in the latter half of the 20ᵗʰ century is obviously the fruit of al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamism. Indeed the re-approachment theory reaffirms the significance of al-Afghānī's religious Pan-Islamism. It was also taken as a slogan against imperialism, especially that of America and Israel. So "Jāmi'a Islāmīya" and calling for "Taqrīb" was, and still is, an Islamic bridgehead toward overcoming the continuing colonialism of the Islamic world, past and present[26].

Thus, the process of evaluating the present Islamic movement dynamically within its inner contexts, and estimating its future prospects accurately, is deeply linked to a thorough examination of the heritage of al-Afghānī's ongoing living political and religious thought, and viewing Islamic movements in the context of their relationship with Western imperialism.

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[26] Brunner explains that since the days of al-Afghānī there has rarely been a call for Islamic unity without reference to the machinations and conspiracies of the "enemies of Islam" under which one is free to include Freemasons, imperialists, colonialists, Communists, Orientalists, Zionists, or any unpopular grouping within Islam. Justification for Islamic ecumenism did not always derive from theological motives so much as from a political-ideological front against an opponent [Brunner 2004: 209, 395-96]. As seen above f. 19, *RI* was published from the 1940s to the 1970s. At that time, secular nationalism was spreading in Middle-East as a whole. We should confirm here that Islamic revivalism existed even in an era of nationalism, contrary to what one would expect. This is evidence of the anti-imperialistic aspect of Pan-Islamism.

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DTMI; Daʿwa al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya. Bayrūt: Dār al-Jawwād.
RI; Risāla al-Islām: Majalla Islāmīya ʿĀlamīya. Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmīya.

Appendix:

■table 1; The members he was associated with in Istanbul:

Shī'ī/Persia	Iranian leader Fayẓī Efendī Tabrīzī
	the Iranian leader of immigrants from Iran to Turkey Ḥosayn Reẓā Pāshā
	Iranian friend Seyyed Borhān al-Dīn Balkhī
	Shaykh al-Ra'īs Abū al-Ḥasan Mīrzā
	Iranian disciple Shaykh Aḥmad Rūḥī Kermānī
	Mīrzā Āqā Khān Kermānī
	Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān Khabīr al-Molk
	his companions 'Abd al-Karīm Bīk
	Ḥamdī Bīk
	Shaykh Maḥmūd Afẓar al-Molk Rūḥī
Sunnī/Arab	'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribī
	Ibrāhīm Muwaylihī
	'Abd Allāh al-Nadīm
Hindī	Indian friend Nowwāb Ḥosayn

Source: [Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 58; Keddie 1972]

■table 2; The members who supported for publishing the "*Risāla al-Islām*"

the Shī'ī 'ulamā's, the great Marji's in Najaf or Qom	al-Shaykh Moḥammad Ḥosayn Kāshef al-Ghiṭā'
	al-Seyyed Hebe al-Dīn al-Shahrastānī
	al-Seyyed 'Abd al-Ḥosayn Sharaf al-Dīn al-'Āmelī
	al-Shaykh Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ al-Māzandarānī (al-Samnānī)
	al-Shaykh Moḥammad Javvād Mughnīya
	al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥosayn al-Rashtī
	al-Shaykh 'Abd al- al-Ḥosayn ibn al-Dīn
	al-Shaykh Moḥammad Taqī al-Qommī(the secretary general of Dār al-Taqrīb; al-Amīn al-'Āmm li-Dār al-Taqrīb)
	Āya Allāh al-Seyyed Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Ṣadr
	Āya Allāh al-Seyyed Moḥammad Taqī al-Khavansārī
	al-Marji' al-Kabīr Āya Allāh al-'Uẓmā al-Borūjerdī
the Aẓhar Shaykhs in Egypt	al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Majīd Salīm
	al-Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt
	al-Shaykh Muḥammad Abū Zahra

	al-Shaykh Muḥammad Muḥammad al-Madanī (the head of the journal editor; Ra'īs Taḥrīr al-Majalla)
the professors in Islamic university	al-Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Īsā (the office leader; Mudīr Idāra al-Majalla)
the famous Islamic writers	Aḥmad Amīn
	'Abbās Maḥmūd al-'Aqqād
	Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī

Source: [*RI* 1991: iii]

Cf. Dār al-Taqrīb was established and supported by Islamic leaders around the Islamic countries as below;

Moḥammad Taqī Qommī
Moḥammad Madanī
Moḥammad Ḥosayn Āl Kāshef al-Giṭā'
Maḥmūd Shaltūt
'Abd al-Majīd Salīm
'Abd al-Ḥosayn Sharaf al-Dīn
Muḥammad Jawwād Mughnīya
Muḥammad 'Alī 'Alawīya
Moḥammad 'Abd Allāh Dārez
Maḥmūd Fayyāḍ

Source: [*DTMI* 1966: 7]

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■He took his education at Tehrān and Shi'it sacred places like Najaf or Qazvīn in his teenage [Riḍā 1931: 28; 'Imāra 1984: 47; Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 20-21; Shāhī 2000: 17].

■According to al-Makhẓūmī, he had profound knowledge in rational scholarship, especially in old philosophy, Islamic historical philosophy, Islamic civilization and other Islamic/Muslim matters. He also mastered Afghan (Darī/Pashtō), Persian, Arabic, Turkish, French and understood English and Russian [al-Makhzūmī 1931: 76].

■Muḥammad 'Abduh, who had accepted his education in Egypt during 1871-79, said that al-Afghānī had offered him the high level education as below;

al-Kalām al-A'lā	
al-Ḥikma al-Naẓarīya	
al-Ḥikma Ṭabī'īya	
al-Ḥikma al-'Aqlīya	
al-Hay'a al-Falakīya	
'Ilm al-Taṣawwuf	

'Ilm al-Fiqh al-Islāmī	
Taṣawwuf	al-Zawrā'
Manṭiq	Sharḥ al-Quṭb 'alā al-Shamsīya, al-Maṭāli', Salam al-'Ulūm
Falsafa	al-Hidāya, al-Ishārāt, Ḥikma al-'Ayn, al-Ḥikma al-Ishrāq
Tawḥīd	'Aqā'id al-Jalāl al-Dawwānī
'Uṣūl al-Fiqh	al-Tawḍīḥ, al-Talwīḥ
Falakīya	al-Jaghmīnī, Tadhkira al-Ṭūsī

Source: ['Abduh 1972: 12; Riḍā 1931: 28; Amīn 1955: 24, 66-67; 'Imāra 1984: 53; Ḥalabī 2005: 7]

Session 5 (Feb. 2　16:45-17:45)

・Esen URMANOV (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

　" Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia"

・Walaa HASSAN & Intisar Al-FARTTOOSI (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

　" Forced Displacement Crisis in the Middle East: Case of Iraq"

Characteristics of Islam as culture and civilisation in Central Asia

- Central Asia is one of the centres of Islamic culture, studies, and law;
- Traditionally Islam there is resilient and tolerates incorporation of non-Islamic cultural elements;
- Islamic teachers and ulama did not intrude politics while their approval of any policy was obligatory;
- It had links mainly with Islam in India, Middle East and leaned on Persian cultural richness;

Several Landmarks Conducive to Rise of Religious Radicalism

- Emergence of underground "parallel" Islam in the Soviet era;
- Rigorous attitude of official religious heads Muslim Board who purposefully brought literature from the Middle East to local practices disassociated with Islam;
- Civil freedoms in perestroika era as opportunities to put the issue of Islamic Revival in agenda;
- Break-up of the USSR and return to national values, cultural roots which tacitly meant Islam but without political aim;
- Poignant search for models of development including the one proposed by missionaries, religious leaders, public groups of young people;
- Crackdown of religious agenda by secular government;
- Rise and freefall of radical political movements with Islamist agenda;
- Political Islam preached by Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami;

Parallel and official Islam and civil freedoms

- Uncontrolled Islamic groups existed under the Soviet rule in Tajikistan since the 1960s;
- Young students of Islamic studies from these underground groups split from their prominent teachers in the 1970s and resorted to political agenda;
- From the half of 1980s Soviet authorities resumed inertial atheist propaganda and using religious leaders with strict approach assaulted local Islam;
- Official leaders presumably imported literature from the Middle East;
- From tumultuous times of perestroika era Central Asian ushered era of independence;

Islamism in the context of search for identity

- Nationalistic governments resorted to traditional values but did not expect birth of political and militant Islam;

- Organisations of public watch with Islamic agenda in Uzbekistan and opposition comprising religious leaders emerged in Tajikistan;

- In Uzbekistan state quenched Islamists and in Tajikistan state slid into civil war and relentless fighting with opposition;

What is what?

- 1992-1997 Civil war in Tajikistan is NOT war between neo-communist government and Islamists but war between fractious regional clans some of which were Islamist;
- Leaders and members of Islamist entities from Uzbekistan fled to Tajikistan took part in the civil war;
- Islamist groups shared common ideological values: dominance of culture of violence and possibility of usage of violence for political purposes;
- Culture of violence in the post-Soviet state is inherent to prominent sportsmen, soldiers and officers well-trained in the Soviet army, they all joined radicals for a plenty of reasons;

Rise and Fall of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

- The movement was born in 1996 in Tajikistan as the result of the last round of inter-Tajik peace negotiations;
- Financially and politically, the movement relied on Pakistani security forces, Taliban, Al-Qaeda and drug traffic;
- Prime aim is to topple down Islam Karimov, current president of Uzbekistan, and establish Islamic state;
- The movement held a series of plots and military incursions in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;
- Finally defeated in US 2001 operation in Afghanistan with some leaders and most part of members killed, and now the remnants find shelter in the north of Pakistan out of range of Islamabad authorities;

Chronology

- 1992 – establishment of Adolat (Justice) Salafi group, Islam Lashkarlari, Islamic party of Turkestan in the Ferghana valley defying the power of Tashkent and later flee to Tajikistan;
- 1992-1996 – civil war in Tajikistan;
- 1996 – establishment of IMU;
- 1997-1999 – fallout of Tajik peace process and foundation of bases in distant regions of Tajikistan, out of range of Dushanbe;
- 1999 winter, summer and autumn – explosions in Tashkent and military incursions to Kyrgyzstan;
- 2000 summer and autumn – military incursion to Kyrgyzstan and enlistment in US data on Foreign Terrorist Organisations;
- 2001 – based and defeated in Afghanistan;
- 2001-currently – scant reports about killing, detaining and putting on trial of members of IMU;
- 2006 – attacks at Tajik and Kyrgyz border posts allegedly held by IMU ;

Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami

- Single alternative to secular regimes has set out a wide network of members who contribute not only by zeal but also by personal incomes;
- HTI has links with the party bureaus in the Middle East and Great Britain and from time to time include the Middle Eastern or world Islamic agenda into local propaganda;
- It aims at restoring Caliphate and founding Islamic state in Central Asia;
- HTI through media and leaflets renounces violent tools of capturing power but its program contains violence and militancy in the final stage of achievement of political goals;

Member of HTI

Chronology

- 1999-2000 – establishment of HTI branch in Central Asia;
- 1999-2002 – around 3000 activists were imprisoned in Uzbekistan by data of Uzbek human rights activists;
- 2002 – a French journalist gave proof of 60 000 partisans in Uzbekistan;
- 2000-now – reportedly police and security forces detain and jail activists in three countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;

-

Why do Islamists rise in Central Asia?

- Radicalism in CA is a component in international Islamist movements;
- Despite still an insignificant number of supporters, media chronicles report, it can outreach and lure more people even the youth with modern education and elite;
- Shrinkage of social basis of regimes, overstaying elites, clanship with democracy and secularism, desperate social and economic affairs;

- Disillusioned with current situation, angry with authorities, some Central Asians join radicals;
- Some of them choose radicalism for ideological reasons;

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- **L'islamisme radical en Asie centrale]** **Où mènera la répression du Hizb ut-Tahrir ?** **http://www.cyberscopie.info/pages/art_archives/art59_archi.html;**
- **The Future of Islamic Radicalism and Religious Freedom in Central Asia** **http://politicom.moldova.org/stiri/eng/23730/**

Thank you for your patient attention!

Welcome to non-violent and non-radical Central Asia!!!

Title: Forced Displacement Crisis in the Middle East:
Case of Iraq.

Walaa Hassan   **Intissar Al-Farttoosi**

MA students in Peace and Conflict Studies
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies,

The Middle East region had experienced a massive rise in numbers of war-induced displacement, considered to be a serious threat to stability in the region. The increase in human rights abuses and the escalation of armed conflicts was the reason behind it.

The presentation aims to draw attention to the alarming rise in war-induced displacement in the Middle East Region since 2006, as a result of the outbreak in Lebanon, cross-border conflict between Hizbollah and Israel, as well as the escalation of conflict in Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

However, we will explain more about the humanitarian crisis facing Internally displaced persons who are considered highly vulnerable, with more focus on Iraq case, describing the trends and causes of forced displacement in 2003 and 2006.

Displacement within and from Iraq remains one of the largest and most serious humanitarian crises in the world. "Over two million Iraqis are refugees, most of them in neighboring countries like Syria and Jordan. An additional 2.4 million Iraqis are Internally Displaced People (IDPs) within their own country".[1]

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[1] IOM, 2007 year review

Forced Displacement Crisis in the Middle East: Case of IRAQ

by

Walaa Hassan and **Intissar AL-Farttoosi**

Peace and Conflict Studies

MA program -

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Definition of Forced Displacement

- *Is the non-voluntary movement of a person in order to escape armed conflict, a situation of violence, violation of his or her right, a natural disaster, or a man-made disaster; This term applies to refugee movements and forced exchanges of populations among States.* [1]

[1] IOM Terminology- section 1.1

Internal displacement of armed conflicts:

- This definition include internal displacement, persons who are displaced within the borders of the country.

- It is estimated that 20-25 million people world wide are internally displaced because of conflicts, generalized violence and violation of human rights .

Internal displacement of armed conflicts(continue):

- The needs of internally displaced persons "IDPs" are similar to those of refugees in many respects.

- the dilemma of IDPs is worse than that of refugees.

Vulnerability of IDPs:

- Internally displaced people faced extensive threats to their rights and safety because of conflict and human rights violations.
- Children, women and elderly may experience psychosocial distress related to displacement.
- During conflict it is difficult for International and National organization to reach IDPs during conflict.
- IDPs problem still considered as a national concern, not recognized internationally, even the Guiding principals are not binding.

Internal Displaced Persons in The Middle East:

- In 2006 the massive rise in numbers of displaced people in the Middle East region, has made the issue of internal displacement an obstacle to stability.

IDPs Crisis in The Middle East (continue):

- The increase in human rights abuses and the escalation in armed conflicts caused these mass displacements of population across the Middle East.

- The situation in Iraq remains the largest internal displacement crisis in the region.

IDPs and estimated refugees in different Middle East countries

Country	IDPs	Refugees (Originating from the country)	Total Population (million)
IRAQ	2,000,000	2.2 million (UNHCR,July07)	26,70
Palestine	24,500-57,000	4,379,050 (UNRWA,March06)	3,70
Lebanon	216,000-800,000	100,000 since 12 July (Govt., 27 Aug06); 18,323 (UNHCR, prior to June 06)	4
Syria	305,000	12,337 (UNHCR, June 07)	19,04
Yemen	30,000 - 35,000	1,362 (UNHCR, June 07)	21,6

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center   www.internal-displacement.org

Causes of Displacement:

- In Lebanon 800,000 Lebanese were displaced during 2006 was a result of the outbreak a cross the border conflict between Hizbollah and Israel.
- In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, the renewed military operations and economic decline led to an increase in the vulnerability of displaced people, all of whom have also suffered from long-term displacement and conflict.
- In Iraq the escalation of conflict and widespread violations occurred in Iraq, where people suffered the effects of ongoing military operations.

Forced Displacement in Iraq

1. Historical background
2. Conflict during and after the war 2003
3. Movement of migration (outside Iraq) after 2003.
4. Movement of displacement after 2003

1. Historical Background

Iraq has along history of displacement. For many decades, human rights abuses, expulsion of citizens from their homes, internal and international conflict and war resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

2. Conflict during and after the war 2003:

- Military operations against Iraq (war 2003) and collapse of ex-regime.

- Terrorist groups after the war 2003

3. Movement of migration (outside Iraq) after 2003:

Due to the conflict during 2003 and after it, a wide movement of migration to outside Iraq has caused what is so-called "refugees". They are estimated more than **2 million** Iraqis in all over the world.

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* Estimates include recognized refugees, asylum seekers and other Iraqis who may be in need of international protection, UNHCR Sep. 2007

Iraqi refugees		Iraqi Refugees		Iraqi Refugees	
Syria	1.2-1.4 million	Sweden	23,600	Hungary	1,200
Jordan	500,000-750,000	Australia	11,100	Bulgaria	1,200
Egypt	Up to 70,000	Denmark	9,900	Austria	1,200
Iran	57,000	Norway	8,700	Greece	820
Lebanon	20-40,000	U.S.	19,800	New Zealand	820
Turkey	10,000	Switzerland	5,000	Armenia	460
Gulf States	200,000	Canada	4,000	Romania	450
Germany	36,200	Finland	1,600	Ireland	340
U.K.	22,000	Italy	1,300		
Netherlands	21,800	France	1,300		

4. Movement of displacement after 2003:

- Following the war 2003 a movement of displacement started inside Iraq from different governorates due to the military operations and insecurity.
- Escalating conflict due to the attack on the holy shrine in Samara on Feb 2006.

Comparing IDPs after and Before the events of Samurra

The difference between IDPs before the events of Samurra and after.

Below is the last figures of IDPs in Iraq on displacement after 2003 and after 2006 (MoDM, March 2007-statstics)

No.	Governorates	No. of IDP families from 9Apr.2003 17Feb.2006	No. of IDP families from 18 Feb.2006 29March2007
1	Baghdad	1225	20000
2	Muthanna	20	1712
3	Wassit	525	8931
4	Maissan	191	4820
5	Thi-Qar	567	5318
6	Basrah	124	4300
7	Karbla	471	8452
8	Babylon	1400	9000
9	Diwaniya	580	3105
10	Najaf	105	7151
11	Anbar	3000	6000
12	Diyala	99	7530
13	Salah al Din	3800	7500
14	Kirkuk	1050	1073
15	Nineveh	3000	6105
	Total	16157	100996

Conflict and movement of displacement

- It's quiet clear the conflict started in 2003 still has it's effects on stability in Iraq.
- The increasing movement of displacement is highly related to the escalating of conflict.
- It is a necessary to manage the movement of displacement and to find possible solutions.
- Displacement as a crisis should draw more attention internationally to find sustainable resolution.

Spotlight on Conflict and Displacement:

- Displacement in Iraq is more than to be an ordinary phenomena;
- Iraq as a community has diversity as Sunni, Shii, Kurds, Christians, etc.

THANK YOU